British antisemitism in the Second World War. by Kushner, Antony Robin Jeremy
BEST COPY 
AVAILABLE 
Variable print quality 
BRITISH iiI M SEMITI Shl IN THE SECOND V1ORILD VIAR 
By 
Antony Robin Jeremy Kushner 
Vv L. 'I . 
Department of Economic and Social Histcry, 
University of Sheffield, Ph. D., July 1986. 
To the E. S. R. C. 
"It is as if a physical scientist were told: 
'I want you to tell me whether I can find certain 
metals in the Antarctic. I forbid you to go there, 
or to talk to people who have been there; I shall 
give you no funds whatsoever for carrying out your 
research; and I want an answer immediately'. " 
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SUMMARY 
British Antisemi. tisrn in the Second World War 
This thesis examines both antiserni tism and Jewish- 
Gentile relations in Britain during the Second World V'lar, 
It argues that although hostility to Jews has rarely be- 
come violent, antiserniitism has still. made a strong impact 
on Anglo-Jewry and the whole of British society. Firstly, 
the thesis outlines a tradition of organized antiseiaitism 
which managed to survive the war and also helped to in- 
crease 'Jew-consciousness' in Britain. Secondly, it shows 
how hostile stereotypes of Jews continued, despite the 
close contact of Jews and Gentiles in the conflict, and 
the sympathy created by the plight of European Jewry, 
Thirdly, it analyses tensions caused by shortages of 
goods as well as other domestic problems that arose dur- 
ing the war and which led to Jews becoming scapegoats, 
Finally, the thesis suggests that antisemitisrn has not been 
alien to the British experience, and can indeed become res- 
pectable in times of crisis, as was the case with the intern- 
ment panic in the surnrier of 19110. 
The basic difference between British antisemitism in 
the war and that of Germany or France was the role of the 
state. The thesis illustrates how the British government, 
in principle, was opposed to antiseiaitism, but that this 
did not mean it was immune from hostility towards Jews. 
Indeed, its antipathy partially explains the feeble res- 
ponse to the crisis of European Jewry and the scale of 
alien internment. The continuation of British liberal 
democracy has put restraints on the success of' nti- 
semi tism - without being able to destroy. it, Antisemitism 
has thu: survived in Britain, putting a dual and contra- 
dictory pressure on Anglo-Jewry both to assimilate and to 
keep apart froi: i Gentile society, Tie net result has been 
to create an atmosphere unlikely to produce a healthy 
Anglo-Jewish identity. 
Tony Kushner 
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Introduction 
The horror of the attempted extermination of European 
Jewry in the Second World War remains a unique experience, 
not only in Jewish, but in world history. It is hard if 
not impossible to find a parallel, and as far as our under- 
standing of it, the Holocaust is "the unconquered Everest 
of our time". 
' Thus to compare British antisemitism in 
the years 1939 - 191+5 directly with the Nazi experience is 
quite meuningless; if studies of British antisemitism are 
to be valuable not only in analysing the security of the 
Jewish minority but also in throwing light on the nature 
of British society, they must be strongly rooted in the 
economic, social and political context of that country. 
Since the readmission in 1666, opposition to Jews has 
never reached the same level of violence as that-across 
the Channel. The state, though not necessarily sympath- 
etic, has refused to condone attacks on the Jewish commun- 
ity, a factor of great significance elsewhere. 
2 As Todd 
Endelinan suggests, Anglo-Jewish history "cannot be sub- 
sumed under the general category of Western European Jew- 
ish history"o3 In Britain, Jewish emancipation never be- 
came a major political issue, and when the final legal 
disabilities were removed in 1858 it was achieved without 
any loss of blood or indeed any great interest on the part 
of the British or even the Jewish population. 
4 
Does this suggest that Anglo-Jewish history must be 
studied in strict isolation from events elsewhere? The 
answer must be no, for although British Jewish development 
2. 
followed a different path from that of Continental and 
East European Jewry, there were features that were common 
to both experiences, and the impact of events abroad were 
to have their effects at home. With the issue of antisem- 
itism, there is little to compare in Britain with the Rus- 
sian pogrom or Nazi brutality, or indeed with the show- 
case trials in France (the Dreyfus case), Russia (the 
Beiliss case) or indeed America (the Leo Frank trial). 
However, this lack of violence, or prominence in national 
politics, does not mean that British antisernitism should 
be dismissed as unimportant. Gisela Lebzelter in her 
Political Antisemitisrn in England 1918 - 1939 has justi- 
fied her research by suggesting that "one cannot reduce 
the subject of antisemitism to its German variant alone if 
one wants to assess its rank with modern history in gen- 
eral", 
6 
yet it must be suggested that there are wider ben- 
efits from such studies; analysing antisemitism, which 
tends to cut across lines of class, intelligence, sex and 
age, can reveal much about the receiving society. 
The term antisemitism must be defined before going 
any further. The disreputable nature of being labelled 
an antisemite is well illustrated by the refusal of any 
of the leading anti-Jewish campaigners to accept the tag. 
7 
The word is of recent origin and has been credited to 
Wilhelm Marr8 who in a pamphlet in 1879 attacked what he 
saw as the Jewish domination of Germany. 
9 Marr differen- 
tiated antisemitism from previous attacks on the Jewish 
religion which he dismissed as idiotic, _ 
10 Uarr was con- 
cerned with the effects that Jewish emancipation was' 
3 
having upon German society and he defined antisemitism as 
being opposed to Jewish power. Marr's definition presup- 
poses the existence of a Jewish influence but his attack 
on Jews as Jews will be the starting point in defining 
the term, James Robb has suggested that hostility towards 
Jews, to be categorized as antisemitism "must be associat- 
ed definitely with the quality of being a Jew", and this 
study will follow Robb's definition. 
11 
There are many serious problems with this definition 
and they must be examined before it can become functicnal. 
Firstly, it covers possibilities ranging from polite tea- 
room type attacks to advocating and embarking upon geno- 
cidal policies. There is no room within this definition 
to solve the contradiction of those like Harold Nicolson 
who could write: "Although I loathe anti-semitism I do 
dislike Jews", 12 Nicolson's attack on antisemitism was 
not confined to his diary - he was active in trying to put 
pressure on the British government to do more for the Jews 
of Europe during the war. 
13 However, Nicolson's remarks, 
in suggesting that there is something in someone being 
Jewish that he objected to, must be defined as antisemitic. 
It is clear, therefore, that there are many types of anti- 
semitism and as Geoffrey Field suggests: "The qualitative 
differences between this (social dislike for Jews) and 
political anti-semitism should not be minimized". 
114 The 
term 'antisemitism' readily conjures up images of Nazi 
concentration camps, yet despite this, it must be used 
for many other forms of hostility to Jews. 
A second difficulty with defining antisemitism as 
Lf.. 
hostility to Jews as Jews is that historical events-do 
not always fit so cleurly within an antisemitic/non- 
antisemitic pattern. A good case in point, illustrating 
the complexity of the subject, was the dismissal in Jan- 
uary 1940 of the only Jewish member of the Cabinet, 
Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War. Few 
have gone as far as the champion of Jewish refugees, Col- 
onel Wedgwood, who suggested that Hore-Belisha was removed 
from office simply because of his Jewish origins, 
15 
yet 
the fact that the Minister of War was a Jew cannot be 
dismissed as irrelevant to the question. 
Hore-Belisha had joined the War Office in 1937 and 
had recorded in his diary that Duff Cooper, of the Treas- 
ury Department, had told him "that the military element 
might be very unyielding and they might try to make it 
hard for me as a Jew". 
16 Hore-Belisha's background, 
apart from being Jewish, was middle-class and there was 
much opposition to his appointment from Conservative die- 
hards, as well as from the Army, where colonial privilege 
had managed to remain undisturbed until his appointment. 
17 
Hore-Belisha immediately set about democratizing the Army 
and as if this was not bad enough, he carried out his re- 
forms without going through the 'proper' channels, further 
alienating the military elite. 
By the time of the outbreak of war the opposition to 
the Minister of War from the military and high social 
castes (despite Hore-Belisha's popular appeal) 
18 had be- 
come near-conspiratoriale On November 24 1939, Hore- 
Belisha summonsed Major-General Pakenham-Walsh, the chief 
5 
engineer of Lord Gort (Commander-in-Chief in France), 
" concerning weaknesses in the British sector. Hore- 
Belisha was eventually to be proved correct on the 
B. E. F. Defences, but his criticism lost him any remaining 
support he had in the War Office. After this incident 
Gort, Ironside (C. I. G. S. ) and the king's brother worked 
to get Hore-Belisha removed19 and on the 4 January 1940 
the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, told the Minister 
of War to resign, 
20 When asked for an explanation, the 
Prime Minister told Hore-Belisha that "there was a pre- 
judice against him", 
21 
and the latter interpreted this as 
being antisemitic. 
22 
Hore-Belisha's fears cannot be dismissed as those of 
an egocentric politician suffering from paranoia. After 
his dismissal, he was to have been offered the Ministry 
of Information, a position he would have suited perfectly. 
However, Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, vetoed the 
idea because he felt it wrong for a Jew to become Minister 
of Information, 
23 
and his Under-Secretary, Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, summarized the view of the Foreign Office: "that 
Jew control of our propaganda would be a major disaster"? 
A week after Hore-Belisha's resignation, Captain Ramsay, 
the antisemitic M. P. of Peebles, distributed copies of 
the 12 January 1940 issue of Truth to all M. Ps in the 
Commons, in which there were allegations about Hore- 
Belisha's financial activities, 
25 
Despite the efforts of Ramsay and Truth to give the 
issue a definitely antisemitic flavour, it is difficult 
to analyse how important the Jewish factor was in Hore- 
Belisha's dismissal. Had Hore-Belisha not been Jewish 
6 
and he followed the same policies, the opposition to 
him would still have been strong; the fact that he was 
Jewish made the situation even less tolerable. An exam- 
ination of the diaries and letters of Hore-Belisha's 
political allies and foes shows an acute awareness of 
his Jewish origins, and while it is wrong to suggest that 
he was dismissed because he was a Jew, it would be naive 
to believe his Jewishness was irrelevant to his re- 
movalo 
26 
The Hore-Belisha case poses several other questions 
about the defining of antisemitism. Captain Ramsay and 
Truth were not the only ones who welcomed the removal of 
the Jewish Cabinet Minister; the B. U. F's Action cele- 
brated the resignation of Hore-Belisha, "this little Jew 
who was inflated to become Minister of War in a time of 
grave national emergency". 
27 However, it was only a 
small, distinct minority who attacked Hore-Belisha's 
Jewishness so clearly. As John Higham has perceptively 
pointed out, referring to the terms antisemitism and 
philosemitism: "most people waver between conflicting 
attitudes and seldom enjoy an undivided state of mind". 
28 
Attitudes to Leslie Hore-Belisha illustrate this point 
clearly. Neville Chamberlain admired his abilities: 
"his courage, imagination and drive" and felt that he 
"appeared to have special qualifications" for the job as 
Minister of Information, yet the Prime Minister also be- 
lieved Hore-Belisha was "so impatient, ebullient - so 
Jewish ... "29 Sir Henry 'Chips' Channon M. P. was a great 
friend of Hore-Belisha through the 1930s and 1940s, a 
frequent dinner guest, who could none-the-less be des- 
7 
cribed by Channon as "an oily man, half a Jew., an oppor- 
tunist, with a Semitic flare for publicity" or as "'the 
Jew boy' bundling and self-important.... (yet) I am fond 
of him". 
30 
The ambivalence in attitudes towards Jews, where 
many are "both pro and anti-Jewish at the same time"31 
shows the complexity of the area, and the danger of 
relying too heavily on concepts such as philo and anti- 
semitism. It is indeed revealing that the image of the 
Jew in extreme antisemitism is only matched in its un- 
reality by that of 'the Jew' in extreme philosemitism. 
Todd Endelman has suggested that to 17th Century English 
philosemites "'the Jews' were little more than the per- 
sonification of some abstract religious idea or feeling, 
Like the negatively charged symbols of the Bea:: t and the 
Antichrist". 32 Stephen Spender remembers that in the 
Second World War he regarded the Jewish people in the 
concentration camps collectively as "sacred"33 and in 
1943 Ada Jackson in an award winning poem could describe 
the Jews as "manna-bringers, prophets, seers". 
St} It must 
be suggested that the vast majority of the British pop- 
ulation in the Second World War neither viewed the Jews 
as "timid mice"35 nor as a "dirty, stinking, lot of 
swine: nothing but a lot of parasites battening on decent 
people". 
36 Most people are much more irresolute, capable 
of complex and often contradictory views on Jewish mat- 
ters, as this study will reveal. 
Another issue that the defining of antisemitism as 
a hostility against Jews as Jews does not take into ac- 
count, is the highly controversial question'of the Jewish 
8 
role in the occurrence of antisemitism. Colin Holmes 
has suggested that to understand antisemitism, one "needs 
to take account of the interests and activities of both 
sides in the conflict equation"37 and to attempt to ac- 
hieve objectivity in the subject, this is important ad- 
vice. In the example of the Hore-Belisha case, it is 
impossible to understand the tension that arose without 
including the impact of the Minister of War's personal- 
ity. Hore-Belisha was at times brilliant and could be 
charming, but he was also arrogant and "aggressively 
tactless". 38 His democratization of the Army and his 
social origins had alienated the Military elite but it 
was his tactless handling of a difficult problem that 
was the catalyst in his removal from office. Had Hore- 
Belisha been a member of the Anglo-Jewish aristocracy 
and had he been merely a mouth-piece of the military 
caste (as was expected of him), it is possible that op- 
position to him as a Jew would not have been so promin- 
ent. To understand why the antisemitism towards Hore- 
Belisha became so intense one has to take account of the 
deeply held social prejudices in the War Office, but also 
Hore-Belisha's personality as well as his policies. 
Since the publication of Oswald Mosley's autobio- 
graphy in l96ß39 and more importantly, Robert Skidelsky's 
study of the B. U. F. leader in 1975,40 there has been a 
heated debate on the scapegoat versus interactionist, or 
convergence explanation of antisemitism. Uemories of the 
street fights involving fascists in the 1930s still pro- 
voke strong emotions and it must be suggested that the 
passion that the topic arouses has hindered a clear 
9 
understanding of the problems of both interactionist and 
scapegoat models. At its worst, the interactionist ex- 
planation can degenerate into a simple well-earned theory 
of antisemitism such as Mosley's own contention: "There 
is not the slightest doubt that some Jews began it (the 
'quarrel' with the B. U. F. ) in Britain", 
41 
or Skidelsky's 
explanation of why the B. U. F. became increasingly anti- 
semitic: "the attitude of Jews themselves". 
42 
Equally, 
with the scapegoat model there is a danger in Yinger's 
and Simpson's words that "it does not explain the direc- 
tion that prejudice takes". 
43 
A study such as Geoffrey 
Alderman's on the riots against Jews in South Wales in 
1911 shows the strength and weakness of a 'scapegoat' 
explanation. 
44 
Alderman locates the tension that existed 
in the South Wales Valleys in 1911 and suggests that the 
problems created by the coal and railway strikes led on 
to the antisemitism: "As has so often happened, the Jews 
became scapegoats for economic distress", 
45 
This con- 
textualising of the riots is vital in understanding the 
hostility, but Alderman suggests the limitations of the 
scapegoat model when he examines why the tension was 
channelled towards the Jews; as he points out: "The true 
nature of that (antisemitic) cause is difficult to dis- 
116 
cern". 
Colin Holmes, using an interactionist'approach, has 
also stressed the economic and social pressures operating 
in South Wales at that time, but additionally points out 
that "Jews (in this area) had special characteristics 
which made them visible"e47 The Jews' role as economic 
10 
middlemen, as landlords and shop-owners, must be taken 
into account if the disturbances are to be understood, 
suggests Holmes. In re-examining the case in the light 
of the recently released Home Office papers he puts fur- 
ther stress on the Jewish role in creating the conflict 
48 
There is a danger in going too far in this approach and 
over-emphasizing the role of individual Jews in pro- 
ducing the causes of antisemitism. The Home Office 
papers pay particular attention to the activities of a 
Mr. Joseph Cohen, a Jewish landlord in Tredegar. 
49 In 
these papers the Superintendent of Police in the area is 
reported as saying "that this Mr. Cohen is the man who.. o 
is, more than any other Jew, the cause of the anti Jewish 
feeling". 50 
Cohen's role in creating the conflict needs to be 
severely qualified in regard to this statement. He was 
probably the only Jew involved in blatant rack-renting 
and although some Jewish shopowners exploited the pro- 
blems of the local residents, they were no worse than 
their Christian counterparts. Despite this, "stories of 
financial dishonesty on the part of Jews were widely be- 
lieved in the riot areas". 
51 Cohen was one of the few 
Jews who was outstanding in abusing the local population, 
but the economic and social tension was so great, and the 
image of the Jew as exploiter strong enough, so that all 
Jews in Tredegar were attacked as Mr. Cohens. What is 
being suggested here is that the Jewish role does not 
need to be great for it to be taken into account. In a 
tense situation, the tiniest of half-truths, when com- 
bined with a powerful prevalent image of Jews, can be- 
11 
come significant. In the South Wales example, there is 
a strong need to examine what the images of the Jew were 
in Wales prior to the riots before a more complete ex- 
planation can be reached. 
52 
What does this suggest about the scapegoat/inter- 
actionist debate? It will be suggested here that the 
discussion has suffered from ill-defined terms. The 
'scapegoat' school suggests that the interactionists pay 
too-much attention to the Jewish role, and the latter 
that the former theory is one that suggests "that Jews 
themselves play no part in creating antisemitism". 
53 
Neither side really does the other justice. On the one 
hand, the Jewish role does not have to be very great to 
become important in a conflict situation, 
54 
and on the 
other, as Gordon Allport has pointed out: "Scapegoats 
need not be lily-white in their innocence". 
55 What is 
important is that the historian of British antisemitism 
(as well as other countries) needs to study not only the 
groups who attack Jews, but the Jews themselves, the 
economic and social background of the conflict and the 
image of the Jew in society. The continuous nature of 
antisemitism does not justify an ahistorical approach to 
the subject; studies need to be firmly rooted in the 
economic and social conditions of their time. However, 
it needs to be remembered that although there is a dan- 
ger of under-contextualising antisemitism, there is also 
a risk of over-contextualising. One can explain how in- 
dividuals or groups became antisemitic to an extent, but 
as J. M. Roberts reminds us, "something remains". 
56 One 
12 
has to also take account of the irrational, the unex- 
plainable, How else does one understand the contention, 
made throughout the war, that Hitler, Arnold Leese and 
other leading antisemites were controlled by the Jews? 
57 
With all these difficulties associated with defin- 
ing antisemitism as a hostility to Jews as Jews, should 
the term not be dropped and replaced by examining attit- 
udes to the 'Jewish Question'? 
58 The answer, I would 
suggest, must be no. Firstly, referring to the Jewish 
Question gives the subject an element of legitimacy. It 
has been pointed out that many leading British anti- 
semites rejected the word antisemitism, claiming they 
were impartially interested in the Jewish problem or 
question. Secondly, and linked to the last point, by 
using the term the 'Jewish Question", one is refusing 
to categorize attitudes to Jews. It is true that only a 
tiny percentage of the population can be regarded as 
having totally negative views on Jews, and that most 
people show ambivalence on the subject, but it does not 
mean that one should be afraid to use the term antisem- 
itism, even with those who can simultaneously attack and 
praise Jews (as Jews). It is vital to differentiate be- 
tween different forms of antisemitism; they will vary in 
their importance and implications. However, one must not 
totally lose sight of the connections of the various at- 
tacks on Jews. Ideas do not exist in social and econ- 
omic vacuums, and in the Second World War, many, such as 
Orwell, re-examined their own antisemitism in the light 
of Germany's policies. 
59 The late E. H. Carr pointed out 
13 
the need for historians to generalize, 
60 
and as a gen- 
eric term, antisemitism as defined as a hostility to Jews 
as Jews, will be a useful tool in analysing the various 
forms of reactions to Jews in the 1939 - 45 era in 
Britain. 
ltý 
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Chapter 1: British Antisemitism 1881 - 1939 
"The history of anti-semitism", it has been suggested, 
"bears the signs of being a seamless garment", 
1 
and any 
attempt at a chronological division of this subject in 
Britain needs to take this point into account. Antisemitic 
images and ideas are striking for their persistence, even 
when their original terms of reference have long since 
disappeared. 2 however, if on the one hand one must be 
aware of the continual nature of antisemitism, on the other 
it is important to distinguish between different periods of 
Jewish history. Reactions to Jews in world history have 
often followed a cyclical pattern - times of toleration 
or indifference following on from years of brutal persec- 
ution. The holocaust itself marked the culmination of a 
period of hostility stretching back to the 1870's, a 
period which could well be called the classical age of 
3 
antisemitism. 
The 1870's marked a turning point in the development 
of aritisemitism. On the continent, Jews were being 
attacked less for traditional religious reasons and more 
for their alleged national and racial influence. The 
organised antisemitic movement in Germany and the anti- 
Dreyfusards in France, linked the issue of Jewish eman- 
cipation to the growth of modernism, liberalism and 
marxism. 
4 Jews were seen as the embodiment of the enlight- 
enment, as the leading force of 'progress' which the largely 
c: conservative antisemitic groups rejected. Similarly in 
Britain at the time of the Eastern Crisis, Coldwin Smith 
questioned the policies of the Prime Minister Disraeli, and 
19 
at the same time attacked the political, social and 
financial influence of Jewry but denied any religious 
hostility on his behalf. ' Both a recent and a turn of the 
century historian of British antisemitism have marked 
Smith's campaign, which began in 1876, as the starting 
point of the new form of hostility to Jews in Britain. 
7 
There has indeed been a strain of opposition to Jewish 
emancipation in Britain of which Smitli was part, and 
which reached its peak with the 'Chesterbelloc' campaign 
surrounding the Llarconi Scandal in the years immediately 
before World Var h. 8 This tradition was strong enough 
to continue through to the second half of the twentieth 
century, through the medium of the journal Truth. 
9 
However, anti-modernist forces which demanded the reversal 
of Jewish emancipation never reached the level of signif- 
icance in Britain that they did in other European countries, 
and it was only with the influx of East European Jews in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century that the 
'Jewish Question' became an issue of national importance 
in Britain. 
The assassination of Alexander II in 1881 marked the 
start of the rapid exodus of the Russian Jewish population, 
approximately two million of whom had left by 1914.10 Of 
these over 100,000 came to Britain with peaks in the years 
1881-3,1890-3 and 1899-1906.11 Uliat was the reaction to 
these immigrants? At one extreme, to the pamphleteer 
Joseph banister, the influx of these alien Jews was part 
of a plot to destroy the British race. Banister attacked 
all aspects of the aliens' lives suggesting that "there are 
20 
black sheep in every flock, but of the alien sheep who 
12 flock here, about 99 per cent appear to be black". 
Yet Banister was exceptional in that his attack on alien 
Jews, and indeed all Jews, was totally comprehensive. 
Banister is one of the very few individuals who can be 
identified as a pathological antisemite in British society, 
and it is doubtful whether his privately printed pamphlets 
had any impact at all on the aliens' question at the turn 
of the century. Banister's importance lies in his 
13 
contributions to the world of extreme antisemitism - in 
the 1920's The Britons were publishing his works, 
14 
and 
as late as 1939 the Militant Christian Patriots were 
printing articles by him. 
15 Individuals such as Banister 
by contributing to extremist journals and organizations, 
help to establish an antisemitic tradition in Britain, and 
attempt to achieve legitimacy even though they are operating 
on the outside of mainstream society. Later antisemites 
can then refer back to earlier works such as Banister's 
and can claim credibility as they are operating as part of 
a tradition, and not as isolated mental freaks. 
16 This 
can be seen as a way of rationalising irrational feelings 
and to avoid internalizing the view of the outside worlds, 
which in the British case generally labels extreme anti- 
semites as miscreants. It is thus interesting to note that 
in biss 18B Advisory Committee, Oswald Llosley defended his 
antisemitism because he saw it as part of a long tradition 
in Britain and that "it is probably latent in the racial 
or traditional consciousness of a great many (Britons)". 
17 
Unlike the hysterical outbursts of Banister, most of 
21 
the contemporary opinion on the aliens' question is less 
easily definable as antisemitic. Much has been made of 
the unrespectability of antisemitism as a political tool, 
limiting its importance in the aliens' debate. 
18 However, 
whilst it is true that most, if not all, the anti-alienists, 
including Banister himself, denied any antisemitic inclin- 
ation, it does not follow, as has been suggested that "the 
question of antisemitism is irrelevant". 
19 The vast 
majority of the immigrants were Jewish and this factor was 
of some importance to many of the anti-alienists. 
20 It 
is significant that Arnold : bite, a social imperialist 
whose chief interest was the supposedly negative impact of 
Jewish immigration on the native stock, was largely 
responsible for the first organized anti-alien group - The 
Society for the Suppression of the Immigration of Destitute 
Aliens formed in 1886.21 This organization was short- 
lived but those which followed such as the Association for 
Preventing the Immigration of Destitute Aliens and the 
British Brothers' League had leaders who viewed the aliens' 
question in an antisemitic light. 
22 There is no straight 
forward relationship between anti-alienism and antisemitism, 
but the personal prejudice against Jews of many of the 
restrictionist leaders needs to be taken into account. 
The majority of the Jewish immigrants settled in London, 
and of these, 90; L settled in the East End. 23 The Jewish 
population of Stepney increased from roughly 40,000 in 1882 
to over 100,000 at the turn of the century. 
24 Such an 
influx was bound to create local problems, but with an 
unfortunate twist of fate, this alien expansion occurred 
at the time that middle class London was rediscovering the 
22 
'dangerous classes', and with them the forgotten East 
; nd. 
25 By the mid 1880's concern over lower class poverty 
was being replaced by a fear of working class insurrection 
and the East End came to represent the seriousness of the 
problem. 
26 Thus the aliens' question turned from what 
would have been simply a local issue to one of national 
importance. 27 
The East End in the 18£30's was suffering from an 
economic crisis consisting of cyclical and seasonal 
depressions aggravating a general structural decline in 
its traditional industries. On top of this, in the first 
six years of the decade 20,000 Jewish immigrants settled 
in the area, swelling an already under-employed local 
population. 
28 The only way the clothing trade, boot and 
shoe trade, and to a lesser degree, the furniture industry 
could survive was to cut their wage levels so as to compete 
with provincial and foreign producers. It was to these 
industries that the immigrants flocked, and the net result 
was an intensification of the sweating system, and a 
displacement of 'native' labour by the new arrivals. It 
must be pointed out that firstly, despite anti-alienist 
claims, the Jewish immigrants did not create the sweating 
system in the clothing, footwear and furniture trades, they 
"only reinforced this tendency". 
29 Secondly, although 
these industries generally saw a replacement of Gentile 
with Jewish labour, they would have declined further had 
new techniques not been employed. However, it is not 
surprising with the misery created by the depression, that 
23 
local working class feeling turned against the aliens, 
and on an organised level, that trade unions and socialist 
groups attacked alien undercutting. 
30 Equally, as most 
of these alien workers and their bosses were Jewish, it is 
not difficult to understand why an element of antisemitism 
was brought into the left-wing and radicals' campaign 
against the sweated industries. 
31 
The government, concerned about the condition and 
possible danger of the working classes, responded to this 
local feeling and in 1888 launched its first Se. Ik. c6 
CommiLLtx, --. on Alien Immigration and at the same time 
started an investigation into the sweating system. 
32 The 
results of these studies eased some of the fears concerning 
immigration. Lore importantly, the atmosphere of fear 
concerning the working classes gave way to a return of 
middle class confidence in the early 1890's. 
33 It is 
important, however, to remember that although the aliens' 
question ceased to attract much attention at the national 
level at this point, the issue did not disappear at the 
local level - either in the East-End, or in the other major 
immigrant settlement areas, such as Leylands in Leeds or 
Cheetham in Manchester. 
Immigration into the East End continued and briefly 
increased in the early 1890's as the Russian state applied 
more economic restrictions on the Jewish community. 
34 
What impact did the immigration have on Jewish-Gentile 
relations in the East End? In attempting to answer this 
point one needs to realise that the area in question was 
by no means homogeneous and that in reality "there were many 
24 
East Ends". 5 Moreover, one needs to be aware of the 
dangers that are inherent when generalizations are made 
concerning inter-group relations. Personality factors on 
both sides, ranging from extreme prejudice to total 
acceptance, could make a great difference to actual human 
relations, possibly outside the results that a simplistic 
categorization would lend one to expect. Hence in Robert 
Roberts pre-1914 world of Salford, the general antisemitic 
atmosphere (as a rule) precluded Jewish tradesmen entering 
the area. However, it did not stop Roberts's mother from 
helping and befriending a Jewish glazier, much to the 
neighbourhood's disgust. 
36 Similarly, although Bethnal 
Green was one of the most violently antisemitic areas in 
London (if not Britain) in the late 19th and 20th centuries, 
37 
it could also be host to harmonious relations between Jews 
and their Christian neighbours. Contact, whether in the 
form of the 'shabbos goy' or in other simple relations, 
could produce a corm-non humanity united by poverty, over- 
corning the barriers of religion and nationality. 
38 
However before the 1914-18 conflict, one of the most 
significant features of East End life was the lack of 
contact between Jews and Gentiles. 
39 A housing survey 
undertaken in 1899 revealed that Jewish and Gentile areas 
within the East End were clearly defined, with most streets 
containing at least 95; ý of one part of the community or 
the other. 
40 Such it development was hardly accidental. 
Jews came to the East End for a variety of i: easons, one of 
the most obvious being the desire to be close to fellow 
Jews and Jewish institutions. This explanation however 
hides some of the complexity of settlement patterns; it 
25 
was not so much fellow Jews as Jews from one's birthplace 
or 'landsman' that attracted immigrants to various areas 
or streets in the Last End. To talk of a unified Jewish 
East End, ignores the intra-ethnic conflicts such as those 
between Polish and Lithuanian Jews, 
41 
as well as ignoring 
the class aspects of the community. 
42 Indeed one of the 
attractions of the 1Fast End and other settlement areas in 
Britain has been the economic factor - the importance of 
finding work with Jewish employers. 
43 
On the other side of the equation, Gentile East 
London did its best to limit the Jewish population to its 
specific area in Vlhitechapel. To the south of Cable Street 
in St Georges in the East, the largely Irish population, 
would, in the words of Toynbee Hall investigators "have 
no dealings with the Jews and will not live with them". 
44 
Landlords in the area usually refused Jewish tenants, and 
the few iilmlij rants who did manage to find accommodation 
soon moved on, due to intimidation or actual violence. To 
the north of Vlhitechapcl, in Bethnal Green a similar 
reception awaited any Jewish trespassers, this time from 
the highly immobile indigenous population. 
45 In the 
comedian Bud Flunagan's words "Bethnal Green was a hostile, 
different world, Gentile and very anti-Jewish". 
46 
Even though there was friction between the two 
coimaunities, actual violence against Jewish aliens in the 
early 1890's appears to have been rare. 
47 It would seem 
that in the housing question a form of equilibrium was 
reached with the Jewish community keeping to its alloted 
area. ºlhere anti-alienisrn rianifested itself in this period 
26 
was over employment, typified by the Trades Union Congress 
which passed anti-alien resolutions in 1892,1894 and 
1895. On a local level, the 'native' hostility to 
48 
Jewish infiltration of local industries is well illustrated 
by the Bethnal Green branch of the rational Union of Boot 
and Shoe Operators, which put forward an anti-alien 
resolution to the London Trades Council in 1894. The 
resolution was defeated and the branch left the Council, 
claiming it was now dominated by "Jew cliques". 
49 Such 
antisemitic feeling; probably stopped many Jews from 
entering non-Jewish firms, with the hostility coming from 
employer and worker alike. 
50 
Despite the obvious tension over employment, no 
disturbances occurred and the antisemitic riots that hit 
the East End at the end of the century centred around the 
issue of housing due to a disturbing of the balance that 
had been reached at the start of the 1890's. Although 
Jewish immigration was at a relatively low level until 
1899, those that did come to the East End put more pressure 
on the already over-crowded Jewish quarter. This factor, 
coupled with an increase in rents (due to commercial 
pressure from the City in the west), created a sudden 
housing crisis in the areas surrounding lJhitechapel. 
51 
Local profiteers, both Jewish and Gentile, indulged in 
rack renting, and evictions of 'native' East Enders in 1897 
led on to the first housing riot around John Street in 
St Georges-in-the-Bast. 52 In June of that year over 100 
people were involved in a street brawl, and in the following 
years violence continued in St Georges, if on a smaller 
scale. 
53 A similar pattern emerged in Bethnal Green, 
27 
although there was a time lag of six years. Riots 
-occurred in 1903 with again 'native' displacement being 
the immediate issue with the erection of the Teesdale 
Street Ihvellings. The arrival of aliens into 'superior' 
new property created much jealousy, and the. violence of 
the street riots suggests the high degree of hostility 
that must have existed amongst the Gentiles of Bethnal 
Green. 54 
It was the animosity created by the housing issue 
that enabled the first mass-based anti-alien organization 
to be formed - the British Brothers' League (B. B. L. ). 
Formed in 1901, the League attracted its support from the 
East End, but significantly the grassroots of the movement 
never threw up any organizers, and as a whole the organ- 
ization suffered from the incompetence of its middle-class 
leadership. 55 Estimates of its membership vary from 1500 
(those who paid dues) to 45,000 (those who supported a 
B. B. L. petition). 
56 The former figure is probably closer 
to the active membership, though the latter illustrates 
the wider degree of support that the B. B. L. enjoyed in the 
East End. The ß. 13. L., like the British Union of Fascists 
(B. U. F. ) which followed it in the 1930's, achieved its 
highest degree of success in the areas around the Jewish 
area of settlement. Hence it was in districts where the 
threat, rather than the actuality, of Jewish settlement 
was seen, that the B. B. L. became popular. The Bethnal 
Green branch of the B. B. L. was the only one that kept any 
level of success throughout the movement's brief history, 
claiming 2000 members. 
57 Other popular areas were Hackney, 
Shoreditch, St George's and Poplar. The latter area, 
-despite the virtual non-existence of a Jewish population, 
was characterised by extreme anti-alienism, where the 
threat of an alien invasion was seen in a conspiratorial 
form. 58 
17hether the League can be viewed as antisemitic is a 
difficult question, and one that has elements of similarity 
with that concerning the B. U. P. Both organizations denied 
any antisemitic sentiment, the former group arguing that 
it attacked alien Jews as alien; and not as Jews, 
59 
and 
the latter that they attacked Jews for what they did, and 
not for what they were. 
60 
Such denials are a constant 
feature of those who have attacked Jews, 
61 
and if they 
were accepted at face value, the history of British anti- 
semitism would be a very short story indeed. However the 
very repudiation of antisemitism by the B. B. L. 's leaders 
is of significance itself. Although forms of antisemitism 
have made an impact on British society, and although social 
antisemitism has, at times, been perfectly acceptable, 
62 
pure political attacks on Jews as Jews have not been 
tolerated and are soon as 'unLritish'. Groups which wish 
to attack the alleged Jewish power are thus forced to deny 
any antisemitic bins, and those, such as the Imperial 
Fascist League, who have refused to veil their attacks 
have been relegated beyond the pale of political respect- 
ability. 
An interesting feature of modern Anglo-Jewish history 
is how groups antagonistic to the Jewish minority have 
used the state's fear of antisemitisrn to their own 
29 
advnntnge; claiming their interest in Jewish matters was 
not to create a Judenhetz but to prevent one. 
63 This 
became one of the most popular arguments of the B. B. L. 
leaders, especially one of its parliamentary representatives, 
William Evans Gordon. 
64 
This B. B. L. argument is a good 
illustration of the dangers of limiting the definition of 
antisemitism to straight-forward attacks on Jews as Jews. 
Antisemitic arguments are often subtle and complex. They 
can thus achieve a greater impact than if they were 
presented in a politically unacceptable crude form. Evans 
Gordon's argument was that a restriction of aliens was 
necessary to avoid antisemitism; the unwritten corollary 
of which vias that Jews themselves created the hostility. 
65 
However the B. B. L. 's antisemitism was not always 
presented in such subtle terms. Like the B. U. P. 30 years 
later, the League had no qualms in attracting the support 
of virulent antisemites, both in its leadership and in 
its ranks. There is little doubt that antisemitisni appealed 
to a significant section of the latter as the violence 
against Jews and Jewish property after the major Peoples 
Palace meeting amply demonstrated, 
66 
and whilst most of 
the B. B. L. 's leadership wished to avoid being labelled 
as racists, no one left the B. B. L. because of its anti- 
semitic tendencies. 
67 Indeed the first secretary of the 
B. L. L., '. dillir. ni Shaw resit*, ncd not over the Jewish issue, 
but clue to personality cl,. -lies with fellow leaders A. T. 
Williams and J. L. Silver. 
68 It is si(; nificant that Shaw, 
: iilliz is and Silver were all capable of making antisemitic 
statements concerning the aliens' question, though all 
denied any y such prejudice. 
30 
Pot all of the L. B. J,. 's spokesmen wore willing. to 
hide their attacks on the Jewish aspect of the problem, 
and Arnold :. leite, prominent in earlier anti-alien 
societies, used the Peoples Palace meeting to denounce 
what he saw as the "Je i ah financial domination of the 
, overnment". 
70 , leite': attack on Jewish power is not 
surprising in light of leis opinions of the 1890's, where 
after his experiences in l; tessis, he had come to believe 
71 
ill a Jeri! li world Coll spii ac, y. .. hat is maor"e interesting 
is the respect with which 4hi. te's views on iºmnigrntion 
were held, even by the government. 
72 Despite the extreme 
nature of ':: iiite':; J"ro3"k, he has Leeii described as "ý: 
>>opultu" polanhletce7"", whose Opinions were influential 
t! lnonl°ut ; uclc prolAinctlt politicians as lard hosebury, 
`.: here:, c repardles: of "; joui r, c: listic excesses". 
74 
the work of the al, ti;; elditic p; llilllhlcteei", Joseph i;. -; lli. star 
\7f'S "COn: 3]t'llefl to : feverish ]lilpotcnCe", 
fJ 
". Jhite, l: llo 
was equ, a. l.: º cai, ccylii: c' : Lout i.,. c: tl: lmut of l. Jc: c:: i., '. i 
consp: iiney, could be rec: cpteci ]iito the mctin:, tl"e^lil of Lriti:; il 
politicrl life. I ti: ould sllV£rc;, =t thut them vie two mnjor 
renSOllS for tl, is" :. ppOrcrlt : i_1lcoDU:. tcncy. Arstl, y, anti- 
r. t diff ci"c3zlt level. -, ill Society, 
modifying, or ciit;, "11i. siTlt" 
tllcii. 
" Vicw to : alit tllc: occasion. 
`l'liosc i111o , :: 'ilt11o1"it,. i"i 'ci". on; Liticz:, " ' ýý, t I: 
i. 11cvpnL"l c of 11 c.: i bili. t; r Ki. l to too the c: ompl(;:: itt of :, ut"11 
1. liC{iVi ciUL". 1L. jL' C1u(1"wctc: i":, : ">. ic11 w: iwlistci", i: ltovc: .: i=ti. - 
:; camiti ;, 11 Lil(: w no colltl"ol, ; "6 tended to the QutcYANI ; r%2 
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but were more of a do n(; er" to the Jewish community. 
77 
Secondly, : Ihite was fortunate that his %-: ork coincided 
with the anxiety over the 'national efficiency' problem. 
As a leading Social Darwinian, Tlhite's views came to the 
fore. 
Concern -.,. bout the condition of the recruits in the 
Doer Viar, coupled with the startlint; results of the 
Rova; tree inverti(; a! tion: into poverty in York, cave rise to 
the belief that Britain, os a nation, eras 'physically 
deteriorating'. 76This tirrts in turn connected to the 
decline of Britain's iridiuetrial supremacy, and thus 
reformers bed; tan to search for answers to the problem of 
79 l, ritain's national efficiency. ýocinl imperialism 
(the theory of exploitiri the British empire, so as to 
improve the living; standards of the working classes), was 
one popular solution put forward in the early 1900's, 
£30 
Find Arnold 1.1hite was to ciacrf; e as one of its lending 
propagandists. 
l:: l 
In D. period where social D. -a- ; illism vas rife, when the 
out epics movement was enjoying its greatest influence, the 
ntmosphere was favourable for the success of im migration 
restriction. Prom this, tiie importance of campaigners such 
as Arnold !; bite, 'dilliz! m Evans Gordon, Tbomas Dewar and 
llol: ard Vincent cwau to push the aliens' question from a 
matter of interest only in the East End, to one of national 
importance. It is important therefore, not to view the 
British Brothers League in i ; ol. ntion, but to see the complex 
threads, clhich via. orf°:: nizatiorºs such as the Londoner's 
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League, the Iruaigration Reform Association and, at the 
top, the Parliamentary Committee on Alien Iinmigratioii 
(P. C. A. I), which linked the Last End's populist anti- 
alienism to Westminster. 
82 Close links between the 
leadership of these groups made sure that pressure from 
the Last End tins channelled into parliamentary pressure. 
The anti-aliens, with Sir Howard Vincent as Chairman of 
the IFational Union of Conservative and Unionist Assoc- 
iations, could fully exploit the favourable atmosphere. 
AlthouL; h the aliens' question was "not in any way a central 
theme" of the first half of the 1900's, it did, via this 
anti-alien pressure, become one of the many issues of 
governmental reform. 
133 In 1902 a Royal Conuriission on 
Alien Immigration was set up and its re cormnendat ions the 
folloe; in¬; year became the basis of an Aliens Bill in 1904.84 
This was rejected, but a new hill in 1905, after 149 araend- 
rcnts was eventually passed by the Liberals at the end of 
the year. 
85 
The legislation was by no means antisemitic. 
86 Indeed 
it included clauses protecting the right of entry to those 
persecuted "on religious or political grounds". 
ßl However, 
it must not be for-gotten that those who had campaigned for 
it, from the B. B. L. to the P. C. A. I. were anxious to stop 
alien Jewish immigration, and that an element of anti- 
semitisia was to be found in the restrictionists arguments, 
from street meetings through to the Royal Commission 
itself. 138 
The Act, under favourable Liberal administration, made 
little impact on the numbers of Jewish immigrants entering 
Britain. In the years 1906-14 an averace of 4-5000 arrived 
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each year. 
89 If a few were sent back because of the Act, 
their numbers were few and indeed insignificant compared 
to the 17,500 cases that the Jewish Board of Guardians 
rejected in the 1880-1914 period. 
90 The importance of 
the Act was more symbolic, representing the end of the 
right of free entry into Britain. With the start of the 
war in 1914, immigration effectively ceased and the Aliens 
Restriction Act of 5 August 1914 put severe restrictions 
on alien activities. 
91 The intense anti-alien feeling 
of the war paved the way for the more severe Aliens Act 
of 1919,92 and thus by the time of the next Jewish 
exodus, from Nazi Germany in the 1930's, considerable 
barriers had been put in their way. 
Attention has so far focused on attacks on the 
immigrant Jew - the supposed threat to society from below. 
However, one of the unique aspects of antisemitism is the 
way the Jew is attacked in a variety of ways, which, if 
taken together, can often lead to a totally contradictory 
pattern. 
93 Thus whilst the Boer War acted as a turning 
point in the aliens' question, it also brought to a head 
another strand of antisemitic thought, involving the 
'Jewish threat from above'. The assault came from left- 
wing and radical elements in British society, who attacked 
what they saw as the undue Jewish financial prominence in 
South Africa. 94Antisemitism as a political weapon is 
often assumed to be a monopoly of the right, and there is 
a danger in under-estimating its importance and widespread 
nature by ignoring attacks on Jews from other sections of 
society. However, there is equally a danger of muckraking 
34 
- it is important to contextualise all forms of hostility 
to Jews, and this is vital in the issue of socialist anti- 
semitism, where we have wisely been counselled to "keep a 
sense of proportion". 
95 
It is in this careful light that one must examine the 
notion of a 'tradition' of socialist antisemitism in 
Britain. From Cobbett in the first half of the nineteenth 
century through to the occasional Chartist attack in the 
1840's (added to Marx's own views), one can trace a pattern 
of hostility to rich Jewish financier-capitalists, 
96 but 
it is a limited and sporadic one. Within this pattern it 
is important to take account of the role of individuals, 
a reminder that personal prejudice against Jews, whether 
due to social or psychological reasons, knows no political 
boundaries. Thus the virulence of the Marxist Social 
Democratic Federation's journal Justice's attacks on 
Jewish finance in the 1880's and 90's oNes much to the 
antipathy of its editor H. M. Hyndman, and other individuals 
such as John Burns. 
97 Justice in fact was-the only 
socialist organ to attack Jewish finance, in the 1880's , 
although at the same time it defended the Jewish immigrant 
in Britain. 98 One interesting feature of Justice's anti- 
semitism was the way it chauvinistically questioned the 
national loyalty of the 'Jew capitalist', despite the 
paper's belief in internationalism. 
99 
Any worthwhile discussion of 'rich Jew antisemitism' 
at the turn of the century has to take account of the 
significant role of Jewish financiers in Britain and 
specifically in South Africa at this time. 
100 This was 
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indeed the 'Golden age' of the Jewish financier, a view 
internalised even by the Jewish Chronicle. 
101 Yet what 
is of more importance is the manner in which the role of 
these Jews is distorted and manipulated into a conspiracy 
theory, which has no basis in reality. Thus although there 
were houses of Rothschild across Europe, it did not 
follow that they were in league acting as a super-national 
power, as some socialist organs were to claim. 
102 Their 
power was limited on the whole to their own countries, 
where it has been suggested that, "The French Rothschilds 
were good Frenchmen, the German Rothschilds, good Germans; 
the English Rothschilds, like good Englishmen, worked for 
peace and the balance of power". 
103 Equally in South 
Africa one cannot ignore the presence of financiers such 
as Barnato, Beit and Phillips, 
104 
yet there is an 
unjustifiable leap in imagination to suggest that these 
characters were acting as a Jewish cohort, rather than in 
individual bourgeois self-interest. 
It is this 'leap' that characterizes the nature of 
Justice's views on the Boer War, and to a lesser extent, 
other socialist organs such as the Clarion and Labour 
Leader, as well as radical critiques in the journal Truth 
and in the work of John Hobson. To Hyndman the South 
African conflict was simply, "the Jews' War in the 
Transvaal", 105 and his conspiracy theory went further, 
alleging that the press, "the Jew Jingo Gang", were control- 
ling British public opinion. 
106 Robert Blatchford's 
Clarion and the I. L. P. 's Labour Leader also had outbursts 
of rich Jew antisemitism in the latter part of the 1890's. 
107 
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However, it was only in 1900, under the influence of the 
writings of John Hobson, that the latter paper started a 
consistent, if brief attack on 'Jewish imperialism'. 
108 
After-1900 this rich Jew socialist antisemitism sub- 
sided. The reasons for this are complex but there appear 
to have been three major factors. Firstly, the campaign 
(with the exception of Justice) had limited roots and was 
specifically linked to the South African campaign, which 
after 1900 ceased to occupy the centre of the political 
stage. Secondly, it has been suggested that after 1900, 
with the impact of the Dreyfus case and with the inten- 
sification of Russian antisemitism, the left began to 
realise that antisemitism was a tool of reaction. 
109 
It is perhaps possible to overstress this point - it did 
not stop the occasional attack of rich Jew antisemitism 
after 1900, and also ignores the reactionary violence on 
the Continent and in Russia during the 1880's and 90's, 
which, according to this theory, should have discredited 
socialist antisemitism well before the 1900's. The third 
factor was that Jewish socialists within groups such as 
the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour 
Party acted as a check to antisemitism after the Boer War. 
110 
In short, the socialist and radical critique of the 'Jew 
financier' centred around the Boer War and after the turn 
of the century, lapsed back into a pattern of occasional 
attacks on the subject. 1evertheless it would be wrong to 
dismiss or ignore the idea of a tradition of socialist 
antisemitism in Britain, a tradition notable for its 
persistence rather than its incessantness. In the 1914-18 
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conflict both Justice and the I. L. P. sporadically attacked 
Jewish profiteers, and it would be revealing to know if 
the I. L. P. 's periodical antagonism to 'Jew financiers' 
manifested itself in the 1920's. It is interesting that 
Oswald Mosley's New Party and British Union of Fascists 
attracted support from former I. L. P. members such as 
Beckett and Forgan. Moreover, it has been posited that 
the fascist leader himself converted his earlier I. L. P. 
attacks on middlemen to his 1930's attack on Jewish 
financiers. 111 Whether Mosley actually learnt his anti- 
semitism from the I. L. P. in the 1920's is unknown, but the 
fact that the I. L. P. continued its occasional attacks on 
Jewish finance as late as 1939 and even during the Second 
World War, 112 would make it a distinct possibility that 
the same ideas were present during Mosley's period in the 
I. L. P. 
If there is a danger in exaggerating the nature of 
socialist antisemitism and of failing to contextualise it, 
there is also a risk of ignoring another strand of hostility 
to the alleged 'Jewish power', that from the radical right. 
113 
The National Review set up by Admiral Maxse and his son 
Leopold, was firmly in the Tory social imperialist camp 
and the journal became renowned for its Germanophobia. 
114 
Yet within this hostility there was another element of 
enmity aimed at German Jews, whose activities were viewed 
by the National Review in a conspiratorial light. 
115 Leo 
Maxse was convinced that there was a Germanic conspiracy, 
which aimed to see that nation controlling the whole of 
Europe. An international syndicate was at work in all 
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Europe's capitals, it was claimed and behind it all was, 
"that hateful figure the International Jew". 116 Maxse 
denied any antisemitic prejudice, 
117 
claiming he was 
only attacking a section of Jewry, but his attacks on 
German Jews before the First World War were representative 
of a growing antisemitic feeling in Britain. 
118 Maxse 
was perhaps unique only in that he saw German Jewish 
activities in a conspiratorial light, a belief that was 
to flower more fully in the National Review during the war 
itself. 
Other right wing papers such as Outlook, The Throne 
and Referee gave space to the conspiracy ideas of Joseph 
Banister and Arnold White, 
119 but the only other major 
organ to consistently attack Jewish power was the 'Chester- 
belloc's' Eye Witness. Founded in 1911 with Hilaire Belloc 
as editor, the paper reflected the latter's social prejudice 
against Jews, and also his fears of international Jewish 
influence. 120 Belloc's antisemitism had its origins in 
the Dreyfus case, and his French connections are another 
example of the foreign influence on British antisemitism. 
121 
Cecil Chesterton, the editor of Eye Witness from 1912 was 
even more extreme in his antisemitism than Belloc, and the 
following year Frank Hugh O'Donnell joined the paper. 
122 
The three formed a hierarchy of antisemitic thought, with 
O'Donnell, an uncontrollable polemicist, at the top. 
123 
Whilst there was disagreement about the 'Jewish question' 
in Eye Witness, particularly between Belloc and Chesterton, 
124 
there was a common fear about the Jewish influence in 
Britain. 
There is no doubt that by 1911, when both Chesterton 
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and Belloc had rejected the British party system of the 
day, that the two were eagerly seeking a British Dreyfus 
case so as to expose the Jewish corruption of the country. 
Belloc had created a fictional case in 1904,125 and 
Chesterton, "was looking greedily for a scandal to 
oppose". 
126 It is with this background that the Eye 
Witness seized the opportunity, offered by some apparent 
financial misdeeds, and launched the Marconi Scandal. 
127 
It is not necessary to enter into the history of this 
case, which has been covered elsewhere, 
128 but mention 
should be made of the fact that three of the principal 
characters involved - Rufus Isaacs, his brother Godfrey 
and the Postmaster-General Herbert Samuel were Jewish. 
The 'Jewish' aspect of the Scandal was of the utmost 
importance to the Eye Witness (which became New Witness 
in November 1912), and the paper quickly developed a 
conspiracy theory to explain the situation. 
129 It has 
been suggested that the fact, "that Cecil Chesterton was 
poisonously and notoriously anti-semitic does not affect 
the issue at all", 
130 
yet it was to the Jewish origins 
of the characters involved in the case that the Witness 
constantly referred. In understanding what remains an 
unsolved and complex issue, what is irrelevant is the 
supposed 'Jewishness' of the Marconi Scandal. As in South 
Africa there were Jews involved, but as has been pointed 
out, "such details do not clinch the claim that these 
individual Jews were working in a Jewish interest". 
131 
Neither the financiers in the Boer War nor those involved 
in the Marconi Scandal acted in an intrinsically 'Jewish' 
manner. 
110 
From the New Witness came the National League for 
Clean Government, formed in 1913 a direct response to the 
132 Marconi Scandal. The League continued the Chester- 
belloc campaign against Jewish corruption, although 
avoiding the use of blatant antisemitism. 
133 The League 
which in 1918 became the New Witness League 
134 
and after- 
wards the Distributist League (which continued till 1940), 
135 
has been seen as the 'missing link' in political antisemitism 
in Britain, covering the years from the demise of the 
British Brothers' League to the rise of British fascist 
groups in the 1920's. 
136 Whilst this perhaps overplays 
the importance of the organizational links of the League 
to the early British fascist movement in Britain, there is 
no doubt that the antisemitism of the Chesterbelloc circle 
is a vital strand in the tradition of British antisemitism, 
and that its prewar output was influential in the post- 
1918 period. It has been pointed out that Belloc's The 
Jews, 137 once seen as a British contribution to a 
European wave of antisemitism in the 1920's, 
138 
was in 
fact based on Eye Witness articles written in 1911.139 
Thus the Witness / Chesterbelloc conspiracy ideas bridged 
the pre-war to post-war period. 
If their campaign against 'Jewish power' was part of 
an antisemitic tradition linking one period to another, 
another of the Chesterbelloc's complaints against Jewry 
formed a connection between the two dominant pre-1914 
strands of hostility - that against poor Jews and rich Jews. 
To the Witness, whether a British Jew was of the first or 
twenty-first generation was irrelevant, for he would always 
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remain an alien. 
140 The solution to the Jewish problem 
was therefore to recognise the fact that there was a 
Jewish nation, and that a hyphenated Jew was a contra- 
diction in terms. In practical terms Jews should have 
Jewish names, live in Jewish areas and remain outside the 
British political system; in other words a form of 
apartheid. 
141 What this theory implicitly amounted to 
was a rejection of Jewish emancipation, of the freedom of 
British Jews to operate politically or economically in 
the wider society. Whether this aspect of the Witness 
campaign achieved much support outside their immediate 
circle is fairly doubtful, but it must be suggested that 
their conviction that Jews in Britain were somehow alien 
or foreign was one of widespread popular belief. This 
attitude continued to at least the Second World War, well 
illustrated by a Mass-Observation survey in 1943, where 
Jews were included in a list of 'foreigners'. Out of over 
a hundred replies, only one correspondent replied that he 
did not view Jews in that light. 
142 
To summarise the 1881-1914 period. Jews were subject 
to many types of hostility in these years. Nevertheless 
there were common features in the various forms of British 
antisemitism. Whilst the East European immigrant and his 
habits were seen as essentially unBritish, even the long 
established Anglo-Jewish elite, the so-called Cousinhood, 
143 
could not escape the alien tag. Similarly although there 
was little to connect a Jewish property speculator in the 
East End to a member of one of the Jewish aristocracy's 
banking houses, both could be attacked in Shylockian terms 
and their activities seen in a conspiratorial light. 
144 
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In considering pre-war antisemitism it must not be 
forgotten that this was the age of mass immigration of 
East European Jews, and that this influx created real 
problems. Equally, it was a time when the Anglo-Jewish 
elite achieved a degree of prominence in certain sectors 
of the economy that was bound to give it national exposure 
from time to time. The Marconi Scandal, the Indian Silver 
Affair and the Petrol Price Crisis, 
145 
are all examples 
of cases of financial and/or political irregularities in 
which some of the principal characters happened to be 
Jewish. To suggest as Belloc and others did, that these 
scandals, "were connected with an atmosphere essentially 
Jewish in character", 
146 
was a distortion which was based 
on antisemitic bias rather than on any factual evidence. 
147 
Some charges made against Jews in the 1881-1914 period 
would appear to be based purely on imagination rather than 
reality. The common accusation that the immigrants were 
unhygienic can be better explained by the xenophobic English 
belief that "anything foreign" was "dirty", 
148 
rather than 
inferior Jewish cleanliness. 
149 Others were based on a 
high degree of factual accuracy - the White Slave trade 
problem. Yet the way this last issue was twisted so that 
satanic images of Jewish sexuality could be connected to it, 
shows the importance and perseverance of Jewish stereotypes 
in British society. 
150 
The study of antisemitism can reveal much about the 
nature of society and thus is a useful tool for the social 
scientist. Yet at the same time one must remember that 
the immediate impact of antisemi. tism is not felt by such 
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theoretical subjects as 'liberal democracy', 'progress' 
or the like, but by the Jewish community itself. How 
far then was the Anglo-Jewish population affected by pre- 
war antisemtism? In the higher echelons, it must be 
pointed out that although there was social antipathy 
against Jews, this did not stop the elite from advancing, 
either economically or in high society. 
151 There was 
discrimination, whether in applying for fellowships at 
Oxford, 152 or in the City club or the country golf-course. 
There was bullying at Rugby or Eton, snobbery afterwards 
at University, but not all clubs discriminated against 
Jews and one could always choose another circle of friends. 
The impact of such prejudice can only have been psycho- 
logical, pushing the Cousinhood outside the Jewish world, 
or alternatively deeper within it. 
153 In the East End 
and other immigrant areas the impact of antisemitism was 
again more psychological than physical. True there was 
violence, whether in the form of the street riots of the 
1897-1903 period, or in gang warfare, or at the schoolgate, 
but then East End life was rough in itself. 
154 Anti- 
semitism, or the well-justified fear of antisemitism, 
caused the Jewish East End to close in on itself. Job 
discrimination and the fear of conflict led Jewish workers 
to seek Jewish bosses and thus the potentially hostile 
world could be kept at a distance. 
Antisemitism in Britain, with the rare exceptions of 
events such as the 1911 riots in South Wales, often 
developed in more sophisticated and subtle forms than 
other parts of Europe with their ritual murder accusations 
and bloody pogroms. The general subtlety of British 
laý 
antisemitism should not however blind us to its potential 
impact on society. As has been illustrated with the 
Aliens Act of 1905, antisemitism could operate, if in a 
modified, indirect guise. Time and time again it will be 
necessary to repeat for the Second World War period, a 
factor that was to be common for the period up to 1939, 
that "anti-semitism can shelter behind a different facade". 
155 
However, it will be necessary now to examine what impact 
the earlier world conflict had on Jewish-Gentile relations. 
The effect of war on a minority's position in society 
is often complex, making comparisons difficult if not 
impossible. 156 On the one hand external conflict can 
create internal solidarity as a society unites to confront 
a common enemy; 
157 
on the other wars create their own 
tensions out of the hardship that is often endured in them. 
The net impact of these two conflicting forces is further 
complicated by the fact that wars are often catalysts of 
economic and social change. A combination of these three 
elements can lead to a variety of results as far as the 
minority is concerned. A unification under patriotism 
could help a minority group adapt more successfully into 
the wider society unless the minority is seen as 
essentially outside the 'in-group'. In the latter case 
such patriotism could make the minority group even more 
vulnerable to attacks on nationalistic grounds. Internal 
tension is even more dangerous to a minority, for the 
demands of patriotism in a war often mean that there are 
limitations to the ways such tension can be expressed. 
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This in turn could make minorities more attractive as 
scapegoat figures. Finally although wars open up 
economic opportunities to wider groups in society (often 
those on the fringes of the economy - such as women, 
minorities, the disabled), and thus give chances for 
advancement to minorities that were withheld before, 
this very progress can lead to jealousy from those whose 
status is threatened by such developments. 
If these simultaneous equations were not convoluted 
enough, another factor can also come into play - the 
relationship between the minority and the enemy. In both 
World Wars in twentieth century Britain, this factor was 
to be of much importance in determining the British reaction 
to sections of the Jewish community. The 1914-18 conflict 
was marked in Britain by a feeling against the enemy that 
transcended mere dislike of the military opposition and 
became a general hatred of all things German. This was to 
have an obvious effect on those members of the Jewish 
population whose birthplace or even family origin was 
German, yet it is difficult to define whether their 
Jewishness was relevant in the attacks that were made upon 
them. 158 
In the early stages of the war a shop of a Galician 
Jew was attacked in the East End, 
159 
and in Manchester 
similar assaults on Jewish, as well as German shops took 
place in 1916 after the Battle of the Somme. 
160 In the 
latter cases it would appear that the violence was directed 
against these shops because of the foreign names of the 
Jewish owners, and in one example simply because the shop 
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owner was Jewish. This illustrates clearly how the Jewish 
community could be seen as essentially alien and 'unBritish'; 
a factor that was to become vital in the issue of the Jew's 
ultimate loyalty, in this most nationalistic of wars. As 
was to be expected the National Review intensified its 
attack on German Jews in the 1914-18 period, the war being 
seen by Maxse as an opportunity for Britain to throw off 
its 'German-Jewish yokel. 
161 The National Review with 
its extreme xenophobia probably reached its most popular 
level in World War I, but the impact of its theoretical 
antisemitism was insignificant compared to the violence 
that erupted in the centres of Jewish immigration in 1917. 
As Jewish apologists have been quick to point out, 
the Anglo-Jewish contribution to Britain's war effort was 
well out of proportion to its numbers. 
162 At the start 
of the war 10,000 Jews volunteered and by 1918,40,000 
others had been conscripted. Yet while the East End had 
by December 1914 sent 300 old boys from the Jews Free 
School and over a hundred from the Stepney Jewish Lads 
Club to the front, 163 the vast majority of the Jewish war 
effort came from the old established middle and upper 
classes, and comparatively little from the new Eastern 
European arrivals. 
164 On the one hand these latter 
potential Jewish recruits faced the hostility typified by 
Hackney Recruiting Station, where officers used phrases 
such as 'Lord Kitchener does not want any more Jews in the 
Army'. 165 This was possibly as a result of the long held 
stereotype of the non-fighting Jewish coward, possibly 
because of the loyalty issue. On the other, the recent 
Jewish arrivals, already traumatised by their experiences 
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in the Russian Empire, and the shock of emigration, were 
unwilling to sacrifice the limited stability they had 
achieved in Britain by enlisting in the army; a factor 
strengthened by their reluctance to fight on the same 
side as the Tsar. 
With the implementing of conscription in 1916 the 
issue of alien Jews enlisting came to the fore. A 
government offer of free naturalisation after three 
months service was largely rejected by the immigrants, 
only 700 out of 25,000 accepting the terms. 
166 The 
immigrant Jews not only were indifferent to the war; they 
actively opposed involvement in it. By 1916, a Foreign 
Jews Protection Committee (F. J. P. C. ) was formed, in 
response to the government's threat of deportation if 
voluntary recruiting failed. 
167 Tension in the East End 
grew throughout 1917, and local recruiting tribunals 
resolutions reflected the great hostility of the Gentile 
population to their Jewish neighbours. Claims that Jews 
were taking all the jobs and businesses while "the boys" 
were away fighting, were added to the accusations that the 
aliens were shirking their duty. 
168 By September 1917 
this tension turned into violence significantly in the 
Teesdale Street area of Bethnal Green, the scene of ugly 
riots in the peak years of immigration. 
169 A comparatively 
trivial issue triggered off an antisemitic stampede of up 
to 5000 people, and Jewish property as well as Jews 
(including three soldiers) were attacked. 
170 
It has been suggested that no antisemitic riots or 
pogroms are spontaneous; that anti-Jewish violence has to 
118 
be deliberately organised, 
171 
yet there is no evidence 
of any systematic planning as far as the September 1917 
East End disturbances are concerned. The very fact that 
a seemingly insignificant incident lead on to an explosion 
of public fury, suggests that it was the underlying 
tension between the Jewish and Gentile populations in the 
area that sparked off the riots, rather than the work of 
outside antisemitic agitators. The violence occurred 
when morale was at its lowest amongst the British people; 
victory seemed a long way off, shortages of everyday items 
were getting worse, domestic grief was growing as the 
horrendous losses at the Front continued and conscription 
was in operation. 
172 It is also significant that the 
outbreak was located at the edge of the main Jewish East 
End community, where friction was greatest and mutual 
Jewish-Gentile understanding at a very low level. Given 
the area's deep and widespread antisemitic tradition, it 
is not too surprising that the complex problem of the 
conscription of local Russian alien Jews came to be 
interpreted in an antisemitic manner, and the level of the 
violence would seem to reflect the growing domestic tension 
of 1917. 
It is important though not to see the East End 
disturbances in isolation, for the summer of 1917 also 
saw riots directed against the Jewish communities in 
Manchester and Leeds. Both these cities had a significant 
Jewish population by the First World War 
173 but it was in 
Leeds, which had a higher concentration, but a lower 
absolute number of Jews, that the violence reached its most 
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alarming levels. For two nights at the start of June 
1917, huge mobs entered Jewish areas of the city, attacking 
both people and property; violence that was undoubtedly 
antisemitic. 
174 As in the East End the alien military 
service issue was at the fore of the complaints against 
Leed's Jewish community - according to the Chief Constable 
only 26 out of 1400 alien Jews in the city had joined the 
forces. 175 Again the violence needs to be contextualised 
within the domestic tension of the period, and within the 
antisemitic atmosphere of a town that had recently received 
roughly 10,000 Jewish refugees. 
176 
Yet within the broad pattern of similarity between 
the Leeds and East End riots, there are also significant 
differences. Whereas it would appear that the disturbances 
in London were spontaneous, there is evidence that those 
in Leeds were partially organized, or at least, attempts 
were made to orchestrate them. The Chief Constable of 
Leeds shortly after the worst of the riots was quoted as 
saying that the riots were organized, 
177 
and contemporary 
reference was also made to the role of working class gangs 
in the antisemitic violence. 
178 Even more intriguing, is 
the possible importance of an antisemitic pamphlet 
circulating around the adjacent areas to the Jewish 
population of Leeds. Its title bears similarity to one 
of Joseph Banister's works and its contents included a 
provocative account of the low proportion of Jews recruited 
in Leeds. 179 
Whether or not gangs or antisemitic publicists 
managed to direct the riots remains a matter of conjecture, 
but it seems certain that the alien recruitment question 
50 
was the immediate reason for the violence. It is thus 
probable that the recently held Socialist Leeds Convention, 
which demanded a negotiated settlement and the setting up 
of Soviets, was the catalyst to the disturbances, bringing 
to a head a mixture of prejudice, frustration and 
misunderstanding towards the Jewish population. 
180 On 
the surface the Leeds riots bear a superficial resemblance 
to the Tsarist pogroms of the turn of the century - the 
circulation of inflammatory antisemitica, the role of 
mobs and gangs in the violence. Yet one must also be 
aware of the differences - the police while not over- 
sympathetic to the Jewish community were anxious to contain 
the disturbances and equally the state was anxious that 
public order should be maintained. 
181 If the police 
acted as an external form of restraint on the level of 
violence, there would also appear to have been an internal 
check; limiting attacks to property and to minor physical 
assaults. Whilst it is too easy to explain the lack of 
extreme brute force in British antisemitism to glib 
references to the British sense of fair play and decency, 
182 
it is vital to contrast the degree of violence in anti- 
semitic outbreaks in Britain compared to the huge bloodshed 
of the Russian pogrom. In explaining this difference, 
references to Britain's relatively stable liberal democracy, 
are far from irrelevant. 
183 
Finally, with regard to the events of 1917, mention should 
be made of the riots in Manchester. Until recently the 
memories of these disturbances have remained undisturbed 
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by historians. However it now appears that they are well 
on their way to being elected, to what E. H. 'Carr described, 
as a member "of the select club of historical facts". 
184 
Oral history and autobiographical reminiscences have 
recalled the violence associated with the Napoo Gang (which 
originated in the Ancoats district of Manchester), some of 
which was directly aimed at the Jewish community. 
185 Yet 
again the conscription issue seems to have been the under- 
lying reason for the tension, yet it is interesting that 
this causal factor was distorted to the extent that Jewish 
girls were attacked by the Napoo. It would appear that 
the tension created by national conscription lead this 
gang to seek an outlet, and thus a scapegoat was found in 
(mainly Jewish) girls who were obviously not available for 
military service. Ironically, the attacks of the Napoo, 
which covered the 1916/7 period, were finally repelled by 
a group of local Jewish soldiers in a pitched battle. 
186 
Despite their more limited nature, the skirmishes in 
Manchester are significant for it is only if they are 
considered that a total picture of the events of 1917 can 
be constructed. In each of the cases of East London, 
Leeds and Manchester there are common factors in the 
disturbances; all took place in areas of high Jewish 
population; hostility to Jews was ingrained in these parts 
before the riots; the violence occurred at roughly the same 
time in the war - when morale was at its lowest; and 
finally the issue of alien conscription played a major 
part in all three examples. However it was in Leeds, with 
the lowest number of Jews that the violence was at its 
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worst. Manchester with at least 10,000 more Jews than 
Leeds had only minor trouble, and the East End with over 
100,000 Jews in its boundaries could not match the passion 
and tenacity of the Leeds riots. In other words, one 
needs to be aware of the great dangers of attempting to 
directly correlate the Jewish role to levels of antisemitism. 
In the case of the 1917 riots one cannot ignore the problem 
of Jewish conscription, but it was local tensions and 
peculiarities that explain the degree of violence that 
took place. 
The Manchester riots are also important for the Jewish 
reaction to them, for they show rather than a timid 
acceptance, an organized and confident response to the 
antisemitic violence. This in turn reflects a greater 
integration of the immigrant Jewish population into British 
society in the 1914-18 period. It is significant that after 
the war in Manchester street gangs ceased to be dominated 
by racial or religious grounds and allegiances tended to 
be territorial as ethnic loyalties dissipated. 
187 This 
would seem to be a generalised model for the whole of 
Jewish-Gentile relations in Britain in the Great War. War 
created tensions that led on to antisemitic conflict, yet 
it also pushed the people together and helped assimilate 
the Jewish population. It has been suggested that in the 
East End "war had emphasised the difference between the 
East London Jewish community and the surrounding population" 
but it also "contributed to the gradual process of 
integration of the foreign Jews into East London society". 
188 
Thus although one East Ender remembers how in Stepney in 
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the 1914-18 period, gentiles "didn't treat 'em (the Jews) very 
well" , 
189 
another recalled that "I was glad of them 
when the war was on". 
190 
However the war did not only bring positive results 
to the Anglo-Jewish community, it also brought its special 
tensions and general xenophobia which proved to be fertile 
ground for the development of conspiracy theories. Indeed 
it has been convincingly argued that the Balfour Declaration 
of 1917 was an attempt by the British government to appease 
what was seen as the great power of world Jewry, and to 
win it over to the British war effort. 
191 It has already 
been commented on how the war acted as a stimulus to the 
National Review's concern about German-Jewish power; yet 
besides the internal growth of fear, it was the external 
event of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 that provided 
the nourishment that allowed the idea of a Jewish world 
conspiracy to reach its maturity in Britain. However, 
whilst it was the upheaval in Russia in 1917 that created 
an atmosphere that was conducive for the acceptance of 
conspiracy ideas in post-war Britain, it is not possible 
to explain how Jews were immediately identified with the 
Revolution and world plots, without reference to an 
earlier British tradition that viewed Jewish activities 
in a conspiratorial light. 
192 
The stereotype of the Jew as an anarchist or Communist 
revolutionary was one that appeared sporadically in the pre- 
1914 period, 
193 
even if it was not as powerful an image 
as the Jew as alien or Shylock. It was the alleged Jewish 
involvement in the Russian Revolution that brought the Jew 
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as Communist caricature to the fore; an image that was to 
last till the post-1945 period. That many prominent 
Bolsheviks were of Jewish origin cannot be denied, 
194 
yet 
this involvement needs to be contextualised. These Jews 
had rejected their religious roots; most Bolsheviks were 
not Jews; and finally many Russian Jews were opposed to the 
Bolsheviks and suffered in the Revolution. Ultimately in 
no sense can the whole Revolution be regarded in any sense 
as 'Jewish' in its ideology or in the direction which 
it took. 
In considering the alarming expansion of fears about 
Jewish conspiracy in post-1918 Britain it is vital to 
differentiate between the degrees of concern over Jewish 
power. Whilst the Morning Post, the respectable organ of 
High Toryism, under the influence of its Russian corres- 
pondent Victor Marsden linked Jews with Bolshevism and 
international finance, it was not willing to accept the 
idea of a planned total world conspiracy uncritically. 
195 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Russian forgery 
which outlined such a plan, was circulating in Britain by 
1920 as The Jewish Peril, 
196 but the Morning Post was not 
convinced that the book was genuine. 
197 However, prominent 
members of this paper were willing to accept that certain 
Jews had acted through the centuries in a conspiratorial 
manner, making a large impact on international developments, 
even if a total plan did not exist. This modified version 
of a conspiracy theory was also published in 1920 as 
The Cause of World Unrest. 
198 The authors of this work; 
Ian Colvin, H. A. Gwynne and Vesta Webster linked the all- 
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powerful 'International Jewry' to Germany, a position 
similar to that of Leo Maxse's National Review. To these 
Germanophobes, the International Jew wanted Bolshevism to 
survive in Russia so that Germany would be allowed a freer 
role in post-war developments. 
199 Yet even Maxse stopped 
short of belief in The Protocols, stating that he regarded, 
"the Pan-German issue as greater than the Jewish issue, and 
the latter as agents of the Pan-German rather than the Pan- 
German as the agents of the Jews". 
200 
Whilst those who adopted a total conspiracy theory - 
that all events in past and present history were controlled 
by Jews, were rare, this cannot be said for those 
harbouring deep fears about Jewish power in society in the 
immediate post-war years. Tory 'Die Hard' thinking to be 
found not only in the National Review but also in The 
Spectator, the Morning Post and The Times, reveals a super- 
patriotic anti-Bolshevism that easily encompassed fears 
about Jewish power. Characters such as Lord Croft, the 
Duke of Northumberland and Lord Sydenham all linked by the 
National party, along with Leo Maxse represented a strain 
of right-wing Conservative thought that although still 
impeccably respectable, was becoming increasingly anachron- 
istic. 201 Fearful of the post-war world and its 
increasing radicalism at home and abroad, the 'International 
Jew', whether as Bolshevist, financier or Indian admin- 
istrator, came to represent to this group all that was 
wrong with society. As has been pointed out, they may 
not have made much impact on Conservative policy, but their 
ideas, via the organs they controlled, reached a very large 
audience. 
202 
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The Protocols may have fuelled fears of Jewish power, 
just as belief in the latter gave credence to the former,. 
yet one needs-to keep a very strong sense of proportion 
in dealing with their post-war influence in Britain. 
Although the arrival of The Protocols in Britain created 
a significant stir in 1920, few accepted their genuineness 
uncritically. When a year later The Times exposed them 
as forgeries, 
203 their direct use was to be found only 
on the outside of mainstream politics. After the heated 
debates of 1920, the 'Jewish Peril' ceased to be a matter 
of national interest throughout the rest of the decade. 
However, although the political atmosphere was not conducive 
to the success of Jewish conspiracy ideas, as the immediate 
post-war fear of revolution calmed down, The Protocols did 
not disappear from Britain. 
The fact that this was not allowed to happen was due 
to the activities of several fringe groups and organs. 
They were self-conscious, of what they saw as the importance, 
of keeping Britain alive to the danger of the Jewish 
Conspiracy. It is for this reason that an organization such 
as The Britons, formed in 1919,204 which might otherwise 
have been relegated to the dustbin of history, assumed some 
importance. The Britons were unique in the 1920's in that 
their organization was geared exclusively to an attack on 
the Jewish menace in society. 
205 Apart from publishing 
leaflets with a circulation of 2000, and a variety of short- 
lived journals-with a more limited appeal of 150,206 The 
Britons main task was to publish The Protocols. Up to the 
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end of 1922 over 4000 copies had been sold, yet in the 
next 8 years and 4 editions later, only 490 more were 
purchased. 
207 These figures give an indication of the 
limitations to the extreme antisemitic world in Britain. 
In comparison to other parts of Europe, or indeed in 
America, where Henry Ford was distributing the message 
of The Protocols in papers with a circulation in the 
100,000's, 208 the British total pales into insignificance. 
Yet The Britons, with their crude racial antisemitism, 
were not alone in warning about The Protocols in the 1920's. 
If one were to locate the antisemitism of The Britons, 
it would surely be found in the gutter, but this could 
certainly not be said of its fellow conspiracy hunter - 
The Patriot. Formed in 1922, a year after its sister 
organization, the Boswell Publishing Company, this journal 
(funded by the Duke of Northumberland), aimed at the 
drawing room and the gentleman's club. After the 
209 
death of the National Party, The Patriot remained one of 
the last bastions of Tory die hard thinking. Its patriotic 
defence of Empire and paranoia over Socialism invited a 
conspiratorial antisemitism to enter its columns, though 
this by no means totally dominated the paper, as was the 
case with The Britons. The Patriot shared The Briton's 
obsession with The Protocols, but the former's discussion 
of Jewish conspiracies was at a less hysterical, and more 
critical level. 
The Patriot is significant for several reasons. 
Firstly, the literature of extreme antisemitism in Britain 
has tended to be of low physical quality, often being no 
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more than cyclostyled sheets, und therefore reinforcing 
its underground, deviant image. In contrast, The Patriot 
gave the surface appearance of being a mainstream weekly. 
210 
Not only was it well produced, but its lifespan, at 25 years, 
was much longer than similar antisemitica. Heavily 
subsidised by its founder in the 1920's, and Lady Houston 
in the 1930's, The'Patriot found itself distributed (free 
of charge), into upper-middle class institutions, 
211 
and 
thus its message reached more of an audience than its 
undoubtedly limited circulation would suggest. 
212 However, 
despite the organ's respectability, it would be unwise to 
overestimate The Patriot's influence, which must be seen 
in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. This 
brings us to the second point - the role of The Patriot as 
a clearing house for genteel antisemites. Apart from 
swapping ideas within the paper's columns, readers and 
contributors could meet at The Patriot's London offices, 
which functioned more or less as a club for an antisemitic 
coterie in British society. 
213 
In this way The Patriot, which survived until after 
the Second World War helped to preserve and encourage 
Britain's antisemitic tradition. On an organisational 
level, the paper helped to launch the first Fascist 
organisation in Britain - the British Pascisti. 
214 This 
was a group that, despite its radical title, shared a 
similar ideology to that contained in The Patriot - super- 
patriotism and anti-Bolshevism mixed with a healthy dose 
of conspiratorial antisemitism (and a distinct luck of 
fascist ideology). 215 Oscar Boulton and Nesta Webster were 
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just two of the individuals prominent in both The Patriot 
and the British Fascisti. However, The Patriot not only 
served to unite those already interested in 'the Jewish 
Question', it also acted as a springboard for future 
activists. As we shall see later, at least 2 prominent 
antisemites of the Second World War were weaned on The 
Patriot in the 1920's. 216 
Thus organizations such as The Britons, the British 
Fascisti and papers such as The Patriot kept alive anti- 
semitic ideas which might have faded into total obscurity 
had they not existed. While the tide was definitely against 
them in the 1920's, they were not totally isolated. The 
arguments of The Patriot could be found in a similar form 
in the journals of the British Empire Union and the 
National Citizens Union. All these groups were largely 
a response to post-war fear of Bolshevism, and with 
parallel roots, the Social Credit movement emerged in the 
early 1920's. 
217 Attacking finance capitalism as well 
as Bolshevism, Major Douglas's organization, lacking a 
coherent theory, turned to The Protocols to fill its 
intellectual gap. 
218 Likewise, the Catholic distributist 
movement identified the International Jew as responsible 
for the twin evils of capitalism and socialism. 
219 Taken 
individually these groups amounted to little, together 
they at least ensured that those susceptible to conspiracy 
ideas could find an outlet. 
It has been suggested that after the immediate post- 
war scares, the 1920's were not conducive to the success 
of antisemitism. Why was this the case? On the one hand 
I would argue that apart from the General Strike in 1926, 
60 
the decade was relatively stable at an economic, social 
and political level. 
220 On the other, Jews, after the 
flurry of excitement concerning The Protocols ceased to 
be a matter of national interest. The mass immigration 
from Eastern Europe had effectively ended, the 1919 Aliens 
Act ensuring that the pre-war flood became a post-war 
trickle. 221 Moreover, those who had arrived before 1914 
had become much more integrated into the wider community. 
As has been suggested, the dilemma for the Jewish community 
after 1918 was no longer to instil Anglicization but to 
promote and preserve its Jewishness. 
222 
The war ultimately acted as a*force that pushed the 
immigrant Jewish population to interact with the wider 
society. By 1918, in the East End, Jewish workers had 
generally become integrated into local labour matters, 
223 
and this was also the case in municipal politics. 
224 The 
1920's certainly saw improved Jewish-Gentile relations in 
areas of high Jewish settlement, though perhaps autobio- 
graphical reminiscences paint too rosy a picture of the 
period. 
225 There has been a tendency to suggest that only 
the outside influence of the British Union of Fascists 
spoilt the Jewish-Gentile harmony of the post-war period; 
226 
obscuring the fact that tensions still existed between the 
two communities before Mosley's incursions. into the East 
End. On a political level, the actual integration of 
Stepney Jews into municipal affairs created its own 
problems, as their largely left-wing stance clashed with 
Irish Catholic 'Labourism'. This inter-ethnic conflict was 
to last well into the 1930's. 
227 Discrimination against 
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employing Jewish workers did not disappear either. 
228 
These significant reservations apart, allowance must still 
be made for a better understanding between Jews and non- 
Jews in areas where contact was frequent. Perhaps the 
situation is best illustrated by the late East End 
communist, Joe Jacobs. After having described the Jewish 
East End in the 1920's as a ghetto with "frontiers", 
229 
Jacobs qualified himself: "the 'frontiers' which I have 
described could not have been so sharply defined. These 
'frontiers' got very blurred and in some instances did 
not exist. Jews and 'Yoks' mixed quite freely in several 
kind of activities. " 
230 Jews if still to some extent 
different, were most definitely equal. 
Was this increased toleration true of British society 
as a whole? It has been suggested that this was not the 
case, and that in fact the publication of Hilaire Belloc's 
The Jews, and the arrival on stage of John Galsworthy's 
Loyalties, marked in Britain part of a wave of Continental 
antisemitism. 
231 A close examination of both the 
arguments and the receptions of these works will allow a 
critical appraisal of this latter claim, and will also 
provide some information on the general state of Jewish- 
Gentile relations in the 1920's. 
The ultimate message of both Belloc and Galsworthy 
was that the Jew will always remain an outsider in British 
society - the 'Anglo-Jew' was an impossibility. However, 
whilst Galsworthy simply stated this perceived dilemma, 
Belloc was prepared to go further. Following his pre-war 
Witness articles, Belloc was to suggest that as Jews would 
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always be aliens, that this should be recognised in a 
system of apartheid. To Belloc the situation was urgent 
and there were two answers to the 'Jewish problem': 
elimination or segregation: "There is no other way. " 
232 
Belloc introduced a new element in The Jews to his 
pre-war writings, that of the Jew as Bolshevik. Although 
Belloc firmly rejected The Protocols, to him the Russian 
Revolution, like the Panama and Marconi Scandals, was 
"essentially Jewish in character". 
233 Unless the world 
came to recognise the Jewish problem - the power of the 
essentially alien Jew in society, and tried to deal with 
it in a legalistic fashion, then violence would take over. 
How far were Belloc's ideas accepted in British 
society? Unfortunately the historian of the 1920's is not 
blessed with the public opinion surveys that were soon to 
arrive in Britain from America. Nevertheless some 
tentative conclusions can be made. First of all, as Belloc 
pointed out, the British public were "reluctant to consider" 
the Jewish question. 
234 Jewish matters were not seen as 
a vital issue, and The Jews did little to change this 
state of affairs. The book did receive some favourable 
reviews, but these came from predictable sources, such as 
The Spectator. 235 Belloc, himself, was disappointed at 
the lack of attention and the general unfavourable reception 
the book received. 
236 Whilst many may have shared Belloc's 
belief that Jews were aliens or foreigners, or that Jews 
were powerful in international finance or socialism, few 
were interested enough in the subject to contemplate the 
use df legislation to control Jews in British society. 
63 
Social prejudice against Jews, as outlined in 
Loyalties was fairly widespread in post-1918 Britain; 
237 
objections to nouveau-riche Jews to be found in the works 
of both T. S. Eliot and D. H. Lawrence, counting for a large 
part of this snobbery. 
238 However, this feeling was not 
translated into political terms, and it certainly did not 
reach the proportions, in either literary or social terms, 
that it did in America. 239 Another author whose prejudice 
against Jews has been a source of embarrassment to his 
later admirers is John Buchan. One commentator in excusing 
Buchan has suggested that before Hitler "(British) Men were 
normally anti-semitic, unless by some quirk of temperament 
or ideology they happened to be philo-semitic". 
240 This 
sweeping statement makes no allowance for the ambivalence 
of attitudes that most people hold on Jewish matters, 
241 
242 Buchan being no exception in this matter. Negative 
attitudes may have been common, such as Virginia Woolf's 
comments on "(Jewish) nasal voices, and their oriental 
jewellery", but they were often mixed with admiration such. 
as the same author's love of their "immense vitality". 
243 
Stereotypes may have persisted throughout the 1920's, 
but for the most part, the British public was not too 
concerned about Jewish matters. The Board of Deputies 
reported a decline in antisemitic references from 1925 till 
the end of the decade. 
244 Even the domestic crisis of the 
1926 General Strike does not appear to have triggered off 
any latent antisemitism, despite the efforts of The Britons 
to inject such a flavour. 
245 Indeed perhaps the favourable 
atmosphere of the middle years of the 1920's is best 
6Lj. 
illustrated by the formation in 1927 of the Society of 
Jews and'Christians. 
246 This movement was not aimed at 
proselytization, indeed quite the reverse, its goal was 
a mutual understanding of the two faiths based on a 
respect for a shared heritage. However, it would be 
dangerous to leave the 1920's purely on a note of 'light 
and rejoicing'. 
247 The lack of prominence of antisemitism 
in British society did not mean its absence, as the question 
of deportation of aliens illustrates. 
Anglo-Jewish immigration matters are assumed to dis- 
appear from importance in 1914, not to revitalise till 
1933. However, in between these dates as one Jewish 
official put it "the fear of deportation hangs over the 
whole alien community". 
248 Allegations were made that 
antisemitic bias affected Home Office decisions on deport- 
ations. Given the fact that 11. Joynson-Hicks, the Home 
Secretary, and his assistants were not known for their 
love of the Jewish people, such accusations were by no 
means far-fetched. 
249 Also if 1927 saw the founding of 
the Society of Jews and Christians, it is ironic that just 
a year later as the Imperial Fascist League was created. 
250 
The League's swastika emblem was a foretaste of what was 
to be a less secure decade for Britain's Jewish community. 
In purely political terms 1933 was not a year of great 
significance in Britain as it was in Germany or America. 
Yet for Britain's Jewish population it became an important 
turning point both at home, with the creation of the 
British Union of Fascists, and abroad with the Nazi seizure 
of power. At the start of 1933 unemployment had risen to 
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well over 3 million, just less than one quarter of the 
British workforce. 
251 Although a 'National' government 
was in power, the apparent consensus needs to be qualified 
by the growth of extremism on both sides of the political 
spectrum. 
Before examining the relationship between the B. U. F. 
and antisemitism, it needs to be pointed out that prior 
to the major launching of its attack on Jewry, that the 
"Jews" were already "in the news". 
252 To a lesser extent, 
events in Palestine, but more importantly the wave of anti- 
semitism, headed by Hitler, that had spread across Europe 
made Britain "Jew conscious". 
253 By the end of the. 
decade this 'consciousness' had reached an even higher 
level of intensity, a situation for which Sir Oswald 
Mosley's organization can take some of the credit. 
In his 18 B Advisory Committee interview in July 1940 
Mosley claimed that he used to think that "anti-semitism 
was for half-wits", and that the social discrimination 
against Jews that was practised in his childhood home was 
"stupid". 254 Indeed there is no evidence that antisemitism 
played any role whatsoever in Mosley's early career. 
255 
However, as has already been suggested, Mosley and several 
of his followers could well have adopted an antipathy to 
International Jewish Finance from his I. L. P. days. 
256 It 
is perhaps partly this influence that explains the anti- 
semitism that existed even in the New Party, 
257 
and also 
Mosley's intention to attack "international Jewish bankers" 
in his first B. U. F. publication. 
258 In other words, we 
need to recognise that antisemitism was not something that 
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was later attached to the B. U. F., it was present from the 
start. 
259 
Having said that, it is also important to realize 
that antisemitism varied in significance on the B. U. F. 's 
programme from 1933-1940. After the restraint that the 
Rothermere alliance imposed on the movement's antisemitism 
disappeared in mid 1934, an increase in hostility can be 
perceived. At an Albert Hall meeting in October 1934, 
Mosley launched his attack on "the power of organized Jewry", 
seen by one commentator as a decision "to become an anti- 
semitic movement". 
260 Such an analysis simplifies the 
complex reality of the internal dynamics of B. U. F. politics, 
and perhaps more significantly suggests a unity of purpose 
that never existed in the movement. 
It has been claimed that before the B: U. F. was launched 
Mosley stated that the movement needed a scapegoat and that 
scapegoat was to be the Jews. 
261 Whilst the claim might 
be true, the possible implications of it, that Mosley's 
antisemitism was 111001%0 insincere", 
262 
must be totally 
rejected. Rather than a cynical manipulator of antisemitic 
prejudices, Mosley was liable to let his emotions get the 
better of him on Jewish matters. As he himself admitted 
"one did sometimes get carried away in the heat of 
speeches". 
263 Gutter antisemitism can be found in the 
B. U. F. leader's meetings well before October 1934.264 Yet 
despite these qualifications it is evident that the B. U. F. 
did concentrate to an increasing extent on Jewish matters 
after late 1934. 
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This has been seen as a scapegoat function - the B. U. F. 
leadership realizing it had failed, and therefore turning 
on the Jews as "a tangible object for projection and an 
outlet for frustration". 
265 There is an element of truth 
in this explanation; for the public ending of the Rother- 
mere connection doomed the B. U. F. as a national force in 
British politics, 
266 to a group engaged in only a 
sectional dispute. However, rather than seeing this move 
to attacking Jews in purely scapegoat terms, it is more 
revealing to realize that the strong influence of Social 
Darwinism in B. U. F. ideology, necessitated 
conflict. 
267 As this could not be found at a national 
level, an opposition was required, which, it must be 
stated certain Jewish and left-wing organizations were 
willing to provide. Yet within this explanation several 
important qualifications need to be made. Firstly, the 
concentration on Jewish matters was not necessarily a 
rational decision by Mosley. As the decade progressed he 
became more conspiratorally minded. He accepted uncritically 
A. K. Chesterton's report on Anglo-Jewry, that suggested 
that Jews controlled British finance, politics and press. 
268 
As will be shown later, by the time of the Second World War, 
Mosley had convinced himself that his political failure had 
been caused by Jewish opposition, and by the time of his 
internment he was seeing plots around every corner. 
269 
The net result of the B. U. F. 's obsession over Jewish 
matters was, in Robert Skidelsky's words, that "British 
fascism became of interest only to Jews and anti-semites". 
270 
Skideisky misses out one other element in this equation - 
the government, but this will be dealt with later. 
68 
The second point to note is that there were forces 
within the B. U. F. that wished the movement to adopt a 
clearer platform on the Jewish Question. These were tobe 
found not only in the leadership of the movement, with 
characters such as A. K. Chesterton and William Joyce, 
271 
but also in the grass-roots. From 1934 onwards, the 
B. U. F. made inroads into the East End, a development that 
owed more to the demands of the locality rather than a 
positive plan by the B. U. F. 's bourgeois leadership. 
272 
The B. U. F. 's East End campaign was largely tied up to 
local issues, which in turn were specifically linked to 
the Jewish community. Again this reinforced the limitations 
of B. U. F. development to a Fascist = Jewish/Communist 
conflict, perhaps most commonly remembered in the Battle 
of Cable Street. 
The third qualification concerning the scapegoat 
model, that of Mosley turning to antisemitism to prop up 
a fading movement, is perhaps the most controversial; the 
part of Jewish opposition provoking B. U. F. hostility to 
Jews. This was Mosley's own explanation for his 'quarrel 
with the Jews', claiming in true primary playground fashion 
that the "Jews began it in Britain". 273 This account 
ignores the detail that a degree of antisemitism was 
present in the movement from the start, and that Mosley 
had no qualms in attracting antisemites (and in fact 
actively recruited in the existing fascist movements, which 
he knew himself to be antisemitic). 
274 This is not to 
deny the powerful grassroots Jewish/Left-wing reaction to 
the B. U. P., but it must be questioned how this opposition 
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increased the B. U. F. 's antisemitism. It was the movement's 
weakness that allowed the Jewish question to become so 
prominent in its ideology. After the violence at Olympia 
in June 1934, the B. U. F. had lost its public respectability 
and the loss of Rothermere, shortly after, ensured that 
this could not be gained back. Thereafter the B. U. F. was 
doomed; the Jewish/Left opposition merely gave it a reason 
to continue its feeble existence. 
What then is the significance of the B. U. F.? It must 
be suggested that only 4 elements in British society took 
this group seriously. Firstly, members of the B. U. F. 
themselves. Perhaps like all fringe groups the B. U. F. 
suffered from self-aggrandizement, encouraged by their 
leader's constant belief, that the crisis that would bring 
his movement to power was always just around the corner. 
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Secondly, the Jewish community which with the rise to power 
of the German National Socialists, feared a similar 
development in Britain. Thirdly, the extreme left which 
again saw the B. U. F. 's threat in European terms and thus 
saw fascism as a weapon of the ruling classes. 
276 Finally, 
the state itself. If nothing else, the recently released 
Home Office papers show the deep concern the British 
government had over the success of domestic fascism. 
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The fascists, if less so than the radical left, were seen 
as a threat'to the security of the state, and were therefore 
carefully monitored. As antisemitism was perceived as an 
integral part of fascism this was to have a negative and a 
positive result for the Anglo-Jewish community. On the one 
hand, the state would not condone the use of political 
antisemitism, 
278 
on the other it could adopt a position 
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of near-paranoia concerning the possible increase in 
domestic antisemitism. This, as will be shown was to 
make a great impact on Britain's refugee policy. 
Apart from alarming the state, the B. U. F. 's greatest 
impact was on the East End, and particularly on Jewish- 
Gentile relations in this area. 
279 In accounting for 
the success of the B. U. F. in the East End, 
280 
one needs 
to take account of several vital factors. Firstly, the 
East End in the 1930's was suffering from the depression 
that, in varying degrees of intensity, had hit the whole 
of Britain. Although unemployment was not as high as in 
the notorious black spots such as Jarrow, it had made an 
impact on a local society that had long been suffering 
from bad housing and general poverty. The East End, as it 
had been before the crisis of the 1880's, was again the 
forgotten land of London. There thus existed a political 
vacuum which both the Communists and the Fascists tried 
to fill. Secondly, the area had by the 1930's a tradition 
of Jewish-Gentile conflict stretching back-to the period 
of mass immigration. 
However, as has been pointed out, the nature of East 
End inter-ethnic relations had changed drastically since 
the turn of the century, especially in the most heavily 
Jewish area, Stepney. Close proximity in this latter 
borough had brought a degree of harmony, and it is 
significant that in only one area, around Duckett Street, 
was the B. U. F. successful in Stepney. 
281 Mirroring the 
borough-as a whole, the Jewish population had declined in 
1930 to roughly 95,000 out of 225,000 or 43% of the total 
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(of which over 70% were born in Britain). 
282 This 
dispersion from the original settlement continued throughout 
the 1930's and by the start of the war it is doubtful 
whether there were 80,000 Jews in Stepney. 
283 Institution- 
ally and economically, the East End still held an important 
role in the lives of London Jewry, but the suggestion that 
it remained an unassimilated Yiddish world is well wide 
of the mark. 
284 Amongst the older generation, the use of 
Yiddish could still be found, but like the Yiddish theatre 
and newspapers, it was in decline. The six Yiddish news- 
papers at the start of the decade had whittled down to 2 by 
the start of war; 
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and a self-conscious attempt was being 
made to stop the inevitable death of the Yiddish theatre. 
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Before the start of war, the Jewish Board of Guardians 
suggested that as the number of East End Jews who could not 
read English was so small, it was unnecessary to provide 
a Yiddish supplement to national registration forms. 
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However Anglicization and general integration does 
not imply total assimilation. Even as late as the 1930's, 
Jews and non-Jews tended to work apart, and on a more 
trivial basis, differences could be observed in dress-sense 
and in night life. 
288 This separatism could create 
conflict, whether in local politics where the largely left- 
wing Jews were in the minority to the Right-wing Labour 
Catholic majority, 
289 
or in petty personal jealousies. 
A report into Stepney Jewish-Gentile relations before the 
war showed the limitations of such conflict, including: 
"anti-semitism has not emerged strongly ... but rather what 
we may term UNSEMITISM, ie. Cockney and Jew living together 
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in the same street and often in the same house, but living 
in different social worlds. " 
290 A similar survey 
remarked that relations between Jews and non-Jews were 
best in areas of the highest Jewish proportion, such as 
Whitechapel, and areas of Leeds, and that they deteriorated 
when this concentration diluted. 
291 This observation 
fits well with the rest of East London. Hackney, Shore- 
ditch, Bethnal Green and Stoke Newington, had a Jewish 
population of between 6 and 16%; 
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yet antisemitism 
was rife, and the B. U. F. at their strongest. 
It was these areas, particularly Bethnal Green, where 
conflict had been greatest between the Jewish immigrants 
and the native residents. It seems more than possible 
that the Gentile sense of grievance carried on to the 
1930's, perhaps intensified by an increased Jewish influx 
into areas, especially in Hackney and Stoke Newington. 
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A direct correlation between B. U. F. success in these areas, 
and antisemitism would be misleading, however. The B. U. F. 
gained its success because it fought on local issues - jobs 
and housing, 
294 
and unlike the British $rothers' League, 
it threw up its own local working class leaders. 
295 The 
link to antisemitism was more indirect, for both the 
employment and housing questions were closely identified 
as Jewish problems. 
296 Harking back to the age of mass 
immigration, the B. U. F. 's East End branches revived the 
image of the Jew as the sweating employer and as the rack- 
renting landlord. 
Not only did the B. U. F. make its appeal to real local 
grievances, but it also filled a gap in areas like Bethnal 
Green, which were a cultural wasteland. 
297 Lacking clubs, 
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settlements and even public houses, the B. U. F. added a 
sense of excitement to a dreary landscape. 
298 However 
although some Jewish youngsters and Communists also enjoyed 
the vitality of the constant street battles with the 
fascists, to others the violence was nothing short of 
terrifying. 299 In any assessment of the B. U. F. 's influence, 
the reality and fear of fascist antisemitic hooliganism 
must not be forgotten. 
Ultimately the B. U. F. failed to set Gentile against 
Jew in the East End. Its campaign left ill-feeling in 
many areas, especially in the edges of Jewish districts; 
but it also helped to unite the East End. Whether in the 
Battle of Cable Street or in the Tenants Defence Leagues, 
Jew and non-Jew co-operated; in the one case to fight the 
fascist menace, and in the other, to eradicate the problems 
that provided the B. U. F. with its ammunition. 
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If the B. U. F. heightened peoples awareness of Jews in 
domestic matters, it also succeeded in doing the same over 
issues abroad. As early as November 1933 Blackshirt had 
declared "that Jews are striving to involve Britain in 
war". 
301 However, as the decade progressed and the B. U. F. 
became more aligned to the National Socialist movement, 
more attention was placed on foreign policy. From 1938 
Mosley's peace campaign was launched, and with it, his 
attack on international Jewish finance. To Mosley, these 
Shylocks were attempting to mobilize the world, to create 
a war of racial revenge against Germany. 
302 Whilst this 
peace campaign may have revived the B. U. F. 's membership 
figures (though nowhere near their 'Rothermere' peak of up 
to 40,000 in 1934), 303 it ultimately persuaded only a tiny 
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proportion of the British population to oppose the war. 
Yet again though, it did have the malicious impact of 
linking Jews to the Second World War in the public's mind. 
In turn, the government's fear of the British people 
believing it was a 'Jews' War', hung over the whole 
1939-45-period; a legacy to which the B. U. F. had contributed 
greatly. 
However, the B. U. F. was not alone in opposing the 
threatened 'Jews' War'. One of the features of the extreme 
Right in Britain has been its tendency to split in amoeba- 
like fashion, into ever smaller factions. In the 1920's, 
from the original British Fascisti, came the Imperial 
Fascist League, and later the slightly less extremist 
National Fascisti. 
304 The B. U. F. attempted to swallow 
these fringe groups in 1932/3 but although some, like 
William Joyce, did leave the British Fascists, the tiny 
fascist organisations survived. Indeed, theI. F. L. became 
one of Mosley's greatest enemies, its leader Arnold Leese, 
carrying on a constant campaign against what it saw as 
"kosher fascism". 305 
It has been suggested "that few minor figures in 
modern British politics can have been subjected to quite 
such a degree of scholarly overkill as ... Leese". 
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Whilst it is true that there are now almost as many 
academic articles on Leese and his organisation as there 
were I. F. L. members, there are still important reasons 
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for taking this small group seriously. At a theoretical 
level, Leese is one of the few identifiable individuals 
who has put forward racial antisemitic arguments in British 
society. Leese's organisations, journals and finance have 
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been vital in maintaining a subterranean theme of Nazi- 
styled antisemitism and has thus helped the preservation 
of an extreme antisemitic coterie in Britain. 
308 His 
journals and publications stressed the importance of The 
Protocols and perhaps more originally in terms of ant 
semitic circles, accusations of Jewish ritual murder. 
309 
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On a more physical level, the I. F. L. achieved an importance 
out of proportion to its numbers due to the extremism of 
its supporters. Its street meetings in the East End were 
notorious for the degree of violence, both verbal and actual, 
helping to reinforce the insecurity of the local Jewish 
population. 
310 
Finally, Leese and his supporters constituted one of 
the few groups to support Hitler and Nazi antisemitism 
unashamedly right from its inception. The German Nazi 
Party and the I. F. L. maintained close links through the 
1930's, and although the war altered this relationship, up 
to September 1939 the I. F. L. remained a staunch supporter 
of Hitler's Germany. 
311 To Leese fascism was simply a 
method to overcome the power of the Jew, rather than a 
coherent political ideology, 
312 
and thus he supported 
the Nazis whom he felt were genuinely opposed to the 
Jewish world stranglehold. It is thus not surprising 
that he opposed any attempt to "fight for the House of 
Rothschild" in a war against Germany. 
313 
However, Leese and the I. F. L. were not alone in what 
has been called "the most lunatic of lunatic fringes". 
314 
A similar society 'The Nordics', aimed at preserving 
Aryan racial supremity was amalgamated into the I. F. L. in 
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1934 and by 1936 other equally obscure organisations had 
come into. existence, all of which were based on Nazi 
ideology. 
315 By the latter date a new group had been 
formed, the Militant Christian Patriots, whose aim was 
to coordinate the activities of all the antisemitic groups 
in British society. 
316 
This latter group, however, could not stop the trend 
of the radical right to split, and in 1937 two leading B. U. F. 
officials broke away to form the National Socialist League. 
Personality conflicts rather than pure policy disagreements 
317 
would seem to explain this development, yet the 
fragmentation continued. In 1939 out of the latter League 
emerged the British Peoples Party. To add confusion to this 
mess, a new coordinating group, the Nordic League had been 
formed by 1938; the same date as Captain Ramsay's secret 
Right Club came into being. 
318 
All these groups, with their limited membership and 
petty inter-organisational clashes could well be regarded 
as no more than obscure footnotes in the history of British 
fascism and antisemitism; yet in their context they also 
had a more sinister implication. In the last two years 
before the war, two other organisations, the Anglo-German 
Fellowship and The Link were formed, both aimed at avoiding 
war and promoting German friendship, (though the latter was 
explicitly pro-Nazi and antisemitic). By June 1939 The 
Link had over 4000 members 
319 
and was part of a chain of 
groups who were united, if on nothing else, on the need to 
avoid war, communism and the Jewish peril. To many of them, 
Hitler seemed to represent a bulwark against such influences. 
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Thus they cooperated in such groups as the Nordic League, 
which had members from practically all the groups 
320 
outlined in the last paragraph. How these groups 
were to react to the 'Jews' War', when it finally arrived, 
will be dealt with in the next chapter. It is sufficient 
to point out at this stage that several observers have 
suggested that Hitler's interest was in the fringe groups, 
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rather than directly in the B. U. F., and thus had Britain 
been invaded, they could well have become mach more 
significant. 
The fear that somehow Jews were dragging Britain 
into war was not limited to extremists. Lord Beaverbrook 
expressed these exact sentiments in December 1938, adding, 
"They do not mean to do it. But unconsciously they are 
drawing us into war. Their political influence is moving 
us in that direction". 
322 This was from a man who "had 
no sympathy with anti-semitism"; 
323 
an indication perhaps 
of the level of concern of what was seen by many in Britain, 
as the dangerously high degree of Jewish influence in the 
world. 
324 It is ironic that when the Jewish community 
was facing its blackest period, attention was turned 
not to the feebleness of Jewish resistance, but to the 
community's alleged power. 
One symptom of the'general Jewish malaise of the 
time was the arrival from 1933 onwards, of a fresh influx 
of refugees into Britain. Whilst the reaction to these 
central European Jews was not wholly negative, their 
presence was another factor that was making Britain 
increasingly 'Jew conscious'. Between 1933 and 1939, some 
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56,000 German and Austrian refugees entered Britain, of 
whom 90 percent were Jewish. Of these, the vast majority 
came in the last two years before war; the immigration in 
the earlier years having been limited to a few thousand 
per annum. 
325 Despite the limited nature*of this 
movement, the reaction from the British people was strong. 
As one would expect, at the forefront of the opposition 
were the various fascist groups. 
326 However, as with the 
concept of Jews pushing Britain to war, the antipathy was 
more widespread. The Beaverbrook, Rothermere and Kemsley 
press empires were all firmly against allowing refugees 
asylum in Britain. 
At the root of all the opposition to the refugees was 
the economic issue; the fear that foreigners would take 
the Englishmen's jobs. Yet beneath this rationalization 
there lurked a set of assumptions, whose origins were to 
be found in the antisemitic atmosphere of the 1930's. 
The whole debate was to suffer from alarmist fears of a 
huge Jewish influx, which would, in the words of the Sunday 
Express "overrun the country". 
327 If restriction was not 
operated, its sister paper warned, it would lead to an 
"anti-Jewish uproar". 
328 This fear of domestic anti- 
semitism was based on a presumption that it was the 
refugee Jews themselves that created the hostility. This 
corresponded with the ideas of many Hitler apologists who 
operated within the same yellow press circles. Ward-Price, 
Wyndham Lewis and Rothermere, journalists and commentators 
at the forefront of the appeasement campaign, argued that 
Nazi antisemitism was only a reaction to German Jewish 
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malpractice and power, and that the refugees here would 
only try to take advantage of the British pßople. 
329 
The fear of an antisemitic backlash if refugee 
numbers were not carefully watched, was also felt strongly 
in the sphere of British politics. Sir Samuel Hoare, the 
Home Secretary, took seriously an M. I. 5. report in 1938 
which suggested "that the Germans were anxious to inundate 
this country with Jews, with a view to creating a Jewish 
problem in the U. K. ". 
330 Much of the political debate 
on refugees, whether at parliamentary, Cabinet, Foreign 
or Home Office level automatically mentioned the danger 
of possible "anti-Jew agitation in this country". 
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The concern was also shared by Jewish and refugee bodies 
afraid of the consequences of a mass influx. 
332 Not 
withstanding this paranoia, Britain's refugee policy has 
been described as "comparatively compassionate, even 
generous". 
333 The meanness of Britain's response was not 
particularly in refusing entry - especially in comparison 
to other countries, but in limiting the activities of the 
refugees once they had settled. In this, the Government 
was simply responding to public pressure. 
It has been written that "Every refugee was walking 
propaganda against the Nazis" and that these refugees 
"received a warm welcome in Britain". 
334 Neither of 
these statements can be accepted without reservations, but 
as generalities they contain much truth. A public opinion 
survey in late July 1939 would appear to confirm them: 
70% believing that free entry should be allowed for the 
refugees into Britain. This represented the triumph of 
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humanitarian sympathy, best illustrated with the public 
response to the Baldwin appeal for refugee children. 
Over £500,000 and many offers of homes were given by the 
British people in the first half of 1939. By the charity 
of Jewish, but mainly non-Jewish Britons, nearly 10,000 
children were brought to this country. 
335 
However, it is harder to perceive children as an 
economic threat than it is adults, and the other side of 
the July 1939 survey makes less happy reading. Only 15'1% 
of those who would allow free entry wanted no restrictions 
"to safeguard British workers and taxpayers", making just 
10% of the sample. 
336 With hindsight such attitudes seem 
mean, given that the refugees eventually created 250,000 
jobs in Britain, or roughly 5 per refugee. 
337 Yet in 
its context the fears of certain groups in British society 
are understandable - unemployment remained high throughout 
the 1930's, and fear of unemployment was always present. 
Insecure middle class groups such as doctors, dentists, 
lawyers and academics saw the refugees as a direct threat, 
and reacted with varying degrees of hostility. 
If a league table were to be drawn up, the academic/ 
scientific world would probably come top in terms of its 
humanitarian response, and the medical world would be 
firmly at the bottom. The Academic Assistance Council, 
formed in 1933 was a sign of the former group's more 
hospitable approach. 
338 However, its careful choice of 
refugees for specific posts (so as not to create any conflict 
within the Universities) also shows the limitations of such 
tolerance. 339 In medicine and dentistry, there was not 
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even an attempt at such a gesture of goodwill towards the 
newcomers. The medical profession (with the minor exception 
of the Socialist Medical Association), made sure that the 
amount of doctors and surgeons allowed into Britain was 
small, and that these few would have strong restrictions 
put on them. 
340 Although the motive was basically 
economic, elements of antisemitism crept into the argument. 
Dr M. Bayly, a major force in the Medical Practioners 
Union (a group with nearly 6000 members in 1938), injected 
his antisemitic/anti-vivisectionist ideas into the 
organisation. 
341 Medical World, its organ, attacked the 
methods of Jewish doctors, and went as far as praising 
Hitler's eugenic laws. 
342 In 1936 the Beaverbrook press 
also went beyond pure economic arguments about Jewish 
refugee doctors; portraying the refugee psycho-analyst 
as a "Svengali-like figure", controlling the innocent 
patient. 
343 
In late 1938, as the refugee influx reached its height, 
the Board of Deputies produced a pamphlet, While You are in 
England, which attempted to advise the refugees how to 
behave. Nearly half a century later, it makes painful 
reading, with its 'Uncle-Tommish' tone telling the refugees 
to be "more English than the English". 344 Once again 
though, it is vital to contextualise such a document, and 
the timid approach of the established Jewish community. 
It is not surprising that the representative bodies of 
Anglo-Jewry resented the new arrivals, for the refugees 
merely emphasised a factor that the Jewish community, in 
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the antisemitic atmosphere of the 1930's wanted to reverse; 
the foreignness of Britain's Jewish minority. 
The image of the Jew as an alien was not the only 
one that survived and was reinforced in the 1930's. 
Although the B. U. F. did not make explicit use of The 
Protocols, other groups such as the Social Credit movement 
kept their message well alive. 
345 Mosley was not alone 
in stressing the image of the Jew as an international 
socialist or international financier, and fear of Jewish 
power - whether it be over press, cinema, industry was 
widespread. 
346 Also, although some were starting to 
examine their own prejudices in light of Nazi persecution, 
social antisemitism at all levels of British society 
remained rife. 
347 
A memorandum from G. Liverman, a member of the Board 
of Deputies Defence Committee, warned in 1938 that "within 
three years we may be faced with anti-Jewish legislation 
in this country". 
348 Can such a statement be regarded as 
nothing more than the hysterical outburst of an over- 
sensitive Jewish communal worker? At one level Liverman 
was wrong; British antisemitism could not be compared 
directly to that in Germany or the rest of Europe. 
349 
British Liberal democracy remained largely unshaken by the 
crisis of the 1930's, and on a political level, antisemitism 
was seen as a threat to the state. 
At another level Liverman's emotions can be understood. 
Malcolm Muggeridge was right to point out that in the 1930's 
"anti-semitism was in the air, an unmistakable tang". 350 
Hitler, Mosley and the refugees had made the Jews a major 
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topic of conversation and interest in British society, 
one that became near obsessional as the war approached. 
An indication is perhaps provided by the sudden growth 
of mainstream books on the 'Jewish problem' which appeared 
in 1938 and 39; Jews and the Jews in Britain; The Jews of 
Britain; The Jewish Problem; The Folly of Anti-Semitism; 
The Jew and His Neighbour; The Shortest Way With the Jews; 
Jewish Rights and Wrongs; The Jews. Are They Human? and 
Britain's Jewish Problem. 
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Whilst only the first and the last can be termed as 
definitely antisemitic, the others to a lesser or greater 
extent blamed the Jews for creating antisemitism. Their 
solution to the problem ranged from advising the Jews to 
take a wider occupational structure, 
352 to the giving up 
of their religion 
353 
_ or in the words of the popular 
social commentator, Douglas Reed, "No Jews is Good Jews". 
354 
The realization that the Jewish problem was in essence a 
Gentile problem, was slow in coming in Britain, and it was 
to take the horror of the Second World War to force the 
idea home. By 1939 in Britain, although there were positive 
reactions to the Jewish community, as exemplified by the 
kindness shown to the refugee children, there were also 
many strains of hostility to the Anglo-Jewish minority. 
The following chapters will examine what impact the 1939-45 
war had on these earlier tensions, as well as analysing the 
fresh conflicts that the war would bring to Jewish-Gentile 
relations in British society. 
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Union briefly flirted with The Protocols as did the 
British Empire Union. The forgery even reached the 
Isle of Orkney. See Eric Linklater, 'Notes on the 
Way'. Time and Tide vol. 20 no. 25 (24 June, 1939). 
346. Strong enough to merit a Board of Deputies reply to 
these allegations. See S. Salomon, Jews of Britain 
(London, 1938), 53-4 for the press, 56-8 for chain 
stores, 71-2 for cinema. 
347. A Mass-Observation report on Jews in 1939 commented 
on 'the remarkable - truly remarkable - tone of those 
reports' as far as the prejudice it revealed. 
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Physical repulsion was so common within the report 
that M-0 described it as "very ordinary". See M-0 A: 
FR: A12. Upper middle-class antipathy in the 
Bloomsbury set was still alive and kicking in the 
1930's. See comments of Vita Sackville-West on 
Leonard Woolf in 1938 in V. Glendenning's Vita: 
The Life of V. Sackville-West (London, 1983), 294. 
348. Board of Deputies Coordinating Committee Minutes 
(October, 1938) quoted by Lebzelter, Political 
Anti-semitism, 35. 
349. Robert Kee, The World We Left Behind: A Portrait of 
the Year 1939 (London, 1983), 248-80 suggests that 
British people could not understand German anti- 
semitism because it was so far removed from British 
antisemitism. He is right to differentiate the two 
but fails to realise that many people did link the 
two - therefore there was such fear of domestic 
antisemitism. 
350. Malcolm Muggeridge, The Thirties: 1930-40 in Great 
Britain (London, 1940), 242-3. 
351. The authors and dates in order are 'Cobbett', 1938; 
S. Salomon, 1938; L. Golding, 1938; S. Dark and 
H. Sidebotham, 1939; J. Parkes, 1939; P. Harlow, 
1939; N. Laski, 1939; W. Lewis, 1939 and M. G. Murchin 
(pseud. ), 1939. 
352. The suggestion was N. Laski's in his Jewish Rights 
and Wrongs (London, 1939), 141. 
353. W. Lewis, The Jews: Are They Human? (London, 1939), 
107 suggested that if there were no Jews there would 
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be no Jewish problem and saw orthodoxy as a barrier 
to solving the issue. Lewis also accepted without 
question that Jews had power in society, both 
political and financial, pp. 52-3. 
354. This was the title of an antisemitic chapter in his 
Insanity Fair (London, 1938). Reed, extremely 
popular, was a mixture of anti-Nazi and antisemitic, 
who suggested that the Jews had created the moral 
decline of Germany and would do the same to Britain. 
See his Disgrace Abounding (London, 1939), 229-261. 
For a further account of Reed's career see chapter 4, 
P"337-140., and R. Thurlow, 'Anti-Nazi Antisemite: the 
Case of Douglas Reed', Patterns of Prejudice vol. 18 
no. 1 (1984), 23-34. 
12.7 
Chanter 2: Organized British Antisemitism and Fascism 
in the Second World War. 
The Encyclopedia Judaica has discriminated between 
groups that have temporarily adopted antisemitism and 
those that are founded with the sole purpose of fighting 
Jewish influences. However, in the case of the former 
this wise differentiation could be extended further to in- 
clude those organizations which have an element of anti- 
semitism in their ideology, but to whom it is not all- 
embracing. Such antisemitism can be as'persistent as the 
'total' form, In Britain before the end of 1945, only the 
I. F. L. and the Britons (as well as a few other minor organ- 
izations) can be said to have been totally devoted to the 
'Jewish Question'. To devote this section on extremist organ- 
izatirns to these groups would be highly limiting. Instead 
it will concentrate on those organizations which can be said 
to operate outside the mainstream of Britain's political and 
social life, Fascist and quasi-fascist groups will be in- 
cluded, 
2 
as will social credit and distributist circles, 
Such a classification will not necessarily indicate the in- 
tensity of antisemitismo For example, the Weekly Review, 
The Patriot and Truth all had common contributers3 and were 
capable of profound attacks on Jews, yet the latter, given 
its respectability and popularity, will be studied in the 
section on British society and antisemitism. 
4 
Equally, few 
matched the level of antisemitism in Douglas Reed's war 
novels, but again Reed's work was mainstream and not lim- 
ited (at least up to 1945) to the lunatic fringe. 
It has been suggested that war can have two (often 
simultaneous) effects on ethnic or racial minorities - it 
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can push them together under a common unity, or apart due 
to the tensions of the conflict. Much the same can be said 
of fascist and radical right wing groups in Britain in the 
Second World War. At one level these extremist organiza- 
tions entered the war in a highly fragmented state ;5 at 
another, their common vulnerability (given their previous 
support of Nazi Germany) was a stimulus towards co-operation. 
Those 'on the radical right, who had made so much play of 
their patriotism, were now faced with a most serious crisis. 
They saw their country plunged into war against a country 
whose ideology had been their source of inspiration. The 
immediate impact of the war on these groups will now be ex- 
amined. 
Throughout the 1930s the B. U. F., the I. F. L. and the 
whole host of other fringe groups had been united on one 
issue - the importance of avoiding what they saw as a 'Jews' 
War' of vengeance against Nazi Germany. As war approached, 
increasing attention was placed on this issue. The B. U. F's 
peace campaign culminated at Earl's Court in July 1939 
where up to 20,000 people heard Mosley fulminating against 
the threat of war, where he stated: "We fight for Britain, 
yes, but a million Britons shall never die in your Jews' 
quarrel. " 
6 
The imminence of war certainly helped to stop 
the decline of the B. U. F., but claims that it had recovered 
by the start of the conflict to its peak level of support 
of 1931+, are much exaggerated.? Other claims that peace 
meetings in east and north London were "larger and more en- 
thusiastic than any in the British Union's history"8 do not 
seem to be borne out by the facts. Indeed, Special Branch 
reports in November 1938 and September 1939 indicate that 
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East End support for Mosley had declined considerably in 
the year before war. 
9 
Elsewhere in London, recruiting was brisk for the 
B. U. F. immediately after Earl's Court, but August was quiet 
again. 
10 Some increase in membership occurred in Manches- 
ter and East Lancashire, 
11 
and in Yorkshire a recovery was 
made, but this was from a miniscule base, 
12 the same being 
true in Birmingham. 
13 Altogether, the figure of 9,000, 
quoted by Home Secretary Sir John Anderson, which repre- 
sented those B. U. F. members who had paid their last sub- 
scription, would represent fairly the total B. U. F. support 
in the country. 
14 This low figure and the fact that the 
B. U. F. was the only mass fascist organization in Britain 
in the 1930s puts the importance of its rival extremists 
in perspective. 
The most notorious, the Imperial Fascist League, had 
an active membership of 50 in 193615 and there is little 
evidence of a growth in support in the last years before 
the war, as has been claimed. 
16 Other splinter groups 
from the B. U. F. such as the British People's Party and the 
National Socialist League had equally limited support. By 
1939 secret, or semi-secret groups such as the Nordic Lea- 
gue and the Right Club had come into existence, propound- 
ing extreme antisemitism and demanding an agreement with 
Hitler. Linkages were made between these groups, the New 
Pioneer being one forum through which communication was 
made. 
17 Yet even taken together this group of fascist 
appeasers appears unimpressive, their general impotence 
strengthened by their political isolation. 
18 Only 'The 
. Link', Admiral Barry Domvile's pro-Nazi German friendship 
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group could claim a mass membership. From March 1938 to 
June 1939 The Link's support grew from 1,800 to 4,300.19 
Unlike other pacifist groups, The Link did not so much avoid 
the subject of Nazi antisemitism as support it. 
20 However, 
it is probably the case that most of the extremists were at 
the top of The Link, and that most of the rank and file were 
well-meaning pacifists. 
21 One suburban member was genuinely 
shocked when she heard of The Link's Nazi sentiments 
22 
a re- 
action which shows a peculiar naivety, given the nature of 
the organization's propaganda. 
How then were these various organizations and individ- 
uals to react when war was declared? Predicting a pattern 
on past behaviour proves difficult. The head of M. I. 5., 
Sir Vernon Kell, commenting at the end of 1936 on William 
Joyce, stated that nothing would "shake his basic patriot- 
ism". 23 A few days before the outbreak, he was to slip out 
of Britain to become, as Lord Haw-Haw, the most famous Ger- 
man broadcaster to Britain. 
24 Before then the Nazis had 
approached A. K. Chesterton to be such a propagandist. 
25 
However, their assumptions were proved to be wrong, as 
Chesterton refused and volunteered in the British army 
immediately at the declaration of war. Others were more 
torn in their loyalty. Unity Mitford, member of the B. U. F. 
and a devotee of Hitler, could not bear the thought of an 
Anglo-German conflict, and made an unsuccessful suicide at- 
tempt. 26 
The official B. U. P. instructions to its members were 
not so severe. Mosley in a message of 1 September 1939 
claimed, as neither Britain nor her Empire were threatened, 
that the British Union would have nothing to do with "an 
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alien quarrel" brought about by "the dope machine of Jew- 
ish finance". Even so, Mosley added "I ask you to do 
nothing to injure our country, or-to help any other 
Power". 27 Unofficially, members were urged to join the 
various civil defence units and carry on the peace message 
there. 28 The impact of the war on B. U. F. membership is 
difficult to assess. John Beckett claimed that in the first 
couple of months, numbers doubled from 5,000 to 10,000.29 
Such an estimate is difficult to sustain, for although as 
a Special Branch report suggested, there was "a steady 
stream of new recruits", there were also many resignations, 
and perhaps more importantly "many more just ceased". 
30 
Special Branch in the second week of the war estimated 
sales of Action (the B. U. F's populist paper) to be 14,000, 
the same as that in February 1938 when the movement was in 
a general trough. 
31 
Perhaps a better indication of the negative effect of 
the declaration of war on B. U. F. fortunes is supplied by 
their activities on a street level. In September 1939 
only 21 B. U. F. meetings took place in the capital compared 
to 313 the month before. 
32 The leadership was clearly 
aware of the danger of total disintegration of the B. U. F., 
sending out orders to tighten discipline and to ensure 
that no propaganda be used without the organisers' con- 
sent. 
33 Meetings in Ridley Road, the B. U. F. stronghold 
in North East London, attracted "fair crowds", in one case 
300, but these were fewer than was usual, and in any case, 
the meetings were attended only by "stalwarts"103 
According to a Special Branch report Mosley's war 
line was to abandon pro-Naziism and to concentrate on op- 
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position to the war waged "on behalf of Jewish finan- 
ciers". 
35 However, as this explicit attack on Jewish 
power had fallen foul of the censors for the first war 
issue of Action, 
36 
the B. U. F. also avoided attacking Jews 
by name in its meetings in September 1939.37 This did 
not stop veiled attacks exemplified by 'Mick' Clarke, the 
B. U. F's East End leader who warned that the last war did 
not benefit workers, who again would "be sacrificed in 
the interest of profiteers"038 The B. U. F. did turn the 
problems created by war to one beneficial end - exploiting 
the black-out to create a rash of slogans and stickers in 
public places, including the antisemitic disfigurement of 
government propaganda posters039 Little imagination was 
required to produce the net result of 'Your Courage; Your 
Cheerfulness; Your Resolution; Will Bring JEW Victory". 40 
The B. U. F. had not been the only fascist organization 
to have street meetings. The war was, however, to have a 
dramatic impact on its extremist rivals. The National Soc- 
ialist League, which although small had had violently anti- 
semitic meetings, closed down immediately with its leader 
Joyce having left the countrye 
1 The Imperial Fascist 
League closed down its headquarters in the West End as 
well as its branch in Dalston. 
b2 
The view of Special 
Branch that the League had "ceased to exist"43 proved to 
be premature but certainly no public meetings took place 
for the first few months of the war. Instead activities 
were centred on distributing antisemitica and spreading 
anti-Jewish rumours. 
44 Its main publication The Fascist 
ceased production but its in-house organ, Weekly Angles 
continued, helping to keep the I. P. L. alive, if not kick- 
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ing. 
45 Similarly the Nordic League transformed from a 
public antisemitic front to a secret coterie whose activ-. 
ities will be examined latero46 
The only organization of an extreme antisemitic type 
to expand in the first weeks of the war was the National- 
ist Associatione47 Its leader was 'Jock' Houston, who had 
been a leading speaker for the B. U. F. in the East End and 
had indeed been credited with the initial success of 
Mosley's group in Bethnal Green and Shoreditche48 However, 
the inability to control his antisemitism, and'his subse- 
quent frequent arrests led him to be demoted to the pro- 
vinces and eventually out of the B. U. F. 
49 
By the summer 
of 1939 the Nationalist Association was formed and Houston 
once again had a platform for his violent antisemitism. 
50 
Active in Finsbury Square in North East London, Houston 
had attracted by the outbreak of war "a good number" of 
'tough' followers051 For the first months of the war 
Houston managed to control his antisemitism like his B. U. F. 
rivals - not referring to Jews but to 'Eskimos' or ' Mon- 
golians'052 By December 1939 the strain of this was too 
much for Houston who once again reverted to inciting lan- 
guage, suggesting that as far as Jews were concerned: 
"pogroms do not go far enough"053 Houston also translated 
his words into action and was arrested for violence 
against an old Jewish couple. 
54 
This lapse back to open antisemitism was a pattern 
that the B. U. F. was also to follow as 1939 carne to a close. 
Sir Philip Game, head of New Scotland Yard, suggested as 
late as 20 October 1939 that the B. U. F. was "not now con- 
centrating on antiseinitism"55 but by then Game's case was 
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becoming increasingly dubious. In October both the size 
and frequency of B. U. F. meetings increased. Explicit at- 
tacks were made on the International Jewish Financiers' 
responsibility for the war by both Mosley and Raven 
Thomson in North East London 
?6 At the Stoll Theatre on 15 
October 1939 up to 2,700 people heard Mosley repeat the 
theme and demand a referendum on the war057 
In November this pattern generally continued, with 
more meetings, more antisernitism (one local speaker even 
managing to bring in the Protocols to his anti-war argu- 
rnents), 
58 but apart from Mosley's own meetings, there was 
a general decline in attendance*59 At Bethnal Green Mosley 
proved his own personal popularity, bringing in 2,000 sup- 
porters, though as one report suggested, all but a few hun- 
dred were B. U. F. diehards. 
6o 
Mosley claimed that war had 
not been declared on Russia because "Russian communism had 
long been controlled by the same force that controlled 
British capitalism - namely International Jewish Finance" 
61 
This language is not far removed from that of a total con- 
spiracy theory, a development in Mosley's character further 
emphasised by a new element in B. U. F. propaganda - attacks 
on Federal Union. Mosley was to launch this campaign at 
Bethnal Green62 and elaborate it uhortly after in his only 
war publication - The British Peace - How to Get It, first 
issued in January 1940.63 In it he claimed that 'Federal 
Union' was "the biggest racket which Jewiah Finance has 
yet attempted". He continued that Federal Union attacked 
the organised nation, "the last remaining in their path to 
world dominion" . 
64 
Mosley, who according to his son "often 
had a conspiracy theory of history"65 was tius close at the 
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start of the war to accepting the message of The Protocols. 
The war antisemitism of the B. U. F. was not limited to, 
international matters. For the nine months that it oper- 
ated in the war, much attention was spent on attacking the 
"refujews". Action in November 1939 revived an accusation 
of the First World War, claiming that Britain would 
"shortly have British Tommies at the front while alien Jews 
take their jobs at home". 
66 
Later the domestic issue of 
jobs and international matters were combined, as Action 
urged the conscription of "refujews to fight in their own 
war"o67 The B. U. F. was also quick to accuse the Jews of 
profiteering, 
68 
claiming that "in this war as in every 
other war the Jews are playing their old game of cornering 
commodities and profiteering at the National Expense". 
69 
According to one B. U. F. member this antisemitic cam- 
paign was successful7° and there appears to be some truth 
in this belief, despite the general unpopularity of the 
fascists in Britain at this stage. A government Home In- 
telligence memo of March 1940 commented that fascist pro- 
paganda was generally unsuccessful, even less so than the 
Communist Party, but that "Their only popular appeal is... 
antisemitism". 
71 As lute us May 1940 when the public had 
largely turned against the fascist movement, a D. U. F. 
meeting in Brighton managed to change the initial hostile 
feelings of the audience to ones of warmth via the use of 
antisemitism. 
72 
However, despite this populist appeal, the winter 
months were lean ones for the D. U. F. as far as public sup- 
port was concerned. In December 1939 attendances were 
"very meagre" and in January 1940 only 29 public meetings 
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took place. 
73 A minor revival took place in February, 
but generally the cold weather and Mosley's absence from 
the public stage, left the B. U. F.. with fewer than a hun- 
dred regulars at their meetings. 
74 Mosley did appear at 
a private B. U. F. conference at the end of January, where 
future policy was worked out. One official, Donovan, sum- 
marised this in the two short phrases: "Mosley and peace" 
and "Jewry and War". The aim was to connect in the pub- 
lic's mind the former with peace, and the latter with "war 
and suffering". 
75 It is doubtful whether the first aim 
was achieved, though the B. U. F. undoubtedly had some suc- 
cess with the second. A Mass-Observation poll in November 
1939 found that 170/a of the population gave a cynical rea- 
son for Britain's war aims, including many statements that 
it was "for the Jews" 076 
In the first few months of 1940, the Nationalist As- 
sociation appeared to enjoy more street success than the 
B. U. F. Its leader, 'Jock' Houston's message is interest- 
ing for the deep-rooted antisemitic tradition that he 
played upon. In January 1940 he suggested that the war 
was prophesised in the Protocols and that the Jews who had 
planned it would not fight in it, 
77 The next month he 
praised Edward I's treatment of the Jews, and his associate, 
John Webster, revived accusations of Jewish White Slave 
trafficking, 78 The alarming feature about these meetings 
is the degree of success they achieved, with crowds of up 
to 900 at Fin:: bury L3quare, 
79 Moreover, Houston's anti- 
semitic jibes were not only popular with the audience, 
but with the supervising police. 
80 Some co-operation 
seems to have been achieved at this extreme level of or- 
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ganised street antisemitism. Both Houston and P. J. Ridout, 
the principal public speaker for the I. F. L., swapped plat 
forms, and indeed the former recommended and sold the lat- 
ter's organ Angles. 
81 Apart from Ridout's speeches, the 
I. F. L's public activities in the early part of 1940 were 
confined to circulating Angles, which was transformed from 
a 'house organ' to one sold at a variety of peace meetings 
82 
The flagging fortunes of the B. U. F. seem to have been 
recognised by the leadership and three remedies were put 
forward to attempt to revive the movement. Firstly, it was 
decided to contest several by-elections, not because a heavy 
poll was expected, but because of the publicity that this 
would receive. 
83 
Secondly, an attempt was made to involve 
women in the B. U. F's peace campaign. 
84 Finally, the B. U. F. 
was to concentrate its efforts in the area where it had re- 
ceived its only mass support - the East End of London. 85 
The first by-election the B. U. F. was tb contest was 
at Silvertown, a Labour stronghold in the docks of the East 
End. Although the B. U. F. had 7 branches in the dockland, 
there was no local organization in Silvertown. 
86 
Tommy 
Moran, the B. U. F. South iia1es organiser, was brought in 
as the candidate and faced a hostile electorate with no 
local support whatsoevere87 The B. U. F's strategy was on 
the one hand to stress the socialist element of the organ- 
ization's ideology; rather than attack socialism completely. 
Action pointed out the need to preserve its radical British 
past, or "real socialism". 
BB 
On the other, it stated that 
both the Communist and Labour candidates were controlled by 
the world power of international Jewry, 
89 
The whole of the B. U. F. campaign was brought together 
with a strong antisemitic basis. 40,000 copies of Moran's 
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election address were circulated, 
90 Including a B. U. F. 
sheet called "The Silvertown Dawn". In it, the B. U. F. 
warned of the war bringing destruction to the West with 
the "barbaric hordes of Judaic Communism"overthrowing 
civilization. On a less fanciful level, it cautioned 
against foreign refugees stealing local jobs. 
91 
The im- 
pact of Moran's campaign was negligible; he received 151 
votes, or just 1% of the total. 
92 A Mass-Observation 
poll found that no-one could remember anything of Moran's 
200,000 leaflets, whereas 4% recalled the Communist 
Party's literature. 93 Despite the emphasis on 'British 
peace' and British 'socialism', 18% of the electorate be- 
lieved the fascists had links to Germany, and anti-German 
feelings thus contributed to Moran's unpopularity. 
94 The 
B. U. F. failed to exploit any antisemitism in the area, and 
it would seem that those wanting to register an anti-war 
protest vote looked to Pollitt (the Communist candidate) 
rather than ldoran, 
95 
The B. U. F. had to admit it'was "a very poor vote", 
96 
yet compared it favourably with the electoral fights of 
the early Labour leaders097 Two weeks later, the B. U. F. 
achieved its most successful result at Leeds North-East, 
where 722, or just less than 3% of the vote was gained 
by Sydney Allen. 93 Allen made his appeal specifically to 
ex-servicemen, and indeed received support from the 
"League of Ex-Servicemen". 
99 Again stress was put on 
aritisemitism, in literature and wall-writings. 
100 Whet- 
her antisernitisia explained the higher B. U. F. vote is de- 
batable, The local Labour Party agent clearly believed 
that this was the case, claiming that "The Fascist... 
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got most of his votes on anti-semitic lines". 
101 In sup- 
port of this analysis, surveys at both Leeds and 8ilvertown 
found antisemitism generally higher at the latter, although 
more intense antipathy was stronger in the'former. 
102 
Those strongly prejudiced could well have voted for the 
B. U. F.. Other factors need to be taken into account as 
well though; there was no other anti-war rival; the B. U. F. 
had better roots than in Silvertown; and linked to this, a 
fuller campaign was launched with a well-attended speech 
by bfosley. 103 
The second aspect of the attempt to resuscitate the 
B. U. F. was the campaign to introduce women into the fascist 
peace movement,, The new policy was not without impact, es- 
pecially due to the activities of Commander Mary Allen, a 
formidable woman who had joined the B. U. F. in December 
1939.104 Allen combined her moralistic campaign to the 
negotiated peace movement and helped to attract some female 
support to the B. U. F. 
105 This new addition did little to 
moderate the B. U. F. Indeed in March 1940 it was female 
fascists who helped disrupt a peace meeting in Caxton Hall, 
and at a B. U. F. meeting in Holborn stall in the same month 
a Jewish Chronicle reporter was struck by the fact that 
the women "adopted a more hysterical anti-Jewish attitude 
than did their men-folk" 0106 
The third prong of the B. U. P. revival plan, to streng- 
then the East End support, is harder to assess. The war 
brought a decline to B. U. P. activities in the area, and 
meetings, as has been pointed out, tended to be supported 
by only the loyal diehards. 
107 In March 1940, with the 
I 
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improved weather, more meetings took place in the metro- 
polis and Action claimed that 1,000 were present at a 
meeting in Bethnal Green, 
108 The press generally ignored 
109 
such activities, and despite a continued recovery in 
April, the New Statesman's comments at the end of that 
month, that "we hear little to-day of British fascism" re- 
flected the general obscurity of the B. U. P. in British soc- 
iety. 110 
In the East End meetings, there was an increased 
tendency towards antisemitism. The editor of Action, 
Rayon Thomson, was arrested at a Finsbury Square meeting 
for attacking "the filthy and corrupt practices of the 
alien Jew" and another B. U. P. speaker at Bethnal Green for 
collecting money for a Jewish pogrom*ill Mosley also 
showed such tendencies in London and Leeds, 
112 but this 
desperate attempt at popularity could not match the in- 
creasing hostility towards the movement as a whole, as 
Germany progressed across Europe. However, there were 
signs of advance for the D. U. F. -. their British Traders' 
Bureau was attracting lower middle class support, espec- 
ially from North East London, 
113 
and in early May 1940 
Special Branch reported that the B. U. P. activities had 
"increased considerably. "114 
The climax of this intensely anti:.: emitic campaign 
cane at the May Day meeting of the B. U. P. at Victoria Park. 
Much preparation went into the event and "an anti-Jewish 
demonstration" was expected by members. 
115 Morning and 
afternoon rallies culminated in a speech by Mosley at- 
tended by up to Ij, 000 followers. 
116 The audience res- 
I 
t 
ponied warmly to Mosley':, anti:, emitic outburst, including 
L141 
a statement that the purpose of the war was to create "a 
land fit for Hebrews to live in", but any antisemitic dis- 
turbances failed to materialise, 
117 Mosley's claim that 
it was "the greatest day that British Union has yet wit- 
nessed", 
118 
was an exaggeration, but the turnout clearly 
indicated a revival for the movement, Other large meet- 
ings in North-East London took place in the first weeks of 
May, 119 but as events in Europe reached a crisis point 
with the fall of the Low Countries, the B. U. P. faced a tot- 
ally hostile public. 
120 In the last few weeks of May, the 
police were required to close four B. U. F. meetings, owing 
to anti-fascist disturbances, 
121 
and at Dalston, usually 
the stronghold of the B. U. F., a meeting was cancelled ow- 
ing to the extreme anger of the crowd. 
22 
This antipathy was clearly shown in the last by- 
election the B. U. F. was to contest at Middleton, North 
Manchester, on 22 May 1940. Po Haslam, the B. U. F. candi- 
date, fought a campaign nearly identical to that in Leeds 
123 
but whereas in the latter city there was some active sup- 
port for the Mosleyites, the Middleton by-election was 
totally dominated by anti-fascism. 
12LI Mosley was physic- 
ally attacked and in these circumstances the B. U. P. did 
well to pol). 418 votes. 
l25 On the day of the election, 
the Cabinet decided to amend the Defence Regulation 18B 
and Mosley and other leading B. U. P. members were detained - 
much to the public delight. 
326 With further arrests of up 
to roughly 750 B. U. P. members, the organization was effect- 
ively crippled and on 20 June 19140 via Regulation 18AA the 
B. U. P. was made illegal. 
127 No other far right group re- 
ceived such a ban, but the internment of prominent members 
1112 
of such groups as the Imperial Fascist League, the Nat- 
ionalist Association, the British People's Party, the 
Nordic League and the Right Club, destroyed any chance of 
them continuing. 
128 
The issue of fascist internment, and the controversial 
questions it raises, such as the ultimate loyalty of Mosley 
and his followers, is still an emotional subject. 
129 To 
understand why the government acted as it did, and to eval- 
uate the evidence on the loyalty question, it is necessary 
to turn to another side of B. U. F. and fringe group activity, 
from the outbreak of war to May 1940. The radical right in 
this phoney war period cannot be judged on its public meet- 
ings and proclamations alone; for it also operated on anot- 
her, secret level and it is to this that attention must now 
be turned. 
The day after war was declared Admiral Dom vi le's Nazi 
friendship group, 'The Link' was officially closed down. 
130 
However, as the security forces were soon to find out, 
fascist appeasement groups were 'soon to re-appear, both 
publicly and privately. Two main groups were to develop - 
those centred around The Link and the British People's 
Party (whose main forces were D omv i le and the Duke of Bed- 
ford), and the Nordic League/Right Club coterie centering 
around Captain Ramsay. Both had common supporters and both 
were eager to enlist the co-operation of Mosley. 
Out of the first group emerged a semi-public organiz- 
ation, the British Council for Christian Settlement in 
Europe (B. C. C. S. E. )131 Its leading members had some fascist 
connections, although some naive pacifists were also drawn 
into the group. Certainly its leaders aimed at a mass peace 
I 
y_ 
143 
group, although John Beckett's (the secretary's) claim 
that it had 14 - 18,000 members would seem to be a two fig- 
ure exaggeration. 
132 The B. C. C. S. F's line that there was 
no reason for fighting a war that was "not due to one 
country, or one man", did not convince the public which 
quickly identified the movement with the discredited Link. 
133 
However, by mid-October contact had been established be- 
tween this group and the B. U. F's leader. 
134 
The Nordic League was numerically smaller than the 
latter group, but was still, according to M15 "deserving 
of close attention"o Some of Its leaders would "go to al- 
most any lengths to further their subversive and revolut- 
ionary aims". 
135 With the war, two of its prominent organ- 
izers were interned and some confusion emerged as to whether 
the League would continue. Members were instructed to spread 
antisemitic rumours and defeatism and urged to join the 
B. U. F. and the Peace Pledge Union. 
136 Similar instructions 
were given to Right Club Members. However, 'the latter were 
not so keen to co-operate with Mosley. 
137 Despite this re- 
luctance amongst the rank and file, according to Special 
Branch their leader, Captain Ramsey M. P., had agreed to co- 
operate with the B. U. F. as early as 16 September 1939.138 
By late October 1939, in what Domvile called "a hist- 
oric event", the major personalities in the fascist pacifist 
movement met. The group, organised by Domvile, included 
Mosley, Tavistock, Ramsay, Laurie, Lymington and Lawton and 
Hay. -139 What was discussed is not clear, Domvile loosely 
commenting that "Vic talked all round", and regular meetings 
of the group were arranged. 
l40 Throughout November and Dec- 
ember 1939 the meetings continued with the added presence 
144 
of extremists such as H. T. Mills and A. T. O. Lees of the 
Nordic League. 
141 The gatherings would appear to have 
been informal social gatherings where issues such as "the 
menace to freedom" and "the struggle for Peace" were dis- 
cussed. 
142 
In January and February 1940 these meetings continued, 
with a tendency amongst the whole of the British fascist 
movement to assume a private, or at least a semi-private 
character. 
143 The most important development of these 
gatherings occurred in early February, when Tavistock an- 
nounced his intention to travel to Ireland to discuss peace 
terms with the German legation in Dublin. 
144 Permission 
was received from Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, and 
a wide range of individuals from Mosley to John McGovern 
of the I. L. P., and Lord Beaverbrook, took a great interest 
in the success of the mission, which turned out to be 
fruitless, 
A5 
In March, April and May 1940, while Tavistock and the 
B. C. C. S. E. were having public peace meetings, (several 
times sharing a platform with the I. L. P. ), 
i46 
the secret 
sessions continued. The content of these meetings could 
well explain some of the reasons why Mosley and other 
leading fascists were interned in May 1940. In his last 
meeting with the 18B Advisory Committee on 22 July 19110, 
Mosley was told by the Chairman, Norman Birkett, that 
there was no evidence that he was a traitor or had been 
contemplating any act of treachery. 
117 Mosley was re- 
lieved by this statement and it was used in his defence 
by Richard Stokes in Parliament in December 1940.148 How- 
ever, doubt still remained in the Advisory Committee's 
145 
mind, some of it stirred up by Mosley's relationship with 
Captain Ramsay. 
In an earlier interview Mosley had claimed that before 
internment he only knew Ramsay "slightly" and had met him 
just three or four times. There was, according to Mosley, 
no thought of joint action and that in fact they only 
"loosely discussed questions of common interest", such as 
their "mutual dislike of certain aspects of Jewish activ- 
ities". 1h9 The Committee were unimpressed. They were un- 
able "to accept at face value many of Mosley's professions" 
and believed his answers over Ramsay were "lacking in 
frankness and candour". The basis of the Committee's com- 
plaint was the statement that Ramsay had made in his 18B 
interview - that he had been "invited by Mosley to take 
over Scotland in certain circumstances", 
150 
Mosley's connections with Ramsay were indeed stronger, 
as has been shown, and the two knew each other as early as 
July 1939.3-51 When A. T. O. Lees, ex-civil servant and prom- 
inent member of the Nordic League and British People's 
Party was arrested, 
152 he had in his possession letters 
relating to secret meetings that took place in London in 
March, April and May 1940. These letters indicated that 
Mosley and Ramsay had convened the meetings which pro- 
Nazis and antisemites attended. The object of these meet- 
ings, according to the Special Branch report, "was to se- 
cure the greatest possible collaboration and make prepar- 
ation for a fascist coup d'etat", 
153 
There is little doubt that there were extremists 
within the Right Club, the Nordic League, the Imperial 
Fascist League and possibly even the B. U. F. who would have 
146 
welcomed a Nazi invasion and who contemplated actions 
which might have helped to bring this aboutol54 It is not 
too difficult to label such individuals as potential trait- 
orso155 However, there is another category which is 
harder to define. Some members of these organizations 
were not willing to actively assist the enemy, but were 
prepared to consider an overthrow of the British govern- 
ment and to immediately arrange peace terms with the Nazis. 
Groups or individuals proposing such actions cannot be re- 
garded as treacherous, but their activities would have 
justified strong government intervention. It will be sug- 
gested here that Captain Ramsay of the Right Club falls 
into this category and that a similar case can be made 
against Sir Oswald Mosley. 
In the last month before internment, the B. U. F. did 
its utmost to prove its loyalty. In Action for 9 May 1940, 
Mosley called upon his members to resist the foreign in- 
vader if he came, however rotten the British government. 
The British Union was "at the nation's disposal". 
156 A 
day later instructions were issued to all districts re- 
peating Mosley's message of 1 September 1939: "I ask you 
to do nothing to injure our country, or to help any other 
power". 
157 With the fall of Belgium and Holland the 
B. U. F. message was "peace but Britain undefeated". 
158 To 
emphasise their own loyalty, B. U. F. policy in late April 
19110 was to attack the extremists of the Iiordic League as 
Nazi traitors159 
As late as the 18 May the Cabinet were impressed with 
these declarations, the Home Secretary, John Anderson, 
147 
pointing out that no action should be taken against the 
B. U. F. as there was no evidence "that the organization as. 
such was engaged in disloyal activities", 
160 Four days 
later Anderson reversed this decision and Mosley and other 
leading fascists were arrested. 
161 Why did this turn about 
happen? The most obvious development between the two Cab- 
inet meetings that could explain the change in policy was 
the arrests of two associates of Captain Ramsay - Tyler 
Kent and Anna Wolkoff, Several recent commentators have 
gone as far as to suggest that these arrests were actually 
part of a plot so that Mosley could be interned, 
162 Such 
an analysis simplifies what was a multi-causal complex 
event, but first of all it is necessary to outline briefly 
the Kent-Vlolkoff-Ramsay affair. 
The Right Club, which according to Ramsay had met only 
once or twice, was officially closed at the start of the 
war. 
163 However, the organization did not totally dis- 
appear; members met informally to discuss the war and to 
distribute leaflets such as 'Land of Dope and Jewry' and 
'Do you know the real causes of this war? ' 
164 In this way 
the coterie survived enabling some of its members to in- 
volve themselves in more substantial activities. One of 
these was Anna Wolkoff, the daughter of an aristocratic 
Russian emigre. Coming from an intensely antisemitic back- 
ground, she acted as Ramsay's political secretary on mat- 
ters relating to the Right Club. 
165 In the war in connec- 
tion with her antisemitic whispering and leaflet campaigns 
she met up with Tyler Kent, an American cypher clerk in 
the U. U. Embassy, who had transferred from Russia in Oct- 
ober 1939.166 
348 
Through his employment Kent had access to secret 
documents, and he abused his position to photocopy up to 
1,500 items. Some of these were or a highly sensitive nat- 
ure, involving correspondence between Roosevelt and 
Churchill. 
167 By March 191t0 Kent had been in touch with 
Ramsay via Violkoff, and the M. P. had seen some of the il- 
licit files. 
168 However, at this stage a new M15 infil- 
trator, Joan Miller, had discovered Kent's activities and 
the security forces were biding their time before acting 
to bring in the conspirators, 
169 There seems little doubt 
that Kent desired to bring down both the British and Amer- 
ican governments and, hopefully, to replace them with ad- 
ministrations sympathetic to a negotiated peace with the 
Nazis. The Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence certainly 
gave him the opportunity to create a major political scan- 
dal, some of it relating to U. S. aid for the Allied cause. 
On the surface, Ramsay with access to the House of Commons, 
was the ideal man to communicate it. 
Ramsay was definitely interested in the correspondence, 
but there is no evidence of what he intended doing with 
it. 
170 In early May, rather than break the scandal to the 
House, Ramsay preferred to ask the Home Secretary whether 
the government distinguished between antiseinitism and pro- 
Nazism in its defence regulations, indicating his concern 
about his own personal libertyo171 Ramsay aimed to re- 
examine Kent'. s files after a break in Scotland, but in fact 
he-never had the opportunity to do so as he was arrested on 
his return to London on 23 May 19110.172 By then Kent and 
Wolkoff (who had attempted to communicate with William 
Joyce) had been hauled in by M15.173 In a Confidential 
349 
Annex, the Lord President of the Council presented a re- 
port on the Right Club to the Cabinet suggesting that 
Ramsay had been "engaged in treasonable practices in con- 
junction with (Kent)"o The Home Secretary continued that 
Ramsay had been in relations with Mosley, but not over 
the Kent-Wolkoff affaire174 The same day, 22 May 1940, 
the Cabinet agreed to intern Mosley and other B. U. F. 
leaders. l75 
Was the timing of the Kent/Wolkoff arrests simply an 
M15 plot to find an excuse to intern Mosley? Anthony 
Masters, the biographer of Maxwell Knight (who master- 
minded the M15 Right Club campaign), believes that this was 
the casedl76, What is more Masters believes that "Knight 
stated quite erroneously, that Ramsay was an associate of 
Mosley's... (and) that Mosley was 'in relations with Capt- 
ain Ramsay', and without any concrete evidence, poured in 
the right ingredients to believe that a majpr right-wing 
coup was at a far more developed and coherent stage than 
it could ever have been with such different... personal- 
ities". 
177 
However, as we have seen, Mosley was an as- 
sociate of Ramsay throughout the war, and there is evi- 
dence that Mosley and Ramsay were co-operating and plan- 
ning a fascist coup d'etat. Ramsay and the Right Club had 
been considering such an action since the start of the war, 
when members had been contacting sympathisers in the Armed 
Forces. 
173 
The Home Office also felt that at a meeting of 
B. U. P. London Officials on 30 January 1940 speeches by 
Mosley and Donovan suggested that the organization "may 
abandon constitutional methods and try to gain power by 
force". 179 Given the statement by Ramsay that he had been 
150 
appointed by Mosley to take over Scotland, and the mat- 
erial in the possession of Aubrey Lees that the March - 
May 1940 meetings of Ramsay and Mosley were to secure col- 
laboration and prepare for a fascist coup d'9tat, it is 
more than possible that Knight was in fact correct. 
Where Knight was probably wrong, was in his belief that 
the coup was in a developed stage. Whilst Mosley and 
Ramsay may have talked about the need for a replacement 
of the government, there is no evidence that they received 
any support for it outside their own coteries, 
Ultimately Ramsay and Mosley were interned because of 
the military crisis in Europe. With the invasion of the 
Low Countries on 10 May 1940 and the disintegration of 
France, fascist liberty was a luxury the British govern- 
ment could no longer afford. Churchill, who claimed he 
was responsible for Mosley's internment, 
180 believed there 
was a danger that if the Germans broke through, and Mosley 
had become Prime Minister, such a pro-German government 
might obtain easier terms from Germany by surrendering the 
fleet. 181 It was thus the threat of an alternative Mosley 
government, combined with the dire crisis in Europe that 
explains why the fascist internments took place, There 
was no evidence that Mosley, or indeed Ramsay intended any 
treacherous activities (that is actively helping a German 
invasion), There was evidence, however, that the two in- 
tended to reach a negotiated settlement by means that were 
unacceptable to a country on the verge of being invaded, 
The final, more hypothetical question remains. Would 
Mosley, Ramsay and other fascists and pro-Nazis have col- 
laborated with the Nazis had they invaded Britain? Mosley 
151 
claimed to the 18B Advisory Committee that if the Germans 
invaded "then I am finished". In such circumstances, 
Mosley believed that the Nazis would rule through a mili- 
tary dictatorship, or failing that a weak local leader 
like Petain in France. They would not want "a movement of 
renaissance". 
182 There is some strength in Mosley's argu- 
ment and it could be backed up by the fact that the Nazis 
had spent more attention on groups like The Link than the 
B. U. F. 
183A 
puppet leader like Ramsay or Domvi le would have 
seemed a more manageable proposition to the Nazis rather 
than the more formidable Mosley. 
184 Indeed whereas Ramsay 
was on the German 'White List' of possible col]. aborators, 
Mosley was not. 
185 However, the case against Mosley being 
part of a Nazi-ruled Europe is not totally secure. In a 
war-time prison meeting with his solicitor, according to 
an officer present, "Mosley admitted that Hitler had, in 
fact, appointed him to be a sort of co-leader in England"186 
Ramsay also denied that he would help the Germans after 
an invasion. He claimed that he was not prepared to sit 
under the Nazis at any price and that like the Jews, the 
Nazis were Britain's enemies. 
l87 He also violently at- 
tacked the idea suggested by Lord Marley that Ramsay had 
been nominated 'Gauleiter of Scotland'. 
188 Ramsay in his 
perverse way was a patriot, and how he would have behaved 
under a German government is open to doubt. 
139 Of Ramsay's 
Right Club associates a similar ambivalent pattern can be 
found. Anna Wolkoff was no foreign agent, despite her at- 
tempt to contact Joyce. Her extreme antisemit. ism and de- 
sire for peace may have led her into the Nazi camp, how- 
ever, and one of the M15 Right Club infiltrators claimed 
152 
that Wolkoff boasted that she would be Britain's Julius 
Streicher when the Germans occupied the country. 
190 Kent' 
again was, in his own mind, an American patriot, although 
he had requested a transfer to Germany in February 1940191 
Whether he would have helped the Nazi cause directly is 
again open to debates 
For such extremists the war forced a balancing act 
between their patriotism and their virulent antisemitism. 
An element within the extreme were, in Arnold Leese's 
words, "more German than the German". 
192 Two friends of 
Wolkoff were distraught when the German ship, Graf von Spee, 
was sunk, calling it a "day of black despair"0193 In the 
I. F. L., whereas Leese disapproved of the German invasion 
of Scandinavia, others such as Elizabeth Berger and H. T. 
Mills were in full. support of it. 
194 Many more were torn 
in between the two camps, typified by John Hooper Harvey. 
Harvey wrote to Leese in April 1940: "I would not give 
away secret information to the Germans unless affairs 
reached the stage they did in Spain, where foreign assist- 
ance was our only hope of cleaning out the pig-sty, but 
only in (the) very last resort". He added: "I don't want 
to be ruled by Germany or any other foreigner, but at a 
pinch even that is preferable to being ground to pulp 
under the heel of the Jew financier, and his pimps and 
proselytes"40195 
Of the B. U. F. membership, Mosley claimed that fewer 
than 55o would welcome a Nazi victory, and that in Liverpool 
only 3 out of 600 supporters were in that category. 
196 
1115 were less generous, suggesting that 25 - 30%% "would 
be willing, if ordered, to go to any lengths"6197 
153 
Throughout the war some individuals belonging to the B. U. F. 
were arrested for passing information to the Germans, but 
these seem to be exceptional cases, 
198 More common accord- 
ing to Herbert Morrison, reviewing the situation in 1943, 
were those 18B internees who said they would join up if re- 
leased, and then did noto199 Again 'patriotism' did not 
imply a desire to help the British war effort. 
Organized Fascism and Antisernitism After 18B. 
Two years after the major implementation of Regulation 
18B, which saw a maximum of 1,428 people interned at the end 
of August 1940,200 a Jewish observer could write that "anti- 
semitism in Britain to-day is dead" . 
201 As far as the 
organized variety is concerned, the statement is accurate 
enough, but it must not be assumed that the Regulation tot- 
ally destroyed British fascism. 
202 Lacking a deep-rooted 
historical tradition in Britain, the British fascists were 
acutely aware of the need to preserve their continuity. 
The story of their activities from June 1940 until the end 
of the war is not one of a robust rebirth but of a fragile 
shadowy existence, with the stress on keeping alive their 
movement. 
As if to emphasise the need for continuity, Action at 
the end of May 19110 carried the headline "Vie carry on" . 
203 
An appeal fund for internees' dependents was launched and 
the B. U. F. in early June even managed a few street meet- 
ings. 204 However, at this point the majority of the ar- 
rests were made and the B. U. P. was reduced to chaos, Re- 
placements for those who wrote for Action and were subse- 
quently detained, found themselves in turn, arrestedo205 
154 
The last issue cuuie out on 6 June 1940 with the defiant 
message We can take t". 
206 Outside London the confusion 
was greater, with no central instructions and the contin- 
uous arrest of leaders. 
207 The movement was reduced to a 
voluntary organization, depending on local initiatives to 
survive. 
The B. U. F. headquarters was moved and manned by vol- 
unteers ostensibly for administrative purposes, although 
some propaganda was still circulating. 
208 After the 25 
June 1940 such activities had been made illegal and the 
production or leaflets from the Bethnal Green branch in 
early July was soon stopped by the police. 
209 Thereafter 
activities were confined to the odd wall chalking and the 
sending of anonymous cyclostyled letters 
ý'0 In the blitz 
in September 1940 most non-interned B. U. F. sympathisers 
kept a low profile, especially in areas of the East End 
where the fascists had made the least impact. Elsewhere, 
B. U. P. supporters were more daring, trying to create anti- 
semitism in certain North and North West London tube shel- 
ters. Such activities were not tolerated for long by the 
authorities, 
211. 
As late as November 1910, when Mosley was using his 
cell in Brixton for meetings of the "Fascist Grand Council", 
the Daily Telegraph was reporting on secret meetings of 
B. U. F. members aimed at forming the nucleus of an organ- 
ization to keep the party going. 
212 
As will be shown, this 
was. one of the main reasons for the existence of the l8B 
groups which emerged in 1942, but until then no national 
B. U. F. supporting group was created. In October 1941 a 
small clique calling itself the British Union of Freemen 
155 
was caught by :. 3cotland Yard after a long investigation. 
Its members had been producing antisemi tic leaflets adver-- 
tising the New British Broadcasting Station, a Nazi prop- 
aganda network* 
213 In the Christmas of the following year 
a publication called The Flame appeared. Of its 4 pages, 
the first was a reprint of Action of 20 May 1940, the 
second was in support of Mosley and an attack on Jews and 
the war. According to the Daily Worker, it was being dis- 
tributed freely. 
2i4 
In 1943 Herbe: ot Morrison reported 
that there had been several attempts to revive the B. U. F., 
chiefly in London, but apart from local and isolated groups 
they were unsuccessful. 
215 
In the other antisemitic and fascist worlds, the im- 
pact of 18B was more devastating. Of the Nazi appeasement 
groups, the British Council for Christian Settlement in 
Europe, Information Policy and the Right Club, the intern- 
ment of such prominent leaders as John Beckett, Ben Greene, 
Norman Hey and Captain Ramsay assured their destruction. 
216 
The eventual arrest of Arnold Leese had the same effect on 
the I. F. L. Despite the closure of these organizations, the 
extreme antisemite still had many outlets to satisfy his 
hatred. xntisemitic publications such as The Patriot, The 
Van Lard, The Social Crediter and others, as well as the 
Britons Publishing Company, were still allowed to continue 
by the authorities. However, by 19112 to some ex-internees 
and other fascists, this was not enough, and new organiza- 
tiöns were demanded. 
The first to fill the vacuum was Edward Godfrey, who 
set up his British National Party (B. N. P. ) in August 1942. 
Godfrey, who claimed earlier naval connections to Domvile, 
156. 
was an ex-B. U. F. member who refused to recognise Mosley 
as his leader. 
217 A man of little talent, he collected a 
group of malcontents to his party which numbered about 
100 members according to. the Home Secretary, 
218 
or be- 
tween 20 - 30 to the less generous Jewish Defence com- 
mittee. 
219 Despite these feeble statistics, the B. N. P. 
created an enormous reaction, with protest marches and 
petitions for its banning involving thousands of people. 
220 
The degree of animosity that the B. N. P. produced can- 
not be totally explained by the nature of its programme, 
Although Godfrey denied being a fascist, preferring the 
title 'English nationalist', his organization's policies 
were reminiscent of the B. U. F's. 
221 It was for the nat- 
ional traditions of the British people against alien in- 
fluence and infiltration', against the parliamentary sys- 
tem, international finance and planning and for the small 
trader and the revival of the guilds and apprenticeship 
system. 
222 Godfrey regarded the Jews as unassimilated 
foreigners and praised Edward I's expulsion policy, and 
claimed that he would pursue a similar policy if given the 
chance. 
223 Finally, like the B. U. F., the B. N. P. demanded 
a negotiated settlement with Hitler, 
221t 
The B. N. P. became useful for both ex-18B internees 
and for the extreme left. For the former it gave the 
chance to be politically active again, and for the latter 
it was a convenient group to attack as fascists. 
225 When 
the emotional reaction to the B. N. P. is taken into account, 
it is surprising how little the group actually achieved. 
Activities were confined to distributing a mere handful of 
their own publications, as well as perhaps more importantly, 
157 
that of other antisemites such as Count Potocki and Alex- 
ander Ratcliffe. 
226 As for public meetings, the popular 
outcry stopped any of these taking place. 
227 This antag- 
onism forced the organization to close down; although it 
reappeared in April 19143 in the guise of the English Nat- 
ional Association (E. N. A. ). 
228 Apart from Herbert M orrison's 
refusal to ban the organization, its only other major pub- 
licity carne in December 19+3 when Godfrey fought the Acton 
by-election. 229 
Standing as an English nationalist, Godfrey's election 
address was an attack on "the enemy within". 
230 It was not 
explicitly antisemitic, unlike the rest of his campaign, 
though Godfrey did attack "the hidden forces" which were 
attempting to destroy the English heritage. 
231 Godfrey man- 
aged to poll 258 votes, despite having been "roundly abused 
as a Fascist". 
232 Generally he does not seen to have been 
taken seriously, according to Mass-Observation "he provided 
most of the comic relief of the election". However, as a 
News Chronicle reporter suggested, there was reason to ex- 
amine Godfrey with "a straight face". 
233 
The B. N. P. /E. N. A. 
acted as "a clearing house" for those interested 'in con- 
tinuing the fascist movement. 
234 In his election campaign 
Godfrey received the support of Captain Bernard Acworth of 
Truth and The Patriot, and of the League of Ex-Servicemen, 
a group that had supported the B. U. F. candidate at Leeds 
in 19110 and was shortly to be at the forefront of the at- 
tempted fascist revival. 
235 Finally, Godfrey had close 
links with the Duke of'BedCord, who had continued a one 
man campaign against Regulation 18B since the demise of 
the British People's Party. 236 
After Acton, Godfrey disappeared into relative ob- 
158 
scurity, forming a more explicitly antisemitic group, the 
English Legion. It and the L. N. A. were involved in the 
immediate post-war fascist resurrection, though Godfrey was 
never to achieve such notoriety again. 
237 
'Godfrey may have 
been the first to attempt a fascist or quasi-fascist re- 
vival, but by 1943 he was not alone in the field. In the 
middle of that year there were only 429 detainees left 
under 18B, 
238 
and many of those freed were anxious for 
political activity. In this type of atmosphere an obscure 
group, the People's Common Law Parliament (P. C. L. P. ) came 
into prominence as "a stalking horse for fascists". 
239 
Formed in 1940 by F. J. Scrutton the P. C. L. P's outlook 
was an amalgam of its leader's cranky world-outlook - 
pacifism, social credit and 'Christianity'. That former 
members of the B. U. F. and other antisemites should be at- 
tracted to this group is not totally surprising. At the 
start of the war, Scrutton's earlier group, the United 
Christian Petition Movement, had also been popular with 
B. U. F. members. 
240 The P. C. L. P's first two years were un- 
impressive, limited to near-empty public meetings and at- 
tacks in its organ, Parliament Chrintian on international 
usury. 
241 By late 1942 this changed with larger audiences 
many of whom shouted support for the B. U. F. and Mosley. 
242 
Although the P. C. L. P. was tinged with the antisemitism as- 
sociated with social credit circles, its leader did not en- 
courage fa: cist support*243 Scrutton barred Godfrey from 
upeaking to the organization and by the middle of 1943 its 
use by ex-Liosleyites seems to have stopped. That such a 
feeble group should be chosen by ex-18B detainees shows the 
desperation of these men and women to return to politics 
159 
and to resuscitate British fascism. Via two other organ- 
izations explicitly geared to the 18B cause, the revival 
of the B. U. F. took a step nearer completion. 
Throughout 1942 Mosley received a series of visits 
in Brixton by ex-18B detainees and sympathizers with the 
aim of setting up an 18B organization. Mosley was adamant 
that such an organization should be non-political, but many 
others on the outside wanted to collect funds to use to 
fight by-elections on a negotiated peace line. 
244 
Mosley's 
will largely prevailed and by September 1942 the 18B (Brit- 
ish) Aid Fund was registered as a war charity. 
245 
At the 
same time a sister organization, the 18B Publicity Council, 
was launched. 
246 However, if the groups were not explic- 
itly 'political', they were also not as widely based as 
Mosley had hoped, Prominent authors such as Osbert Sitwell, 
Henry and Hugh Ross Williamson refused to take an active 
part, and apart from Francis Yeats-Brown, the group was lim- 
ited to support from ex-1OBs and The Patriot. 
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Not surprisingly, its first public meeting in December 
1942 was widely perceived as an attempt to revive the 
B. U. F. 
248 Fascist and untisemitic remarks were heard 
throughout the n. acting arid in general the 18B groups gave 
the impression that the regulation was imposed on British 
citizens for their anti-Jewish activities. 
2L9 The groups 
operated to fulfil two functions simultaneously. At one 
level, to protest again.: t 18B and to col] ect funds for the 
dependants of detainees, at another to maintain political 
contacts, and as lierbel"t 1.1orrison s t-%ested to "serve as 
a nucleus for a political party until the ban on the B. U. 
is raised". 
250 Francis Yeats-Brown confirmed Morrison's 
analysis in a letter to Henry Wi1]. iam: on before the first 
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meeting: "So we aren't all sheep, and we still want to 
hear of British Union! ". 
251 As a result the groups became 
a re-union club for ex-detainees,, partly social with con- 
certs arid house meetings, and partly political with the 
emergence of new leaders to pave the way for Mosley's 
returne252 
Meetings continued into 1941t and 1945, but by this 
time the 18B groups had spawned their own successors, as 
yet again the British fascist movement was to splintero 
By 1943 the more explicitly pro-Mosley 18B groups were 
rivalling Godfrey's English National Association, 253 but 
the demands for a purely political M osleyite group were 
still growing. On the street level fascist activities 
were reviving, slogans and defacements reappearing espec- 
ially in London. In February 1943 the most notorious in- 
cident happened, with the painting of 'P. J. ' on the Lenin 
memorial. 
254 In August of that year, the ex-18Bs showed 
their renewed confidence and attempted to break up a left- 
wing meeting in their old territory of Ridley Road. 
255 
With the release of Mosley and his wife in November 19L3 
tensions between fascists and anti-fascists grew stronger. 
Although left-wing groups were at the forefront of the 
campaign against the B. U. P. leader's release, there is 
little doubt, as Mass-Observation suggested, that "the 
indignation... was spontaneous, deeply felt and felt by an 
overwhelming majority". 
256 Even Conservative groups joined 
in the chorus of disapproval. 
257 After this, any attempt 
which could be vaguely seen as a revival of fascism would 
face violent opposition. 
Despite this atmnospliere, fascists were willing to risk 
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public meetings. In June 1944 the Jewish Defence Committee 
reported on the first open-air antisemitic street meetings 
since the fascist internments three years earlier, 
258 
Later that summer, both the 18B Detainees Group and the 
League of Ex-Servicemen attempted meetings in Hyde Park - 
a hostile crowd faced both organizations, 
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The latter 
group had been active in the Leeds and Acton by-elections 
supporting the fascist candidates, but in 1944 it was to 
come into its own at the forefront of the attempted fascist 
revival. Even as late as October 19! 14 it was not partic- 
ularly active, concentrating its attack on aliens and on the 
policy of the British Legion. 
260 A month later it was to be 
transformed as its platform saw scenes of conflict not seen 
since the 1930s. 
Leading its transformation was Jeffrey Hamm, an ex- 
B. U. F. member and 18B detainee. 
261 Hamm 's internment in 
the Falklands appears to have strengthened his commitment 
to Mosley and after a spell in the army he was determined 
to revive the B. U. F. In November 19li4 the first meetings 
of the new-styled League of Ex-Servicemen were held in Hyde 
Park. Only three meetings took place, with up to 200 
people in the opposition. 
262 Due to police protection 
Hamm was to get his message across of 'Britain for the 
British' as well as his attacks on 'international finance' 
and the 'House of Rothschild' 0263 His partner Victor 
Burgess announced that those not "100 per cent British by 
race" would be disqualified from voting and confirmed that 
the League was a fascia>t body. 
264 Dunlop, the main force 
behind the 18B groups, was upset at this, as he had carried 
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out blosley's instructions regarding the non-political 
status of the 18B groups since 1942.265 Out of this dis-_ 
agreement came the first split in the post-' 18B' world of 
British fascism. Hamm was to continue as -leader of the 
League of Ex-Servicemen, being heavily involved in an 
anti-alien campaign at the close of the war. 
266 Burgess 
was to run an antisemitic publishing company, Corporate 
Utilities, and his own political group, the Union for 
British Freedom. Finally Dunlop, who had laid the basis 
for the Mosleyite revival, disappeared into obscurity, 
267 
The pattern for post-war British fascism was clearly 
set by the close of hostilities. On a 'street level', 
Jeffrey Hamm's League of Ex-Servicemen would come to re- 
present the dangers of a fascist revival with its violent 
public meetings in London. 
268 Yet by 1945 another level 
of fascist/antisemitic activity had been firmly established. 
In June of that year a group calling itself the National 
Front After Victory held its first secret meeting. As 
Lord Vansittart was to suggest a year later, what was re- 
markable about this group was its interesting membershipý69 
Its Chairman was A. K. Chesterton, by now deputy editor of 
Truth, and other individuals involved included Collin 
Brooks, also of Truth, G. F. Green and Cuthbert Reavely 
and t!. `1'. Mills of The Patriot, Pepler of the Weekly Re- 
view, Henry Williamson, J. F. C. Fuller, Ben Greene and Lord 
Portsmouth. 270 Taken together, the group represented a 
fair cross-section of the antisemitic radical right-wing 
world (excluding Mosleyites). 
In fact the National Front had been formed 12 months 
earlier, but it was only with the end of hostilities in 
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Europe that this group, which aimed to coordinate the 
various . anti-Jewish organizations, started 
to operate. 
Although the Front's main aim was to protect national sov- 
ereignty from "the further extension of Jewish power and 
influence in Britain", members were wary of adopting an 
openly anti-Jewish policy. Instead a more guarded state- 
ment on "the real Jewish problem" was produced. 
271 Co- 
operation was the key word for the Front and contact was 
made with the whole spectrum of groups in Britain's anti- 
semitic network. Closest links were achieved with the 
newly reformed British People's Party which included mod- 
erates such as Bedford, and extremists such as A. T. O. Lees. 
Indeed, the National Front nearly became a branch of the 
latter organization. 
272 At the other end of the fascist 
spectrum, contact was made with ex-members'of the Imperial 
Fascist League, who were supposedly considering an armed 
uprising. However, such activities as well as sympathy 
towards William Joyce were frowned upon by the Front. 
273 
Support was also given to Hamm and the Hampstead petition 
movement 0274 
The National Front was like its later namesake, an 
unstable coalition bringing together moderate antisemites 
and Nazi supporters. All were united in a profound anti- 
communism, but such a bond was not sufficient to keep the 
Front together. 275 Instead, it managed a separate exist- 
ence for only a year or so before being swallowed up into 
276 
the British People's Party. This in turn contributed 
members to A. K. Chesterton's League of Empire Loyalists 
161, 
which in 1967 was one of the two major components of the 
second National Front. 
277 Over the first twenty post-war' 
years, the radical right in Britain had turned full circle. 
In considering in 1947 why the fascist revival had 
happened so quickly and thoroughly, Douglas Hyde perceptiv- 
ely pointed out that "the answer is that (in the war) the 
Fascist organizations never went out of existence". 
278 
Some of the groups covered here were feeble enterprises 
with limited funds and only a few dozen members. However, 
as they self-consciously realised, they filled a function 
of keeping a fascist and antisemitic tradition in Britain 
alive. To do so in a total war against the Nazi enemy was 
in its way a major achievement, showing perhaps the strengths 
and weaknesses of liberal democracy. Civil libertarian 
feeling was strong enough for the government to tolerate 
the revival of fascism. Fortunately for parliamentary de- 
mocracy in Britain, the post-war world did not offer the 
opportunities for fascism to expand outside the fringes of 
society. 
If there is a paradox in the continuity of organised 
British fascism during the Hitler war, then it is strength- 
ened when the parallel existence of a strong British anti- 
semitic ideological movement is also taken into account. 
If the British antisemite had to hunt around for a suitable 
organization to join in the war, this was not true of the 
printed word. At least four weekly antisemitic journals 
continued throughout the war, supplemented by five or more 
publishing companies devoted to antis emitica. 
279 In the 
course of the war against the genocidally antisemitic Nazis, 
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some 'classic' and virulent printed antisemitism was pro- 
duced in Britain. The purpose of this last section will be 
to examine how the Second World War affected contemporary 
British antisemitic ideology, and to see what impact this 
had on society. 
No man likes to be an island, and this includes those 
in the antisemitic world in Britain. Antisemitic propagand- 
ists have made constant reference to what has been said or 
written before. Yet this must not disguise the fact that 
even at its low intellectual level, antisemitic ideology 
(including its most extreme form), has developed and re- 
sponded to economic and social change. It has been suggested 
that the fast-changing world of post-1918 Britain could be 
viewed by some in terms of a crisis, and that this needs to 
be taken account of in explaining the growth of conspirator- 
ial antisemitism in the 1920s and 30s. 
280 In the Second 
World War, with radical internal developments and the ex- 
ternal battle against an antisemitic enemy, this sense of 
crisis intensified in the extreme world of British Jew- 
hating. How then did antisemitic ideology adapt to the 
war? 
Whatever their differences, in the 1930s what fascists 
and antisemites of all shades and hues could agree on was 
that the Jews were planning a World War. To some it was all 
written in The Protocols, to others a slightly less con- 
spiratorial but vaguer concept of Jewish power was respon- 
sible for war. 
2_ However when war came, such general ideol- 
ogical agreement disappeared. By then the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
had been signed, and the antisemitic groups, which had 
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viewed Hitler as the saviour of the world against Internat- 
ional Jewry, and Russia as the home of the latter, were 
thrown into a state of confusion. 
The Patriot showed these tensions roost clearly. A 
strong supporter of Hitler since 1936,262 it reverted back 
to its original anti-German policy with the pact. Nesta 
Webster defended The Patriot, saying it would support the 
war "now that Hitler by his base betrayal of the anti-Soviet 
cause... and reversion to the old Prussian system of broken 
pledges... has forfeited the sympathy that many of us felt 
for him". 
283 Others in the extreme antisemitic world fol- 
lowed The Patriot in reversing their policy with the war. 
The Militant Christian Patriots, the group that had at- 
tempted to coordinate antisemitic activities in Britain, 
and which had also supported Hitler in the late 1930s, 
claimed it was closing its offices and paper, attacking the 
Nazi regime as "Prussianism in a new guise". 
284 
Yet to some groups such a turnabout was unnecessary. 
The advantage of a conspiracy theory is its total flexibil- 
ity. It could be said that elements within the Social 
Credit movement brought the conspiracy theory to its ultim- 
ate absurdity. One section, the Social Credit Secretariat, 
based in Liverpool and controlled by the movement's founder, 
Major Douglas, believed that not only was international 
socialism and finance controlled by Jews, but the Nazi move- 
ment itself. The antisemitism of Hitler had not impressed 
this group which was convinced that the Pan-German-Jewish 
threat continued, and that the war was inevitable given the 
power of this secret force. Douglas himself wrote in 
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November 1939 that "not only is anti-semititum (anti- 
Judaism) not Nazi-ism, but Nazi-ism is pro-Judaic". 
285 
Belief in the theory that 'Hitler's Policy is a Jewish 
Policy', 286 would ueein to be asking too much even of the 
conspiratorially-minded extreme antisemitic world in Brit- 
ain, yet it is perhaps surprising how successful it was 
amongst the fringe. The Patriot of 21 September 1939 re- 
ferred to "the sinister significance of (the) Moscow-Berlin 
Pact" and repotted shortly after that Hitler has "sold his 
soul to the devil". 
287 Nesta Webster commented that she 
had always pointed out the Pan-German as well as the Pan- 
Jewish danger, 288 and James Dell of The Britons and Free 
Press concurred, suggesting that Hitler was "doing what 
the Jewish leaders desire". 
289 These arguments were also 
to be used by the popular publicist, Douglas Reed. 
However, while the Douglas Social Credit movement op- 
posed the war, as it would only lead to the Judaising of 
Europe "via Hitler or via qtr. Greenwood", both The Patriot 
and the Militant Christian Patriots reluctantly supported 
it, if only for the sake of the British Empire. 
290 The 
distributist Weekly Review also offered luke-warm support 
of the war effort, largely because Catholic Poland was being 
threatened by 'Jewish Bolshevism-Naziism' . 
291 
Angus Calder 
has commented on the paradox of "antisemitic right-wing 
patriots" fighting ugailist Hitler, but this was not, of 
course, true of all the extremists. 
292 
Whilst Arnold Leese 
was shocked by the Soviet-German pact and remarked that 
"Hitler has been a marvel, but is no longer one", he did 
not lose all faith in Hitler and could not bring himself 
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to support the war effort. 
293 Although others in the 
I. F. L. supported Hitler in all his actions, Leese's crit- 
icism of Hitler stopped short of suggesting that he was 
under Jewish control. 
294 Leese could not support the 
Social Credit theory being propagated by hip one time 
ally, the Britons; as he wrote to the leader of the latter: 
"No, Dell, I think it's all Bunk with a big B". 
295 Alex- 
ander Ratcliffe, leader of the Scottish Protestant League, 
lost even less faith in Hitler than Leese, opposing a war 
fought for "World Jewry and the Papacy". 
296 
If there were bitter ideological disagreements in the 
antisemitic world on the nature of the war and the position 
to be adopted towards Hitler, then on internal war devel- 
opments there was much more consensus. Even those support- 
ing the war stressed the need to keep an eye on Jewish ac- 
tivities at home. Free Press summarised this viewpoint. 
Whilst supporting "the Government in the War against our 
open enemies", it warned that "the subtle forces which are 
working ceaselessly to destroy our religion and country is 
(sic) as great as ever". 
297 These extreme right-wing 
groups, which had seen any attempt at planning the British 
economy in the 1930s as evidence of the Jewish conspiracy298 
continued to view any such activities in the war in a par- 
anoid manner. 
The greatest bugbear of the radical antiseritic right 
had been P. E. P., a non-party group that represented a 
growing interest in the planning movement in the 1930s. 
299 
Any antisemitic reference to this group was inevitably 
linked up to the involvement of Israel Moses Sieff in 
P. E. P., and from there a direct link was made to The Pro- 
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tocols, 300 With the war even more was blamed on the organ- 
ization. - Miscellaneous statements made by P. E. P. through- 
out the 1930s, that war would bring good opportunities for 
planners, were constantly churned out by the antisemitic 
groups as explanations for the imposition of Jewish control 
over society. 
301 
It has to be said that the Second World 
War gave good opportunities for those worried by planning 
to have their worst fears confirmed. If, essentially, the 
planning movement of the 1930s had caused concern only to 
the radical right, the Second World War developments created 
shudders across the majority of the Conservative Party. 
302 
In the fringe world of the radical right, the explan- 
ation for government interference was automatic - Jewish 
power. At the start of the war, A. R. P. and evacuation were 
seen as alien - Bolshevik plots, the former to introduce 
local socialism, 
303 
and the latter to destroy the English 
countryside by the introduction of 'verminous Jews'Q304 
However, such minor plots paled into insignificance com- 
pared to the new development in the supposed Jewish World 
Conspiracy - Federal Union. This "Utopian Project"305 
originated in America and was popular amongst liberal and 
left wing circles as a way of solving international pro- 
blems by creating a European federal stateo306 In Britain 
interest was shown by the publication of a Penguin Special 
advocating Federal Union in November 1939. At the same time, 
fascist and antiseiaitic groups began attacking the move- 
307 
mento The Social Creditor, always quick to spot a con- 
spiracy, was the first to identify Federal Union as part 
of Israel Moses Sieff's world plan. The M. C. P's Free 
Press soon followed claiming it was all "outlined in The 
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Protocols of the Elders of Zion". 
308 
It has already been pointed out that at this same 
point, Mosley was also attacking the Jewish plot of Fed- 
eral Union. 
309 This shows not only the tendency of the 
B. U. F. leader to move towards a conspiracy theory, but also 
the wide degree of ideological agreement of British anti- 
semites on this matter. Indeed, it is hard to find any 
such extremist group or individual who did not attack 
'Jewish' Federal Union at some point in the war. 
310 Why 
the Jewish connection was made is not immediately obvious. 
Few Jews were prominent in the movement, nor did it say 
much about Jewish matters. However, Federal Union could 
be viewed as a typical P. E. P. stunt if one so wished, even 
if the latter or kindred bodies had no official connections 
to it. As the Social Crediter succinctly put it, "the Jew 
must be adjudged guilty until he is proved innocent". 
311 
By the end of 1940 both the left and the antisemitic 
right had lost interest in Federal Union. However, the 
latter did not take long to find other evidence of the Jew- 
ish conspiracy. From the start of the war, some antisem- 
itic groups had warned about the government powers under 
Regulation 18B. 
312 After the mass arrests in 1940 these 
fears enlarged and the Regulation came to be seen as yet 
more evidence of the Jewish conspiracy in Britain. 
-13 
Jews were using the Regulation to prevent any criticism 
of their behaviour and at the same time removing long-held 
civil liberties, enabling their stranglehold on Britain to 
tighten. The identification of l8B as a Jewish Regulation, 
either as racial revenge, or more sinisterly, as part of 
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The Protocols was a constant feature of the propaganda of 
the revived fascist movement in the war. 
314 However, the 
Regulation was seen as only part of -the conspiracy in 
antisemitic circles. Government actions in 'social policy 
were viewed with even greater alarm. 
In late 1942 the long-awaited Beveridge Report was 
published, the huge queues for it revealing the public's 
315 deep concern over the Welfare State. The Report, which 
examined the three areas of family benefits, employment 
and the national health service, gained nation-wide sup- 
port except, according to the government's Home Intelli- 
gence, from "a hostile minority"e316 This latter oppos- 
ition, as will be later shown, came from large sections 
of the Conservative Party but it also included fringe 
groups on the extreme right who saw the 'Beveridge Plot'317 
as more proof of the increasing Jewish domination of 
Britain. 
By the start of 1943 most in the extreme antisemitic 
world were despairing of Britain's future. They had 
warned that 'Jewish' planning groups would exploit the 
opportunities of war to enslave Britain; the Beveridge 
Report confirmed their worst fears. Beveridge's linkages 
to the "London School of (Judaic) Economics"318 and to 
Israel Moses Sieff's P. E. P. were stressed and his Report 
was viewed as a culmination of plots all stemming from 
The Protocols. 319 Out of this concern came a group spec- 
ifically created to oppose one aspect of the Beveridge Re- 
port - the proposals on the Health Service. "The Medical 
Policy Association (M. P. A. ) was formed in March 1943 and 
it was soon to achieve both notoriety and some success. 32° 
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The background of the M. P. A's leadership shows the 
importance of the antisemitic tradition in Britain in 
providing an ideological structure for its later adherents. 
Of the four men who controlled the organization, two had 
been weaned on the conspiracy theories of The Patriot 
since the 19203,321 another was a leading Douglas Social 
Crediter, 322 and the final one's world-view owed much to 
the British volkisch-mystical tradition and British- 
Israelitism. 323 Such a collection does not appear impres- 
sive and given that the first bulletin of the organization 
directly linked medical planners to The Protocols (via 
P. E. P. and the L. S. E. ), 
324 it could be expected that the 
M. P. A. would have been limited to an obscure fringe of the 
medical world. Its relative success as a pressure group 
needs a convincing explanation. 
It has been suggested that part of the M. P. A's appeal 
came from its antisemitism. 
325 This argument suggests that 
the M. P. A. played upon a strong tradition of antipathy to 
Jews in the British medical world, born out of insecurity, 
the threat from refugees and money-lenders, However, its 
author recognises that this prejudice does not imply sup- 
port for a Jewish conspiracy argument. 
326 Whilst medical 
antisemitisra will be examined in greater depth at a later 
point, it must be suggested that the M. P. A's popularity 
was generally despite its antisemitisme Only if the deep 
fear of government inturventien into the medical world 
amongst the majority of British G. Ps (and the conservative 
B. M. A. ) is taken into account, can the M. P. A's success be 
explained. 
327 Feeding off this fear, the M. P. A. managed 
to inject a conspiracy theory into the argument, one that 
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was at first explicitly antiseinitic, 
328 In such a way, 
arguments which might be considered to be outside the 
mainstream of ordinary belief - such as the Jewish origins 
of Hitlerism and Israel Moses Sieff's control of British 
life - were introduced to a wider public. The M. P. A. 
might not have stopped the implementation of the National 
Health Service, but as a pressure group it was successful 
in augmenting opposition to planning in the medical 
329 
world. 
In general, extreme antisemites in Britain were not 
so positive as the M. P. A. in their attempts to stop the 
tide of 'Jewish' planning. A resigned pessimism is more 
typical of the attitude of such individuals. Writing in 
the Social Crediter, J. Dell of The Britons commented on 
an article by Harold Laski in July 1942. Laski had sug- 
gested that the war offered opportunities for revolution 
and counter-revolution. 
330 To Dell this was tacit admit- 
tance of the essential message of The Protocols and he 
commented "Has the Jew become so confident that he does 
not mind whether cats are let out of the bag? "331 Francis 
Yeats-Brown believed himself an optimist in thinking 'that 
the Jews will not rule the world, as they confidently ex- 
pect', 
33 2 Certainly, with Hitler defeated and a general 
left-wing transformation of British society, the right- 
wing antisemite had little to be cheerful about. Even 
Jewish atrocity stories offered little comfort, for these 
were generally seen by such extremists as propaganda de- 
signed to help Jewish control of the world by getting 
Gentile sympathy. 
333 
In summarizing antisemitic ideology in the Second 
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World War, it is important firstly to stress how it con- 
tained a dynamic element. Although constant reference 
was made to an older antisemitic tradition, new factors 
evolving from developments in the war itself were con- 
33 
stantly addede Secondly, although emphasis has been put 
on some of the ideological agreement of these groups, con- 
flict must also be taken into account. Distributist at- 
tacked social crediter, 
335 
crank dismissed crank as crank, 
and antisemite dismissed antisemite as 'Jewish'. 
336 To 
some Catholicism was the answer to the Jewish Peril, to 
others the two were in league with the devil. Even Arnold 
Leese's attack on Mosley's 'kosher fascism' did not end 
with the start of the war. 
337 The third point to note is 
the varying solutions they offered to the 'Jewish problem'. 
Supporters of a Nazi-inspired racial antisemitism were 
rare in Britain, and no-one in the war publicly advocated 
extermination. 
338 Arnold Leese, who had earlier put for- 
ward 'the lethal chamber' as the solution to the Jewish prob- 
lem, was vaguer in the war itself, suggesting only that 
"the Jew must be taken out of Europe". 
339 Leese's other 
suggestion, that of sending Jews to Madagascar, found sup- 
port from both the Social Credit Secretariat and The 
Britons C 3t}C The idea of exporting Jews also appealed to 
the B. U. F. Perhaps one of the most revealing aspects of 
the papers relating to Mcsley's 18B interrogation was his 
reported willingness to carry out this policy when he had 
power. Rather than keep the Jews in Ghettos, as "an eter- 
nal irritant within the body politic", Mosley was happy to 
remove all foreigners. Asked if this included the Jews, 
Mosley replied: "Quite right". 3141 
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Not all the extreme right went as far as to demand 
the expulsion of the Jewish minority. Some, while agreeing 
with Mosley that the Jews were "a nation within a nation". 
342 
wanted to recognise that fact legally, with ördinances con- 
trolling Jewish activities. 
31L3 However, even here there 
was a tendency towards supporting expulsion if such apart- 
heid failed. 344 However, extremist support for 'zionism', 
of the Jews achieving redemption on the soil of their own 
lands, did not apply to Palestine. Paradoxically, although 
those in the extreme antisemitic world were 'race conscious' 
to a high degree, they still championed the Arab cause in 
the Middle East. Rather than being simply the backing of 
the Jews' Palestinian rivals, this support came out of a 
genuine philo-Arabism. The fact that Arabs were also 
'Semites' was conveniently ignored. 
345 It will be interest- 
ing now to examine how important 'race' was in British anti- 
. Semitic 
ideology. 
How far were genetic explanations of Jewish behaviour 
accepted by extreme antisemites? Only a few isolated groups 
like the I. F. L. were open supporters of racial antisemit- 
ism, 346 but racial explanations also played their part in 
other extremists' ideology. For example, although Mosley 
emphasised in his first 18B interview that the B. U. F., un- 
like the Nazis, did not attack Jews on racial grounds, 
347 
his arguments on the Jew:; were based on an ethnocentrism 
that at times became deterministic. Mosley later argued 
that' his antiseraitism came from a long British tradition 
coming from the soil, and that antagonism to Jews was 
"probably latent in the racial... consciousness of a great 
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many (English) men". 
348 As Richard Thurlow has suggested 
"It is sometimes difficult in practice to distinguish be- 
tween 'scientific' and 'common sense' variants of a (be- 
lief) system" on racial matters. 
349 
Generally speaking 
the B. U. F's views on Jews were Lamarckian rather than 
Darwinian. E. D. Hart in the B. U. Quarterly of Spring 1940 
suggested that culture, not race, was the essence of the 
Jewish problem, and that the solution was to end the Jews' 
nomadism and to settle them on the soil. 
350 Similarly, in 
the Social Credit movement, the opposition to Jews was 
theoretically limited to Jewish financial activities. 
351 
However, yet again the matter is more complex, for not only 
was a form of conspiratorial antisemitism employed, but 
also biological explanations were given by Social Crediters 
for Jewish activities. Jews according to C. H. Douglas 
"have a.. erace consciousness which is perhaps unique". 
352 
What is more, the Social Credit guru also praised the Nazi 
ideology of 'Blut and Boden'; each culture should be rac- 
ially related to the soil argued Douglas, 
353 Others in 
Britain during the war supported such a volkisch outlook. 
Groups connected to Lord Lymington such as New Pioneer, 
the English Array, English blistery and the League of Hus- 
bandry continued to hold summer camps. They also distrib- 
uted literature attacking the malevolent alien Jewish in- 
fluence on the English race, and advocated a return to the 
land. 54 
As a whole antiseinitic ideology in Britain during the 
Second World War continued its earlier pattern with a 
greater emphasis on conspiracy ideas. 355 There was also a 
tendency to replace racialist attacks on Jews with language 
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that was less explicit, being based on a more ethnocentric 
approach. Some ideologists such as A. K. Chesterton aban- 
doned their earlier support for more Nazi-orientated anti- 
semitism, and concentrated on the threat to British nat- 
ional sovereignty from the alleged international Jewish in- 
fluence. 
356 Whatever their stance, all extreme antisemites 
had to re-examine their beliefs in the war against Hitler. 
Although a few did not change their outlook at all in the 
1939-45 period, most had to modify their ideology to some 
357 
extent. The absurd results that some came up with - 
such as the Jewish origins of Adolf Hitler or Julius Streicher - 
show what a desperate time the Second World War was for 
Britain's antisemitic fringe. Nevertheless it also shows 
how flexible and durable conspiracy ideas have been in 
British society. 
Extremist antisemitism thus took many forms in Britain 
during the war. One final vital question needs to be asked: 
what was their impact and importance in British society? 
As far ns organized political groups are concerned, one has 
only to examine the pathetic showing of movements such as 
the B. U. F. or the E. N. A. in the war by-elections to prove 
how distant they were from electoral success. A total of 
1,549 votes in four contests does not indicate a mass fol- 
lowing. 358 However, as Stuart Rawnsley has perceptively 
pointed out, groups like the B. U. F. could exert more influ- 
ence than mere membership figures would suggest, especially 
c 
over certain issues. 
35 In the Second World War the con- 
stant fascist opposition to Jewish refugees and to the Jews' 
War made their impact on British society. As lute as 1943 
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the social commentator, James Hodson, reported on a sur- 
vey of new recruits and what they thought they were 
fighting for. The response "I am fighting because Jewish 
international financiers wanted a war", was not isolated. 
Indeed, Hodson commented that there were many such replies 
"of which this is representative". 
360 However, it is 
doubtful whether other aspects of fascist propaganda, such 
as the need for a corporate state, made any impact on the 
public either in the 1930s or in the war. 
361 
Part of the B. U. F's limited success came from its 
pragmatism. Whereas its rival, the I. F. L., was a one 
trick pony with a limited appeal of its physically and 
verbally violent antisemitism, the B. U. F. adapted to local 
'needs'. In Bristol it was anti-Welsh and in Liverpool 
and Cardiff it was anti-black. 
362 In East Anglia it con- 
centrated on rural issues*363 Its British Traders Bureau, 
aimed at lower middle class malcontents, enjoyed some suc- 
cess, especially in North-East London, here the Jewish 
issue being used successfuliy, 
364 Used effectively, on 
a street level, antisemitism remained one of the B. U. F's 
best crowd pullers. 
365 The organized fascist and anti- 
semitic groups thus helped Britain to remain Jew conscious 
into the Second World War. 
What of the power of the antisemitic word in the 
1939-45 period? In 19'4O John Hooper Haarvey, a man pre- 
viously associated with the literary corumittee of the 
I. P. L., wrote The Heritage of Britain, an Aryan history 
of Britain. 
366 Harvey believed that the knowledge con- 
tained in the book could "yet save the British nation from 
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the downfall which awaits those who lose race-consciousness, 
and who mix their blood with that of lesser breeds""367 
It is doubtful if an unsuspecting. member of the public who 
by chance managed to read one of the few hundred copies of 
The Heritage would have been impressed. Even the Weekly 
Review remarked that Harvey's book was nonsense, "based on 
the undigested reading of anthropologists". 
368 Harvey's 
work obviously belongs to the world of the lunatic fringe 
and his activities with his war-time ally, Count Potocki, 
would seem to confirm this judgement. 
Potocki was pretender to the Polish Crown and his 
'court' in Little Bookham, Surrey, in March 1943 was the 
scene of one of the most bizarre incidents in the war. 
369 
Frederick Bowman, ex-18B and supporter of the Duke of Bed- 
ford, was to be knighted by the 'king' for his services to 
the crown. 
37° Harvey, dressed up in a Robin Hood tunic, 
played his flute, whilst Potocki "as high priest of the 
sun" lit the incense, intoned a prayer and knighted 
Bowman. 7l Can Potocki or Harvey be taken seriously given 
the nature of these events, and the obscurity of their pub- 
lications? 
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is yes, for on the 
one hand Harvey was in the process of becoming an er, inent 
architectural historian and on the other, Potocki's activ- 
ities were not limited to sending 'court circulars' to 
fellow eccentrics, The intriguing aspect about John Hooper 
Harvey was his ability to work at many different levels, 
His 'gutter antisemitism' letter to Arnold Leese in April 
1940 has already been mentioned, 
372 
yet with The Heritage 
he could produce more reasoned 'Aryan' antisemitism. 
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Moreover, although he had contributed to The Fascist in 
the 1930s, at the same point he had written respectable 
academic articleso373 In the war itself Harvey's first 
major book, Henry Yevele, managed to combine both this 
academic respectability and Harvey's 'Nordic' philosophy374 
In it Harvey praised the Gothic (which he häd earlier 
stated was the same as the Aryan), attacked cosmopolitism 
and planning and advocated a Golden Age of the fourteenth 
century. 
375 
His next work, Gothic England, completed at the end 
of the war, was a similar mixture. Whereas in The Heritage 
of Britain he had bluntly praised Edward Its treatment of 
the Jews, in Gothic England the phraseology was more 
guarded. Here Harvey stated that "England had been given 
back to the English by Edward I"; 376 the same message - 
but a respectable tone. This was the great danger of 
Harvey, the ability to communicate an anti-Jewish message 
in a publicly acceptable manner. In his most famous book, 
The Plantagenets, Harvey did this at the most sophisticated 
level. 377 Again he praised "the statesmanship of Edward's 
decision to remove the whole Jewish community", but in this 
case Harvey actually managed to suggest that the Jews had 
indeed committed ritual murders in twelvth and thirteenth 
century Britain. 
378 The subtle way in which Harvey was 
able to bring in the Medieval blood libel against the Jews 
is shown by the fact that it is only now, nearly forty 
years later, that this book, a school best-seller, has 
been suppressed by its ptiblisYiers. 
37' 
Harvey thus succeeded in bringing extremist anti- 
semitic ideas into mainstream British society. Ho: vever, 
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he was not alone. Antisemitic periodicals like the Social 
Crediter, Weekly Angles or The Vanguard had a circulation 
of up to 2., 000 . 
380 The Patriot may have had up to 5,000 
subscriberso381 Their influence on their own was thus 
not great. In 1940 the Home Secretary, John Anderson, sug- 
gested that the 20 or so fascist or antisemitic periodicals 
"circulate among the same limited groups of people"0382 As 
will be shown shortly this in itself did serve a function, 
but these figures show the limited appeal of such anti- 
semitism. However, the ideas contained in them were not 
exclusive to these periodicals. Again a system of dif- 
fusion into wider society operated0 In the war, both the 
periodical Truth, located in most 'respectable' clubs and 
with links to the Conservative Party, 
383 
and the popular 
publicist, Douglas Heed, were putting out similar ideas to 
those of The Patriot or the Social Crediter. The language 
was less hysterical but the message was similar. Reed and 
Truth attacked 18B as Jewish revenge; 
384 the Beveridge Re- 
port, P. E. P. and Federal Union were seen-in terms of 
Jewish conspiracy, 
385 
as was the black market; 
386 
and both 
doubted the stories of Jewish persecution in Europe. 
387 
Reed even went as far as suggesting the Jewish origins of 
Iiitlerism, the same view held by the Social Credit Secret- 
ariat. 
388 The impact of Reed and Truth on British society 
will be left to later chapters, but at this point it is 
necessary to point out that both were ways that extreme 
antisemitism managed to perculate into wider society. 
What then of Potocki? Whilst the total eccentricity 
of his behaviour and appearance paradoxically made him 
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an acceptable literary figure in the 1930s389 the polit- 
ical impact of the Right Review and his . Polish Royalist 
Associated was negligibleo390 However, the war gave 
Potocki a certain prominence despite his dbvious cranki- 
ness. The antisemitic world was short of outlets to 
print its material, and the mad Pole, with his primitive 
press, became a vital link in helping extremist groups to 
get their message across. In 1942 he published the lit- 
erature of the 18B Publicity Council, 
391 
and a year later, 
after he had fallen out with the latter group, Potocki 
printed the second edition of Alexander Ratcliffe's The 
Truth About the Jews,, 
392 A Jewish Chronicle reporter sug- 
gested it was "probably the vilest antisemitic pamphlet 
yet produced in Britain". 
393 In it Jews were blamed for 
90c/0 of all crimes, pornography, birth control, and the 
war. 
394 Perhaps the worst feature of the book was his 
claim that "there is not a single authentic case on re- 
cord of a single Jew having been massacred or unlawfully 
put to death under the Hitler regime". 
395 
The book became notorious and although only several 
thousand were produced, according to the Glasgow police 
"100,000 copies could easily have been printed and sold"396 
The circulation of The Truth About the Jews also illus- 
trates how closely knit the antisetnitic world was in 
Britain during the war. The Potocki/itatcliffe link was 
only one of several connections. The book was also sold 
by Essential Books, an antiseinitic distributer and pub- 
lisher of Taunton, and by Edward Godfrey, the English 
National Association leadero397 John Hooper Harvey's 
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home itself acted as a nucleus keeping an antisemitic 
coterie alive in Britain. Potocki, Alfred Day and 
Frederick Bowman were just some of the extremists given 
refuge by Harvey in the war. 
398 Journals such as The 
Vanguard and The Patriot (whose offices were also a meet- 
ing place for ex-18B detainees) also kept individuals in 
touch with one another in this most difficult of periods399 
Such antisemitic coteries were not limited to the organized 
extremist groups and papers. In Durham, a viciously anti- 
semitic Mass-Observer spent the war attacking Jews along 
with her husband, friends, coalman and grocer1400 
These coteries also performed the function of keeping 
antisemitic ideas alive in Britain. Indeed, in November 
1941 The Patriot launched a desperate appeal for funds to 
keep the journal going, stressing "the need for an organ 
devoted both to exposing the undermining of the country's 
social structure and to providing ideas for maintaining in- 
tact the heritage which has cone to British people". 
401 
Elsewhere other groups fulfilled the same function. It is 
highly ironic that the Britons Publishing Company produced 
two new editions of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in 
the war, at the same time as the Germans were using it as 
a major propaganda weapon against the Allies. 
402 
At the very end of the war Douglas Hyde could write 
that "there is now a growing network of (arrtisemitic") book- 
shops (in Britain) stretching from Liverpool to Tauntorie403 
Hyde was exaggerating to an extent because there were few 
40 in between, but his point that the antisemitic and 
fascist world. hud re-established itself by May l91F5 is a 
sound one. By the efforts of the extremist organizations 
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and journals the antisemitic world in Britain had been 
maintained during the war. Limited in size, it was still 
large enough to keep the government worried about a fascist 
or antisemitic threat to British society. 
405 
Whilst the 
government's fears may have been exaggerated, it is true 
that the foundations had already been laid for the post- 
war fascist revival. Under the guise of the League of Ex- 
Servicemen and later Mosley's Union Movement, fascist 
violence, so prominent in the 1930s, was to return to the 
streets of the East End of London after the war. What had 
happened to the East End Jewish-Gentile relations in be- 
tween these two periods will be the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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LosIc: y 'u 1£it.,: f' con iC11t'lUit thaL 
ººi1 CJi1i']fj coii.. i. irf+cV 
rlili by the JEvl: ý" v11'.; ººC; C1liilia CI. U ilUli. > .: 1". %:. ºº, llº 111.:; 
L 
autobioiýru1111y t, i 1'L (Lo1t,. 1o11, Lyti: i), 3! ýý. '. 
66. 'Job:: for týlý E: llü' iicti oi1 1io. 190, (30 liovc: uil; r: i' 
Tit llcccoLc; i" 193j 3 D, l:: i.: ýº1 li.! 1. r'. mer: ajvr:; ý"rý, i"c; c; aýtri-Cc9 
for j; llttiiit; tif, a 11ot. icc: 1'or British job:. ' . Quoted by L110, It_icl. ýº,;. ý C,, rot. t_c, !ý ; 1cu:: ý, ýt, ý: 1 1939. 
67- Action rio. 4211 (26 Liuu"C(i 1.9110). Loth E. 1'. 11011, It Bliall 
I; ot 11rippoii lft:; '.: a, 1d Civil 
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Liberty (London, 1903), 13 and New Stutesmari yol. 19 
6 January 1940) comment on the ß. 11. r'' ;; concentration 
on the ' refu j ewu' o 
68. As-early as 23 September 1939. See Action no. 186 of 
this date. 
69. Action no. 209 (7 March 19110). For other example see 
Action no. 188 (5 October 1939) - editorial comment 
"Stop Profiteering" or Peter Heyward 'Food Control 
Committees', Action no. 201 (11 January 1940). 
70. In 'London Diary' the columnist commented on meeting 
a fascist in London who "spoke with some confidence 
about the success of the word 'refujew', which was 
going over well in places like Manchester, Leeds and 
the East End of London': In New Statesman vo1.19 
(6 January 1940). 
71. March 1940 memo on 'Anti-War Groups' in IIF 1/319. 
72. J. D. C. report on 13 May 1940 Brighton meeting in 
C 6/5/1/1. 
73, See the reports for December 1939 and January 1940 in 
MO 2/3127- 
Ae ibid. for February 19L1.0. A Home office official put 
the decline down to the cold weather. See J. M. h. 
minutes 22 February 1940 in 1I0 1t111/21382/337, The 
J. D. C. reports for February 19110 comment on there 
being less than 100 regulars at the B. U. P. strong- 
hold of Ridley Road, In C6/5/1/1. 
75. The details of the conference can be found in a 
Special Branch report of 1 February 19L40 in HO L15/ 
24b95/3.150 people: attended the conference. See 
L1EPO 2/3127 for January 19110. 
70. Mass Observation, War Begins at Horne (London, 191; 0), 
1121-2. 
770 Quoted by the jewiSh Chronicle. 19 Julluury 19110. 
780 Webster, although a member of the Nationalist Assoc- 
iation, formed his oven org; snization in February 1)1; 0, 
the Anglo-iri: h Fellowship. This attracted many 
Trish B. U. F. supporters and attempted to connect the 
Irish is :; ue to thu Jewish question. ; (once on 2.5 Feb- 
ruury at Finsbury Veb:; ter's was on "Irish 
girls who wire on the street:. of. London" sent out 
"to earn money by the Jews" 0 Jee C6/5 
11/10 For 
Webster's :; ub:; eyua: nt card: r in founding Essential 
Book.; in 19! 43 arid for his eari. ier activities : ee the 
Special Branch report of 28 April 1943 in 110 h5/ 
25398/213-7. 
79. At a meeting cif' 2% l. larcl: 19140. See. C6/5/1/1. See 
LIEPO 2/5127 for January and February 19110 for further 
comment,; on the lintiohalist Association. 
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80. A J. D. C. report for a Houston meeting of 20 November 
1939 reported that L policernen, including one sergeant, 
grinned at his antisemitic jokes. A similar reaction 
occurred at B. U. F. meetings and led tQ the disciplin- 
ing- of the police in charge of the East End fascist 
meetings. See Daily Telegraph 22 December 1939 and 
Action no. 197 (7 December 19395 and no. 200 (1a. Janu,, ry 
191+0 for the B. U. P. reaction. 
81. See C6/5/1/1 J. D. C. report for 27 March 1940. 
82. INP 1/319 Horne Intelligence memo on 'antiwar move- 
ments'. March 1940 commented that the I . F. L. was 
limited in operation to London and to distributing 
Angles. A J. D. C. report for 8 March 1940 commented 
on the public appearance of Angles- at Finsbury Square 
and Hyde Park. It was sold as "the paper for white 
men" and "not Jewish mongrel racials". See C6/9/1/3. 
It was also sold at more respectable peace meetings 
such as Lord Tavistock's on 3 April 1940, according 
to the Jewish Chronicle, 5 April 1940. 
83. According to a Special Branch report of 20 February 
19140 in 110 115/211895/16. See also Action no. 206 (15 
February 1940) for an appeal for funds for the Leeds 
and Silvertown by-elections. 
84. Action no. 213 (14 April 19110) commented on the need to 
involve women, and the line that should be used - 
"Why sacrifice your sons for the sake of Jewish fin- 
ance? " The Jewish Chronicle, 8 March 1940 noticed the 
large proportion of women in a B. U. P. meeting at 
Finsbury Square.. 
85. A Special Branch report of 27 March 191FU commented on 
Mosley's instructions for increased efforts in Hackney, 
Bethnal Green, Shoreditch and Limehouse. Mick Clarke, 
the East London inspector, was to devote all his time 
to this. In 110 1t5/21t895/27 " 
86. Out of the 7 there were 4 branches in West 11am accord- 
ing to the B. U. F. conference on 30 January 1940. See 
the Special Branch report of 1 February 19140 in 110 45/ 
24895/6. The Jewish Chronicle, 23 February 1940 
pointed out that there was no 
local B. U. P. branch. 
87. M-OA: FR39 'Silvertown By-Election 29 February 19! 10, 
suggested that "Moran never had a chance in Silver- 
town". 
88. Action no. 206 (15 February 19110). Moran also stressed 
this. . See the Jevrisli Clhronicle, 23 February 1940 for 
his car, ipuign. 
890 For its attack on Labour see Action no. 206 (15 Feb- 
ruary 1940) and for the Communi: ts, M-OA: FR39 and the 
B. U. F. slogan "Vote for Pollittski or Peace". 
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90. The circulation figures are in AI-OA: FR39. 
91. A summary of Silvertown Dawn can be found in the 
Jewish Chronicle, 23 February 1940. 
92. F. W. S. Craig, )1inor Parties at British Parliamentary 
Elections 1885 - 19711 London, 1975 , 
12 has the de- 
tails, The 151 represented . 3iJ of the electorate. 
93. M-OA: FR39 Pollitt in his election leaflet "Silver- 
town against Fascism" attacked the fascist version of 
peace, which was a disguise for a joint Chamberlain- 
Hitler war against Russia. The C. P., on the other 
hand, would not fight to save capitalism but to des- 
troy it. Quoted in J. Attfi. eld and S. Williams, ]. 939: 
The Communist Party and the War (London, 1983), 183- 
94- M-OA: FR39. Only 180/; felt the B. U. F. were entirely 
independent and a further 17;, a' were doubtful. 146%S 
didn't know at all. 
95. ibid. Labour's Election Hews stressed the fascists' 
antisemitism and possibly helped to discredit it. 
The C. P. obtained nearly a thousand votes. See Craig, 
op. cit.; 20. 
96. Action no. 208 (29 February 19110). Blame was put down 
to press lies - Jewish power again. 
97. British Union Quarterly vol.. iv no. 1 (spring 1940). 
98. Craig, op. cit.; 12. 
99. Allen's election address was based on an appeal to ex- 
servicemen, stre:: ink; the need for "a land fit for 
heroes", as well as for British Peace and opposition 
to the alien quarrel of Jewish Finance. For a full 
copy see 'The Trevelyan Scholarship Project', op. cit.; 
31-2. The support from the League of Ex-Servicemen, 
leader J. Taylor, which stated "Vie are not prepared 
to lend any . support to a minority of international 
stockbrokers, moneybags or Jews" can be found in the 
Jewish Chronicle, 15 March 19110. For later activities 
of the League see this. chapter p. 161-2. 
100. Again there was a mixture of opposition to international 
and local Jews. In the Leeds B. U. P. newsheet The 
North-East ]feeds Pioneer, there were the usual comments 
such as "Conscript the Jews to fight in their own 
quarrel", as wul] as opposition to refugees stealing 
British jobs plus. attacks on i3urtona The Yorkshire 
Evening News, 13 March ly!! 0 com%mited on the prolif- 
eration of antis eiui. tic posters. 
101. Reported in M-OA: F12 A61 'Extract froja the heed: North 
East By-Election'. 
102. ibid. In Uilverrtown 31; - of the M-0 sample were 
"anti-Jew" only 114iý at heed.:; however, the aiitisemitism 
of this 114% "wals very fierce indeed". 
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103. Action no. 211 (21 March 19110) commented on the good 
:; trect attendances before the election. Mosley 
spoke to a inecLing of 1,000 before the by-election. 
Uee It. Mosley, op. cit.; 162. 
101.. The recently released Home Office file on Mary Allen 
has details of her long and militant career, including 
her '18B' interview. See file HO llali/21933. 
105. See her article on 'Nude Exhibitionism' in Action 
no. 219 (16 May 19110). 
106. Baroness Ravensdale, op. cit.; 147 comments on the 
Caxton Hall meeting. The report of the Holborn Hall 
meeting is in the Jewish Chronicle, 8 March 19! 40. 
107. See note 34. 
108. Action no. 209 (7 March 19L40). There were 103 B. U. F. 
meetings in March 1940 compared to 41 the month be- 
fore. See MFP0 2/3127 for February and March 1940. 
109. Civil Liberty no-13 (March 19110) commented on the 
dangers of discounting the Fascist threat and that 
its antisemitism continued despite receiving less 
press attention. 
110. hew Statesman vol. 19 (27 April 191i0). An editorial 
on British Fascism warned that tl-, ey were carrying out 
"Their propaganda in circles from which the Fifth 
Column may hope to be recruited". 
11.1. Haven Thompson was speaking at Firºsbury Square in 
early April. See the Hackney Gazette, 8 April 19140. 
Flockhart, B. U. F. leader in Shoreditch, was prosec- 
uted for the pogrom remark, reported in MIJPO 2/3127 
for April 191+0. 
132. in London 26 April 19140, Mosley referred to "the 
lackeys of usury who. se Iºutrble task is to fit the 
noble musk of Ut. George over the repellant features 
of Uhylock". quoted by Action no. 217 (2 May 1940). 
At Leeds, 3 day: later t, iossley referred to Leeds as 
"controlled by a Jewish council". In a r'espons e, 
the Yorkshire Post, 30 April 19140, culled this claim 
"sheer stupidity". 
113. The B. U. F's British Traders Bureau was net up early 
in 1939 by Pester Ileyward. Its main activities were 
recruiting the uiaall bussinesss man, using the iienace 
of the (Jewish) Chain store us the bogey. With the 
war iFt warned that the multiples would destroy the 
:; wall man - see for example Ileywu, rd' a Shonkeeners at 
War (London, l9110? ). Its organ, The British Tra(Jer, 
advocated peace. In February 19140 efforts were made 
to incre., ne the ci rcul. ation of The British Trader 
(see Special Branch report of 20 Febviºary 19)0 in 
110 145/214495/16) and this appear:; to have had : ome 
success. its: new prominence fooled another Special 
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Branch report into thinkinr it was a new organiza- 
tion (April 1910 in MEPO 
23/27), 
and the Jewish 
Chronicle referred to a Heyward meeting in late 
April where most of the sizeable audience came from 
Bethnal Green. 'Jock' Houston in his l8B Appeal in- 
terview, 29 April 1941, told the Advisory Committee 
that "the main point of (members) attachment to 
British Union (was that) they objected to cut price 
Jewish shops". Houston had been particularly active 
in North-East London. See 110 283/141/8140436. 
114. MEPO 2/3127 Special Branch report for May 19! 40. 
115.110 115/24895/31-4 Special Branch report for 22 April 
1940. According to lip. Watkins, H. P., the permit 
for the meeting was given "to the great annoyance 
of the vast majority of local people". IIansard II. C. 
vo136 col-354,25 April 19140. 
116. The figure is Special Branch's in a report for May 
1940 in MbTO 2/3/27. The Jewish Chronicle, 10 May 
1940, was less generous, suggesting only several 
hundred, and culling the meeting "a feeble affair". 
117. Jewish Chronicle, 10 May 1940. 
118. Quoted by Action no. 218 (9 May 1940). 
119. "Mick" Clarke claimed 800 people heard Thomas and 
himself speak in Hackney and South West Bethnal Green. 
See Action no. 220 (23 May 1940). 
120. Nicholas Mosley op. cit.; 165 has suggested that up 
to the invasion of the Vlest, the B. U. P. peace policy 
was "tolerated if not e1 ;c torally supported". This 
slightly oversimplifies the issue for there was 
violent opposition to Mosley Lind the D. U. F. before 
May 19140. A Northern member of the I3. U. F., R. Bellamy, 
in his unpublished autobiography 'Vic Marched '! lith 
Mosley', 3-4 claim: that the only violent reaction 
to the B. U. F. was in Chachhierton in May, when II os, ley 
was attacked. However, there had been violence at 
earlier Manchester meetings in lililmslow, November 
1939. See Triitli no-3296 
(10 
November 1939) for a 
sympathetic account to the B. U. F, and a J. D. C. re- 
port for December 1939 in C6/9/1/3 F3, for the re- 
verse. 
121. Philip Garne of New Scot] and Yard had instructed the 
police to take a strong litre on anti-: ww: ir activities 
in early May as f&: e1 irrt was very high und rcc uritinent 
easily aroused. Memo of lt} May 19140 in MEPO 2/3127- 
The closure of the t; meetings is mentioned Iii the 
Special Brunch report for May 19110, loc. cit. 
122. The turn-around in llulston is in a J. D. C. report for 
25 1-. lay 1940 in C6/5/]. /1. An earlier r, Ij)ot, t t'oY. 
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14 May 19140, loc. sit.; had commented that the Tian 
" on the street wa:: anti-Fa:; ci: t but definitely not pro- 
Jewish". 
123. Häslum, a 43 year old engineering director, and a 
veteran of the First World War, aLtacked Jews, rising 
prices, international finance and the sufferings of 
war. See 11-Of:: PR154: Middleton and Prestwich By- 
Election. Another M. P. newalieet, The Middleton and 
Prestwich Pioneer, had the usual line of "this is a 
quarrel of Jewish finance", but according to a reporter 
"no one was interested". See the Jewish Chronicle, 
214 May 19L40 . 
121.. Even the Conservative candidate, Gates, fought on 
the anti-fascist issue - see M-OA: PR 154. A Home 
Intelligence report commented on the "high anti- 
fascist feeling".. IIW 1/264 no. 11 (30 May 19140) . 
125. It. Bellamy, 'Vie Marched', 3-4, 'comments on the Mosley 
attack. According to Bellamy the B. U. F. had "only a 
meagre handful of members and contacts" in Middleton, 
whereas G. Y. Sutherst, the organiser of the district, 
claimed 200 members, in an interview with S. Rawnsley, 
16 February 1977. Rawnsley himself believes the 400 
plus votes were not necessarily in support of the 
B. U. F. but more "a protest against the war". S. 
Rawnsley, 'Fascism and Fascists'., 2114. 
126. The Secretary of State decided to amend Regulation 
18B on 22 May 19140 to include association with hostile 
countries or being subject to foreign control. The 
Cabinet plan was to arrest 25 to 30 leading members 
and cripple the B. U. F. See CAB 65/7 V'IM 1.33 (140) 22 
May 19140. According to Mass-Observation, the Mosley 
internment brought unanimous support: "Very seldom 
have observers found such a high degree of approval 
for anything". 11-OA: F11135, The Public and Mosley. 
See INFI/261 no. 6 (214 May 1910) for similar. 
127. The fi ure is quoted by Herbert Morrison in CAB 66/35 
VIP (43) 148,11.1 April 1943. The new Regulation 18AA 
making; the 13. U. i . illegal, and membership or the 
passing of its. -propaganda equally unlawful can be 
found in the Advisory Committee's recommendation on 
Mosley, 2 August 19110,110 283/18/3- 
-198. For example, 1115 noted now the Imperial Fascist league, 
although not banned, had simply ceusc? d to exist. 1.15W 
minutes 11 May 19143 in 110 15/24967/6714960. 
129. Illustrated by Llic excitement over the release of Llie 
Mosley papers. See for example, 21he Times, 13 Deceiii- 
ber 1983 . 
130. Doinvile wrote in iii:; diaries "Heul a talk to Carroll (ecti Lar of Tue Link':: Ani] o-German Review) - 'Link' 
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is dissolved", Domvile Diaries DOM/56,4 September 
1939. Domvile told the Daily Mail, 6 September 1939: 
"The Link, of course, was closed down as soon as war 
broke out... Now we are at war, the king's enemies are 
our enemies". Four members of The Link were arrested 
at the outbreak of war. 
131. Domvile's diaries give good detail of the origins of 
the B. C. C. S. E. Out of a private luncheon in the sec- 
ond week of the war, involving Dornvile and Carroll of 
The Link, Ben Greene and John Beckett of the British 
People's Party and Gordon Canning (ex-B. U. F. ), a new 
Council of the ten present was formed. 1115 believed 
Domvile to be the moving spirit in an organization 
"with a fascist tinge". See report for October 1939 
in HO 144/22154/88. 
132, Some quickly left the B. C. C. S. E. when -they realised 
its true nature. See the Jewish Chronicle, 13 Oct- 
ober 1939 for this and a list of its other members. 
Beckett's claim was in the Daily Mirror, 20 October 
1939. The B. C. C. S. E. 's biggest meeting attracted only 
400 in January 1940, according to the Jewish Chronicle, 
2 February 1940. See also HO 45/25698/840 171 on 
John Beckett. 
133, The B. C. C. S. E's 'Statement on the European Situation' 
and other documents can be found in M-OA: TC Politics 
Box 10 Files C-D. Time and Tide vol. 20 no-43 (28 
October 1939) described the group as "a home from home 
for unrepenting members of the discredited Link" and 
Harold Nicolson made a similar analysis in The Spec- 
tator vol. 163 (27 October 1939). 
134, By then another element had been added to this coterie, 
that of Norman Hay and Launcelot Lawton who ran Infor- 
mation and Policy, a 'volkisch', pro-fascist and pac- 
ifist paper. After a few hiccups, a meeting was ar- 
ranged with Mosley on the 13 October 1939. According 
to Domvile, they made "good progress". See Dom 156, 
7,10,12,13 October 1939. 
135. The M15 report is of October 1939 in HO 1LiV22L 5L/ 
85-6. 
. 
136" See ibid. and Special Branch report of 16 September 
1939 in HO 14L1/21382/298-9 and H. O. minutes of 24. 
September 1939 in the same. 
137. See the 115 report of October 1939 on the Right Club 
in HO 141t/2245ä/87, anal Special Branch report of 16 
September 1939 in 110 1ä1i/21382/299. 
138. ibid. In the Special Branch report it was stuLed 
that "it is reliably reported that the two huve reached 
agreement". 
139. Domvile diaries, report for 26 October 1939 in Dom/56. 
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140. ibid. 
141, DQm/56 diary entry for 8 November 1939. 
142. ibid.; diary entries for 22 November 1939 and 6 Dec- 
ember 1939. Domvile described the former meeting 
as "informal - over a cup of tea". 
11E3. In January 19110 the B. U. F's two biggest meetings were 
private, 450 attending both. See Special. Brunch re- 
port for January 1940 in MEPO 2/3127. Other private 
antisemitic groups seeking an accommodation with the 
Nazis were coming into existence sucli as the 'Pro- 
British Association' - Special Brunch report of 2 
Apr11 1940 for its activities October 1939 - February 
1940 in 110 141t/22454/ 112-3. Another fringe fascist- 
pacifist group was the Peop? e's Common Law Parliament 
which will be examined later. 
hilt. At a meeting in Tavistock's house with Lymington, 
Marr, Fuller, Gordon-Canning; Beckett, Ben Greene, 
Stuart Morris (of the P. P. U. 
j 
and D omv ile. Diary 
entry for 13 February 19110 in Dom/56. The idea of 
such a deputation had been put forward earlier by 
the Hordih League which as early as 8 October 1939 
had suggested contacting Germany via Ireland. See 
the 1115 note to iiolderness of the Home Office, 13 
October 1939 jr, 110 11111/2211511/102. 
1115. Mosley regarded Tavistock as "a good fellow, but 
woolly headed"; he also respected Greene of the 
B. C. C. O. E. but : till. felt John Beckett "was a crook". 
He was will. iaag to co-operate with such a group be- 
cause they were "sincere". Speci al Branch report 
31 January 3.9110 in 110 !. 5/211895/17.. D omvile reported 
that Mosley was "very interested in Tavistock's meet- 
ing" - diary entry Cor 15 February 19110 in Dom/56. 
McGovern's interest can be found in his autobiography, 
Neither Fear Iior Favour (London, 1960), 137-9, and 
Beaverbrook in 1ý. J. P. Taylor': Beaverhrook (London, 
. 
1972/'., 1103. Tuvistock felt the peace effort was 
doomed as the "British government lid not want peace" - 
Dom/56 diary entry for 29 February 1911.0. F. Bowman's 
18B related papertz rr: veul that in May 19110 the 
T'avistock movement unsuccessfully attempted to con- 
tact the Duke of Windsor to achieve a negotiated 
peace. See 110 115/25-129/660/'19/1. 
1116. McGovern defended Tavistock after a meeting in Lon- 
don on the 3 April 19110. Uee the, Jewish Chronicle, 
12 April 19110. The platform was also shared in 
Glasgow. See the autobiography of Tavistock (later 
the Mike of Bedford) Yeaua" or Traansi tion (London, 
19110,181 sue correspondence to the author from 
J. T. Cal(Nel]., 5 I; ay 1985. 
1t17e In 110 283/16/93. 
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1148. Mosley's reaction to Birkett differentiating im- 
peding the war effort from treachery was "grati- 
tude"; see ibid. Stokes repeated this in a slightly 
distorted form in the Commons - Hansard IIC vol. 367 
col. 836-99 10 December 1940. 
149. The quotes from Mosley are from the second meeting 
of the Advisory Committee, 3 July 1940 in 110 283/i4/ 
84-5. 
150. All quotes from Advisory Committee recommendations, 
2 August 1940 110 283/18/21. 
151. Do mvile , the Mosleys and the Ramsays dined together 
on the 26 July 1939; see Dor: r/56. 
152. Material contained in a Special Branch report of 25 
June 1940 on Commander Mary Allen's 18B file 110 1414/ 
219.53/330-1. 
153. Material on Lees can be found in a letter from Sidney 
Solomon of the Board of Deputies to Victor Gollancz, 
31 December 1945. Lees was Treasurer of the British 
People's Party. In C6/10/22. See also the recently 
released -files on Lees HO 45/25728 and 110 283/45. In 
HO 45/25728/860060/l. Scotland Yard reported on 24 
May 19110 that Lees had been present at private meet- 
ings convened by Mosley "for the purpose of discuss- 
ing with the leaders of various pro-fascist and 
anti-semetic groups the formation of a vast revolut- 
ionary organization, in which they would all collab- 
orate". Special Branch in a report of 8 June 1940 
in the same file commented on the meetings' aim of 
"carry(ing) on open and under-cover acts with the 
object of establishing a fascist government in Brit- 
ain" but that "no concrete plans" had yet been made. 
154. Within the I. P. L. there were a group, opposed to the 
leader Leese, who wore according to M15 "more German 
than the Germans". See the report for 3 March 1942 
in 110115/211967/67496o/105-8. A similar group operated 
within the Nordic League. See Special Branch report 
for 16 September 1939 in 110 11111/21382/298-9. As far 
as the B. U. P. was concerned, several individuals 
were actually found guilty of aiding the energy, the 
most famous of whom were Duvivier and Crovile in Jan- 
uary 1940. See the Jewish Chronicle, 2 February 1940 
and Birkett'a comments, on the B. U. F., 5 June 1940 in 
HO 283/l/12-14 for details and Mosley's reactions. 
155. Peter and Leni Gillman, Collar the Lot: how Britain 
Interned and Expelled its Wartime Refugees Lonclon, 
1985), 118 wisely difi'oeuntiate subversion and col- 
laboration. They define treason in this context as 
helping the German invasion through spying or sabo- 
tage, which will be employed as a clei'ilrition here. 
Activities designed to bring about peace are not thus 
regarded us treasonable, but those which aimed to 
help a German victory over Britain and her allies are 
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156. Action no. 218 (9 May 1940). This became part of the 
classic defence of B. U. F. war policy - see Mosley's 
My Answer (Kamsbury, Wilts, 1946), 1. 
157. QtLted in Action no. 219 (16 May 1940). 
158, Action News Service no-3 (lit May 1940). 
159" According to Special Branch the B. U. P. was attacking 
the Nordic. League "in order to avoid suspicion of 
being labelled as pro-Nazi" and thus to avoid any 
government '5th column measures'. In his second 18B 
interview Mosley claimed he had no links to the Nor- 
dic League - "these people are (an) anathema to us". 
Lees of the League was in Mosley's words "certifiable". 
See Advisory Committee of 3 July 1940 in HO 283/14/91. 
160. CAB 65/7 WM(28)(40) 18 May 1940. 
161. CAB 65/7 VIM (33) (40) 22 May 194.0. 
162. The first claim was by Peter and Leni Gillman, op. 
cit.; 122-3. They claim that it was a plot to re- 
move Kell, head of M15 and Anderson who were seen as 
too soft bn Mosley. The arrests, in their words, 
were "stunningly convenient". The charge is repeated 
in Anthony Masters, The Man Who Was M: The Life of 
Maxwell Knight (Oxford, 1984), 89-90. According to 
Masters, the Kent-Vlolkoff issue was used by Knight 
"in a bid to find an excuse for at last arresting and 
interning Mosley" . 
163. A. H. M. Ramsay, The Nameless War (Crawleigh, Devon, 
1968 (first published 1952)), 99-100. Ramsay's ex- 
planation was that he did not want to cause diffic- 
ulties to Chamberlain. 
l64o The latter leaflet which outlined that the war was 
one of revenge of International Jewish Finance, and 
that the last war as well was due to the satanic con- 
spiracy of the Jewish 'octopus', was regarded as sed- 
itious by the authorities but the Home Office decided 
not to prosecute as its circulation was so small. 
See minutes of 22 November 1939 in HO 1114/22454/103- 
110. 
165, When asked about antisemitisrn, Wolkoff claimed "I 
was literally suckled on it", Earl Jowitt, Some Were 
Spies (London, 1954), 43. Rent claimed she was 
practically Ramsay's political secretary. loc. sit.; 
85, 
166. ibid. ; 112. Nigel West has suggested that Kent was in 
fact a Moscow agent. See The Times, 10 Decehiuber 1983. 
It is possible thit Kent was accepting Soviet money 
but his, sub:. equent neo-nazi career would suggest that 
Kent's heart was not with the Russian cause. 
167. Anthony Masters, op,, cit.; 80-9, deals thoroughly 
with the Kent case and 1,115's involvement in it. 
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168. Jowitt, op. cit.; 49-55. 
169. ibid.; 68 and Masters, op. cit.; 80. 
170. Ramsay, op. cit.; 73, attempts to explain his inter- 
est in the papers as an innocent party. - Jowitt, op, 
cit.; 49, points out that Ramsay indicated that he 
might well require at some point a copy of the two 
telegrams. 
171. Hansard H. C. vol. 360 co1.1378-82,9 May 1940. After 
Anderson said no differentiation was made, the im- 
portant thing being that the war effort should not 
be impeded, Ramsay replied that Anderson had been con- 
fined by the "Jew-ridden press". 
172, Ramsay, opo cit.; 102-3. 
173. Wolkoff wrote to Joyce telling him to increase his 
antisemitism and warnings about freemasonry. See 
Jowitt, op. cit.; 70-1. 
1714. 'Subversive Activities in London' -a Confidential 
Annex in CAB 65/13 vim (40) 133,22 May 19110. 
175. CAB 65/7 VIES 133 (40) 22 May 1940. 
176. Masters, opo cit.; 89. 
1770 ibid. 
178. An M15 report for October 1939 on the Right Club 
stated that "there is talk of a military coup d'etat 
but no agreement on leaders" - Mosley was regarded 
by some with suspicion. In HO 1114/22454/85-7. Even 
Masters admits that Ramsay's aim was to replace 
Churchill and to organise a parliamentary coup to 
replace the government with one that would negotiate 
with Hitler, op. cit.; 81. 
179.11.0. minutes, (February 19110? ) in HO 45/21t895/l. 
180. In an interview with the Manchester Guardian's editor, 
W. P. Crozier on the 22 October 191±3, Churchill claimed 
"I did it. 1 sanctioned it, because the country war, 
in danger of destruction and we could run no risk... " 
In A. J. P. Taylor ed., VI. P. Crozier Off the Record 
Political Interviews 1933 - h3, (London, 1973T 381- 
181. Churchill claimed that if Mosley was Prime Minister 
it was "exactly what he would do". Telegram of 9 
June' 19! 40 in Churchill papers 20/14 quoted by Martin 
Gilbert, tilinston C. Churchill: Finest Hour: 1939 - !i (London, 1983), ! lb-T-- 
182. Advisory meeting for 22 July 19LtO in HO 283/16/82-7- 
183 - Z. A. M. 'Leman, op. cit.; 1141t., and Colin Cross, op. 
cit.; 183, sug c st that the Nazis, were more concerned 
with the friendship groups and the Right Club than the 
I3. U. I, '. 
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184. This is not to suggeot that either Dom vile or Ramsay 
would have collaboraLed. 
185. Norman Longrnate, If' Britain Had Fallen (London, 1972), 
225 has detail:; on the 'White List' . 
186. Quoted by Diana Parkin in The Sunday Times, 18 Decem- 
ber 1983. 
187. Ramsay claimed this in the Kent-Wolkoff trial. See 
Jowitt, op. cit.; 45. 
188. Marley had said this in the Lords on the 13 June 1940 - 
see the Manchester Guardian, 111. June 1940 for details. 
Ramsay jot his solicitor, Oswald Hickson, to deny the 
charge in The Times, 29 June 1940. Hickson stated it 
was entirely untrue to say that Ramsay had been in 
touch with the enemy, is an enemy agent or would be 
approached by the enemy to assume dictatorial powers. 
Ramsay later sued the New York Times for suggesting 
that he was a traitor. See The Times, 1 August 19L11. 
Ramsay received only a farthing's damages. 
189. The title of David Littlejohn's The Patriotic Traitors: 
a history of collaboration in German-occupied Europe 
19140 -5 London, 1972 suggests the ambivalence and 
contradictions of such people's patriotism. 
190. Jowitt, op. cit.; 68. Wolkoff denied she had said 
that, although she admitted that her nick-name was 
'Julius t3treicher'0 
191. ibid.; 42-3- 
192. In Angles no. 86 (9 September 1939). Leese said he 
understood but could not support such a view in war- 
time. 
193, Jowitt, op. cit.; 66. In a letter one female friend 
of Wolkoff wrote to another, 18 December 1939, that 
she wished the Certians "could have got one good shot 
into the Hood". 
1940 1415 report, 5 March 1942 on the I. P. L. , in HO 45/ 211967/674960/105-9. 
195. ibid.; in a letter of 19 April 19140. Harvey's career 
will be examined later. 
196, Mosley in the 22 July 19110 Advisory meeting- in 110 283/ 
16/88. 
197- In CAB 65/7 VM 133(40) 22 May 19hO. 'The M15 men said there wu alt=o no evidence o1' fifth column activities 
amongst B. U. P. leadership or rank and file. 
19£so idigel CIe: t, I, 115: M'iti:. li Security Sorvice Operations 
(London, 1981), 120 und 129-31, has details on the 
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major ca=ses. A N. C. C. L. leaflet 'The B. U. F. Roll of 
Honour' has these and others in a more emotional form. 
See II. C. 1. L. Archive 259/2 and also the recently re- 
leased Home Office renegade files - HO 45/25799- 
25339. 
199. Morrison memo on the B. U. F. in CAB 66/35 WP (43) 148, 
14 April 1943. 
200. Details of the numbers interned due to 18B can be 
found in file 110 115/214893. 
201. The statement is Charles Solomon's, ex director of 
the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in London, in the Jewish 
Bulletin no. 10 June 1942). 
202. Colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (London, 1961), 
195, suggested that "British Fascism ended in May 19t40 
and has not since been revived under that name". 
Whilst technically correct, Cross's statement makes 
no allowances for groups that were composed of ex- 
fascists and whose policies were similar to the earlier 
fascist groups, which emerged during and after the Sec- 
ond World War. 
203, Action no, 221 (30 May 1940)0 
204, The Metropolitan Police report for June 1940 stated 
that there were five B. U. F. meetings; in MEPO 2/3127. 
205, Lady Mosley in her 18B interview claimed that the 
B. U. F. was left in "a most appalling mess", salaries 
left unpaid and the continuous arrests making it im- 
possible to continue Action. See 110 11114/21995/22. 
Police found notes at the house of Richard 'Jock' 
Houston in July 1940 that indicated how British Union 
would continue secretly after the arrest of the major 
leaders. According to these notes Lord Lymingtcn 
would become deputy leader. In HO 45/25713/804.36/1- 
206. Action no. 222 (6 June 19110). 
207. See Melly Driver's unpublished autobiography 'From 
the Shadows of Exile') 47 for the situation in a local 
Lancashire branch in Nelson. 
208 0 The Evening, Standard_, 5 June 
1940 reported that the 
13. U. F's h. q. had reopened. A que: tign was asked about 
this in the Commons by Mr. Silkin to which Anderson re- 
plied that it wus being watched onci that he was con- 
sidering making the 13.1J. 1?. illegal. Hvuisard 11. C., vol. 
362 col. 228,20 June 1940. 
209, The Daily Herald, 10 July 19140 has an account of the 
B. U. P. leafleting and whispering campaign from its 
Bethnal Gruen brunch. The next day the police raided 
the o1't'ice and removed the leaflets; see the End 
Observer, 13 July 19110. This, activity had prompted 
another question in the House. See Hansard vo1362 
co1.1322,11 July 19110. 
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210. The Daily Herald, 1 August 191tO; The Star, 13 August 
19140 and the Sunday Express, 15 September 1940, have 
reports on these anonymous, and usually antisemitic 
letters. The Metropolitan Police reports for July, 
Au gust and September 19110 comment on the decline of 
B. U. F. chalkings and stickybacks. See MEPO 2/3127 
and also M-OA: 'Jokes and Wall-Vlriting' Box 216, 
Pile A, where in early October 19140 only 1 fascist 
slogan was spotted. 
2]. 1. The New Statesman vol. 19 (5 October 19140) and the 
Jewish Chronicle, 25 October 19140, have details of 
fascist whisperings and leaflets in the tubes. The 
Jewish Chronicle, 1 November 19140, commented that in 
Leicester Square and Finsbury Park there was even an 
attempt to stop Jews sheltering though the police soon 
stopped such activities. The notes referred to in 
note 205 found at Houston' flat include the claim 
that fascists were urged to join the Communis in 
their shelter campaign so as to embarass the govern- 
ment, lead on to a Red scare which would then result 
in the release of Mosley'. 
212. The report -on Mosley is by the governor of Brixton, 
ß Ilovember 1940 in P. COM. 9/678 and the Daily Tele- 
rrý, aph is of 27 Ilovember 1940. 
213. The Daily Telegraph, 17 October 1941 has details. 
214. Daily Worker, 5 January 1943- 
215- CAB 66/35 VIP (43) 148,14 April 1943- Morrison pointed 
out that there was disagreement on leadership and also 
on whether to view Germany as a friend or an enemy. 
216, Nora Briscoe's 18B file 110 45/25741 covers the last 
days of active member: of the Right Club before in- 
ternment in January 19141- 
217- 
-A 
Upecial Branch report of 28 April 1943 in HO 45/ 
25398 has details on Godfrey. Morrison commented 
on Godfrey's refusal to admit Mosley's leadership, 
See CAB 06/35 '111' (43), 14 April 1943. A Jewish De- 
fence Committee report of 21 August 3.944 called 
Godfrey "a man of no importance, a pompous windbag". 
In C6/2/13e. 
218. Morrison's e: timate is in Hansard lfG vol. 387 col. 
1329-30,18 March 19143. 
219, The J. D. C's in C6/2/13g. Two members, Stokes and 
Graven, were arru:; Led for attempting to pass infor- 
mation to the Germans. See the Daily Worker for 
13 February 191j3 . snncl 7 April 19Li3. 
220. From February to April. 19! 1.3 protest marches against 
the B. U. Y. were orLanised. See the Jewish Chronicle, 
26 February 19: 3 and 9 April 1943. A town meeting 
was called in Hackney to discus the impact of the 
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B. N. Y. upon the borough - Hackney Gazette, 5 April 1943. 
221. Godfrey outlined this difference to the Acton Gaz- 
ette, 3 October 1943. 
222. The B. N. P. policy can be best analysed from a var- 
iety of its leaflets available in the British Lib- 
rary - 'Uix Points of Sanity', 'To All Private 
Traders', 'Foundations on which the B. N. P. is formed', 
all in 8184 a. 8; and from its short-lived organ, 
British National News no-1-3 (17 August 19)i2 - 14 September 1942). 
223. In 1942 the B. N. P. published Collin Brook's article 
first published in Truth - 'Antisemitism and Treach- 
ery'. This was without Brook's support - see the Daily Worker, 31 October 19! 12. The article outlined 
the essential alien nature of Jews in Britain and ad- 
vocated apartheid as the solution. Godfrey was wil- 
ling to go further and remove the Jews to another 
territory. See his 'My Views on the Jews' in the 
Acton Gazette, 10 December 1943- 
224- For example, his statement in the British National 
hews no. 1 (17 August 1942) "for an honourable peace". 
225. The point that the B. N. P. was used by ex-fascists 
for this purpose is stressed by Douglas Hyde, who at 
the time was the Daily Worker's correspondent on faa- 
ciut matters. In an interview with the author, 15 
September 1983. The Communist Party certainly made 
the most of its opposition to the B. H. P. See the 
Daily Ylorker, October 8,28,29,31 1912 and February 
5,11,13 1943 and April 7,10 and 20 1943. 
226. Potocki literature was circulated"in the B. N. P's sis- 
ter organization, the New Order Group. See New 
Order no. 11 (11 June 1943). He also distributed 
Alexander Itatcliffe's The Truth About the Jews. See 
Special Branch report of 7 September 1943 in 110 45/ 
25398/191- 
227. The major B. N. P. meeting was to have happened at. the 
Stoll Theatre, 21 February 1943. After much opposit- ion the Theatre refused permission for the meeting. 
See the Daily Worker, 11 February 1943. 
228. Godfrey claimed lie was closing down the B. N. P. be- 
cause of the attacks on it as a fascist group. How- 
ever,, several days later the E. N. A. eiierged dedicated 
to "the buiiner oi' St. George hind Lieri"ie England" - the Jewish Ghronicl e. 16 April 19143. 
229. Morrison refused to Lake action against the S. N. P. as it "in no way :,: grits the importance which has recen- tly been attributed to it, and which tends to give it 
a needles: advertisement". Hans Mardi HC vol. -387 col. 1329-3O, 18 March 1943. 
2300 The uclcires. " c,. ir, be found in the Acton Gazette, 10 llce- 
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231. M-OA: FR 1983. Acton by-election commented that 
his policy was chiefly anti-trust mixed in with anti- 
seiaitism. The attack on hidden forces can be found 
ih the Acton Gazette, op. cit. 
232. He received 3.1% of the vote - F. W. S. Craig, ed., 
British Parliamentary Election Results 1918 - 1ý9 (Glasgow, 1969), 1i. 21. The public reactions to 
Godfrey can be found in 11-0 A: Fit 1983. 
233- L1-OA: M 1983 and also News Chronicle, 9 December 
1943, comment on the farcical element of Godfrey's 
campaign. 
234. A 'Jewish Defence' report of the Jewish Chronicle, 
23 April 1943, made this point, 
235, Acworth and the League of Ex-Servicemen's support 
can be found in the Acton Gazette, 3 December 1943. 
F. C. Chester-Hash, Chairman of- the League, gave his 
"whole-hearted support to Godfrey" in a letter to 
the same paper, 10 December 1943, This contrasts 
strangely with Jeffrey Hamm's later remark to the 
author that he knew nothing of Godfrey. Hamm was 
to be the' Leagnue's leader from 1944. Letter to the 
author from J. Hamm, 17 February 1984, 
236. Bedford wrote for New Order no. 11 (11 June 1943), 
and claimed that he would co-operate with the B. H. P. 
because of their opposition to war - interview with 
Douglas Hyde in the Daily Worker, 20 April 1943. A 
J. D. C. report suggested that Bedford may have given 
financial support to Godfrey - C6/2/13g. 
237. In 19411 Godfrey was associated with the English 
Legion, whose policy was "out and out untisemitism" - 
On Guard no. 6 (December 1947) , Godfrey maintained 
his links with Bedford after the war, chairing a 
British People's Party meeting in December 191i. 5. See 
the Jewish Central Information Office, 'Organised 
Anti: ei, iitism in Great Britain 1942 - 1946' (Unpub- 
lis-lied ms., 1946), 13, However, the E. H. A. seems 
to have survived. At a meeting of another fascist 
revival group, the Ilational Front After Victory, 
Ben Greene was meant to be its loader. See the Ivan 
Greenberg papers, Mocatta Library 110/5 'Memo on the 
National Front', 20 September 1945. 
238 Figurc:, for July 1943 quoted by IIerbcr, l: Iorrison, 
tt, ansard JIG vo1.400 co1.2380,16 June 19tE4. 
239. The phrase is from the Jewish Central Information 
Office, op. cit.; 33. 
21 0. See the Jewish Chronicle, 3 November 1939 for this 
and other dot-Ail.,; about the group. 
2I 1. A Mass-Observation report for September 1.9L10 com- 
merited on a P. C. L. P. meeting with 10 elderly and 
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middle class members present. D! -OA: FR no. ta11, 
'Parliament Christian'. For its attack on internat- 
ional usury see Parliament Christian, vol. 2 no. 1F 
(Kay - June 19ti. 2 . 
242. At a meeting at the Stoll Theatre, 1 November 1942, 
the audience shouted pro-Mosley and antiseºnitic re- 
marks. One ex-18B forced his way to the front to 
speak to the audience. Pop reports of this meeting 
see the Jewish Chronicle, 6 November 1942 and J. D. C. 
report in C6/2/13e. 
243. Scrutton's reluctance to attract fascists was re- 
ported in the Jewish Chronicle, 27 November 19tß. 2. 
The Spector documents in the Wiener Library on the 
British National Party comment that Godfrey in- 
structed B. N. P. members to join P. C. L. P. branches but 
Scrutton refused to allow Godfrey permission to speak 
officially at P. C. L. P. meetings. The P. C. L. P. denied 
any antisemitic intention - see the Jewish Chronicle, 
27 November 1942 and 25 December 1942. However see 
Parliament Christian vol. 2 no. 11 (February 19435 for 
an attack on the Jewish responsibility for "the money 
power" and from that, planning. It also saw the 
Beveridge plan as a plot and stressed the involvement 
of I. M. Sieff in P. E. P. - Jewish Chronicle, 12 March 
19430 The Germans gave support for the group in a 
radio broadcast, obviously believing it to be a pro- 
Nazi group. See Reynolds News, 16 May 1943 for de- 
tails. 
2411.. }Mosley was visited by George Dunlop, 'soon to be prom- 
inent in the fascist revival, on 18 February 1942. 
Dunlop informed Mo . ley that he had registered a com- 
pany for the 18ßs and that there was support for it 
being political. Mosley on this occasion and in a 
later visit by a Mr. Swan, 19 September 19112, stressed 
his opposition to this idea. See prison officer re- 
ports in HO t1.5/2Lt891/t1O3. 
2! *5. Morrison told Mander in the Commons that the London 
County Council had grunted a certificate of registra- 
tion in September 191E2. Hansard HC vol. 1i. 04 col-950, 
2 Hovember 19114 
246. The Council's aim was to spread information about the 
working of Regulation 1OB. See their pamphlets The 
Case of G. R. Merriman (London, 1942), t. ia rna Carta in 
the Dustbin (Little Beckham, Surrey, 191.2 - printed 
by Count Potocki and finally Per. -ecuted Women in 
Britain To-day (London, 1915), 
247. On 14 September 19112 Mosley informed a visitor that 
he was writing to O: obert Sitwell to 6et a group of 
novelists togc: thf: r to attack the regulation. In 110 
45/24891/LtOta . The Patriot gave its support to the 
organization - sec issues no-1085 (26 November 1942), 
no. 1037 (10 December 1942), no. 1090 (31 December 
1942) and no-1132 (21 October 1943). The Jewish 
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Central Information Office, 'Organised Antisemitism' 
23, called The Patriot the 18B groups' "mouth- 
piece". 
248. Seethe Daily Worker, 7 and 8 December 1942 and the 
Jewish Chronicle, 18 December 19112 as well as Mander's 
question in the Commons, 15 December 1M2 - Hansard 
IIC vol. 385 col. 1780. 
2149, Anthony Phelps, one of the principal speakers at the 
first meeting at Holborn Hal]. on 6 December 191I2, had 
earlier claimed that he was not antiseraitic as other- 
wise he would have been interned. See the Spector 
documents on the People's Common Law Parliament at 
the Wiener Library. A J. D. C. report of 11 December 
1942 commented on the aim of the 18B Publicity Council 
to claim that internees were imprisoned because they 
were antisemites. 
250. CAB 66/35 WP (43) 11x8,14 April 1943. The function as 
a charitable group is commented on by Middleton fas- 
cist, G. P. Suther: t, who claimed that the Aid Fund 
"collected money, books, clothing". Interview with 
S. Rawnsley, 16 February 1977. 
251. Yeats-Brown wrote to Williamson on 1 December 1942 
"How I wish I could have you at the Iýolborn Town Ball: " 
E. Wrench, Francis Yeats-Brown 1886 - 19I14 (London, 
19148) , 258. 
252. At an'18B Revision meeting' 500 turned up in London 
during March 1943. See the Jewish Chronicle, 26 March 
1943" Other meetings were purely social such as a 
concert at the Kingsway Hail - Domvile Diaries, 27 
May 1944 Dom 56, Patriot no. 1132 (21 October 1943)- 
The Treasurer of the 18B Detainees fund claimed they 
were disbursing 1,500 a year to dependants in an 
interview in the clews Chronicle, 27 October 191i4. 
253, Daily Worker, 25 May 1943 comments on this rivalry. 
254. See Hansard HC vol. 387 cols-1316-17 and 1353-4,18 
March 1943 and I1C vol. 395 cols-09-11j, 1 December 1943 
for questions on the Lenin and other antisemitic wall- 
dtuubings. Douglas Hyde, I Believed: The 1'ßutobiopranh 
of a Former British Communist London, 1951), 139, 
comments on the grovwtli of such slogans, and the 
IJ. C. C. L's Civil Liberty, no. 8 (March 19111ý) suggested 
that there clan a direct link between the increase in 
antisemitism and the release of 1813 detainee: since 
1942. 
255. Reported by the Jewish Chronicle, 6 August 1943- 
256. The story behind Mosley's release can be found in file 
HO 45/2489! t . Churchill's and M orr is on' s explanations 
are in A. J. P. Taylor, op. cit.; 381-2. Robert Skidel- 
sky, op. cit.; 401, has claimed that the opposition to 
the release was "largely, though not exclusively, 
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organised by the Communist Party". This disguises 
the genuine unpopularity of the decision - see M-OA: 
FR no. 2011 'Ltosley and After' or the Home Intelligence 
report of the "storm of indignation" - IINF 1/292, no. 
164-(16 - 23 November 1943). 
257. See the Daily Worker, 19 November 1943- 
258- J. D. C. report for 8 June 191.1. in C6/2/13J on meetings 
at Notting Hill Gate and Tower Hill. 
259. At one 18B Detainees Group meeting the speaker could 
not be heard for over an hour due to the opposition, 
and at the League of Ex-Servicemen meeting, their 
platform was overturned. Both reported in J. D. C., 
30 August 1944 in C6/2/6. 
260. ibid. Hamm was to claim that the League suffered from 
too much petty detail when he first joined it. See 
his autobiography, Action Replay (London, 1983), 136. 
261. Details of Harm's career can be found in Action Replay, 
op. cit. and in C6/9/3/1. Hamm suggested that the in- 
ternment experience made him more anxious to get into 
politics. ' Letter to the author 17 February 1984. See 
also his 18B file HO 115/25740. 
262. Details of the meetings can be found in the Jewish 
Chronicle, 10,17 and 21. November and the Daily Worker, 
6,13 and 20 November 1944, and there is a J. D. C. re- 
port, November 1944, on the meetings in C6/9/13/(b). 
Pritt and Itathbone asked questions in the Commons con- 
cerning the League and Morrison replied that "its 
activities will... be very carefully watched". As it 
had only recently been formed Morrison said it was 
"too early to say whether it will acquire any signif- 
icance". Hansard IIC vol. 404cola . 1526 and 1546,9 Nov- 
ember 1944. 
263. Hamm put forward a Mosleyite economic nationalist ar- 
gument along with his attacks on the Rothschilds. 
This brought forth a response from the crowd: "Here 
we go again. Here's where the Jew-baiting begins". 
Report in the Jewish Chronicle, 24 November 1921.14. 
201. Burgess was 'Director of Propaganda' of the League of 
Ex-Servicemen. His comments were in the second ºneet- 
ing at Hyde Park, 12 November 191411.. Bee the Jewish 
Chronicle, 17 November 191411.. 
265. The disagreement between Burgess and Dunlop, which 
later spread to Hamm and Dunlop, is well-covered in 
a defence report in the Spector files at the Wiener 
Library - Opector Documents 610 '18B Publicity Coun- 
cil', 211 November 19144. A J. D. C. report 'Person- 
alities in the Fascist and Anti-Semitic Movcº., c: nt' 
May 1947 in C6/9/3/1, section on Dunlop, comments 
on the split. 
266. The League did not 3aanage any further meetings in 
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1944. At the end of the war 'Corporate Utilities' , Burgess's fascist press, was distributing sheets 
"the Land Fit for Heroes' attacking alien finance. The League of Ex-Servicemen was issuing similar prop- 
a ; -nda aimed at returning soldiers and asking whether 
they had a livelihood now. Again blame was put on 
our 'alien financial masters'. Both can be found in 
C6/9/l/3(7). Jeffrey Hanu. i became heavily involved 
in the anti-alien petition movement in Hampstead 
which will be dealt with later. See C6/3/3/6 J. D. C. 
report on Face the Facts Association, 30 November 
19450 
267. Details of Burgess s and Dunlop's later careers can 
be found in C6/9/3/1 op. cit. 
263. Hamm's account of the post-war campaign can be found 
in Action Replay, op. cit.; 137-40. For an account 
from the 'other side', namely the 43 group, see Alex- 
ander Hartog, Born to Sing (London, 1978), 74-7, 
269. Hansard HL vol. 1140 col-40Y 12 March 1946. 
270. Membership names taken from an intelligence report 
for 6 July 1915 on the National Front in the Ivan 
Greenberg papers 110/5. The National Front After 
Victory has received little attention. F. Mullaly, 
'Political Extremism in Britain' in A. G. Weidengeld 
and H. de C. Hastings (ed) Britain Between West and 
East (London, 1946), 47-8, is the fullest account, 
suggesting that the National Front was 'the nucleus 
around which an authoritarian right-wing movement' 
would ultimately We shape. David Baker, 'The 
Making of a British Fascist', also makes brief com- 
ment on the National Front. 
271- At the first meeting, 16 June 1945, J. F. C. Fuller 
wanted a non-political facade to the group. 
Chesterton was not impre<; aed but an ambiguous 
statement on a need to solve "the real Jewish prob- 
lem without rancour" was passed. Details in Ivan 
Greenberg papers 110/5. 
272. At the fourth meeting in September 1945 Chesterton 
was against merger with the British People's Party 
as he felt the Rational Front would be swamped. 
See Greenberg papers 110/5 report of 20 September 
1945. The British People's Party was revived in 
June 1945, although its organ People's Post was pro- 
duced in late April 19145. The B. P. P. in 1945 at- 
tracted two ex-Nordic League extrebist:, A. T. O. Lees 
and Elizabeth Berger. iee Spector notes in Wiener 
Library 016: 251/0486. 
273. Commented on Spector Uocuiaent: ý, Wiener Library no. 610 'Fascia; t National Front' . 
274, ibid.; and Greenberg papers 110/5 report for 25 Oct- 
ober 191E5, 
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275- In September 1945 John Beckett sent a message for 
the need for unity against Communism and Lord Nuffield 
was said to be interested in such a movement - 
Greenberg papers 110/5 reports for 20 September 1945 
and-25 October 19450 
276. In 1946 Chesterton and Mills both addressed the Brit- 
ish People's Party's London Central Branch, according 
to a Spector report in the Wiener Library 251/0486. 
In the last issue of People's Post (February 1951i. ) the 
League of Empire Loyalists was strongly recommended to 
members. See the Wiener Library Bulletin vol. 3 no-5-6 
(September - December 195ZF . 
277. The other component was the British iational Party 
(no relation to the Second World War Group). For de- 
tails of the early snake-up of the National Front see 
Martin Walker, The National Front (Glasgow, 1977), 74"- 
278. Ralph Jeffries (Douglas Hyde), 'Fascist Revival in 
Britain', On Guard, no. l (July 1947). 
279. The journals are The Patriot, The Weekly Review, The 
Vanguard and the Social Crediter. This does not in- 
clude the various fascist publications, all sup- 
pressed by June 1940. The antisemitic publishing 
companies were The Britons, Boswell Publishing Com- 
pany, Corporate Utilities, Essential Books and 
Potocki's Right Review press. These nine were not 
the only antisemitic outlets, but they were respon- 
sible for much of the extreme literature produced in 
the war. 
280, C. Holmes, Antisemitism in British Societ 1876 - (London, 1979), 173. 
281. To groups like the I. F. L., the Militant Christian 
Patriots and the Britons The Protocols explained 
everything. To others, like the B. U. F. it was linter- 
national. Jewish Finance' or 'International Jewish Bol- 
shevism', or both. However, this conspiracy theory 
did not refir directly to any written source such as 
The Protocols. 
282. Richard Griffiths, op. cit.; 66-7 sumrnarlses The 
Patriot line on Germany through the 1930s- 
283- Nesta Webs tcr, 'The Record of The Patriot', The Pat- 
riot no. 918 (14 Septeuabcr 1939). Richard Gilman, 
Behind World Revolution: The Stran to Cart. -er of' Ifecsta 
VIebster Arin Arbor, Michigtui, 1982), 51, comment: i on 
Vlubot, er's turnaround. 
28t1.. In a circular to me;; aber:; reported in a Special Branch 
report on the M. C. P., 16 . 3epLomber 1939 in 110 lL / 
21382/297.1iovioviýr, vie : hall :; ee, its organ, Free 
Press, continued into 1910. 
285. In the Social Crediter vol. 3 no. 10 (18 November 1939). 
212 
286. This is the actual title of a social credit pamphlet 
of 1941, written by P. R. Masson and Borge Jenson and 
published by K. H. P. Publications, Liverpool. 
287. The--Patriot no. 919 (21 September 1939) and no. 930 
(7 December 1939)- 
288. Nesta Webster 'Our YIar Aims', The Patriot no-932 
(21 December 1939)" The Patriot's sister paper, 
The British Lion, actually quoted a Douglas article 
'The Mark of the Beast' which suggested trn re was a 
Jewish conspiracy over Russia and Germany - vol. 8 
no. 9 (November 1939)0 
289. Dell was prominent in the M. C. P. See his article 
'Zionism, Hitler and Anti-semitism' in Free Press 
no. l+1 (November 1939) . 
290. Social Crediter vol. 5 no. 6 (19 October 1940) and 
(2 November l9Z O), vol. 5 no. 8 for comments on how 
"the Jews cannot lose the war". For The Patriot's 
support of the war, see 'Britain at War', in the 7 
September 1.939 is siie, no. 917, and the LI. C. P's Free 
Press no. 1t0 (October 1939) . 
291. In an article in the Weekly Review vol. 29 no. 11 
(1 June 1939), 'What a Russian Alliance Means' it 
was suggested that Jewish financiers sponsored by 
Moscow, were forcing Germany into a world war. In 
the war itself hints of a German-Russian Jewish 
alliance were made - Weekly Review vol. 30 no-14 (21i. December 1939)" However, as the historian of 
the Distributist movement has written, "the Weekly 
Review, supported the Allied war effort but consist- 
ently emphasised that the number one enemy was the 
Soviet Union, not Nazism". J. P. Corrin, 'Chester- 
belloc and the 1)istributist Circle' (Ph. D. Boston 
University, 1976), 338. Another pro, -Polish anti- 
semitic organ was Count Potocki's Right Review 
which also supported the war. See no. 11 Septem- 
ber 1939). 
292. A. Calder, op. cit.; 579 comments that they viewed 
Hitler "as a reincarnation of Kaiser Wilhelm" and 
thus "fought to defend the British Empire from the 
Huns". 
293, In a letter to 11.11. I3eamish, 6 November 1939 in 
HO 45/24967/674960/1.05-9,1115 report 8 March 19'42. 
The M15 report above comments on the pro-Hitler ex- 
tremist/'moderate' split in the I. F. L. Leese wrote 
to the Social Creditcr vo1. L1.110.8 (4 May 1940)p 
saying that he did not view Hitler as a demi-god, 
but as "a German patriot. That is all, but it is 
not a little! " 
295. From the Britons Archive, quoted by G. Lebzelter, 
213 
Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918 - 39 (London, 
" 1978 , 82. 
296. The Vancniard no. 259 (11 November 1939). 
297. Free Press no. tO (October 1939)- 
298. Holmes, op. cit.; 174, comments on this opposition. 
299. For a brief history of P. E. P. and other planning 
groups see A. Marwick, Britain in the Century of 
Total War (London, 19687,303-9. 
300. A classic example is the I. P. L's, P. E. P. or Sovietism 
by Stealth: Britons Shall. Be Slaves London, 1935). 
For other cases of anti-planning antisemi. tism see 
the Spector documents, '13B Detainee Groups', 5-9, 
in The Wiener Library. 
301. See for example the Medical Policy Association 
Bulletin, no. 1 (1943) for the P. E. P. statement of 4 
October 1933 that "vie have started from the position 
that only in war, or under threat of war, will a Brit- 
ish Government embark on large-scale planning". 
Available in the N. C. C. L. archive 310/6. 
302,11. Kopa ch, 'The Approach of the Conservative Party 
to Uocial Policy During World War II (Ph. D. Univer- 
sity of London, 1970), 43 and 71, comments that the 
majority of Conservatives were opposed to a 'Bever- 
idge Society'. 
303. Guy Andrews (The Anonymous Group), For Britain: 
Truth in War-time (Southend-on-Sea, ' Esscx, 1939 , 
3 and the British Lion vol. 9 no. 9 (November 1939 
makes the claim tliut A. lt. P . shows 'the plot' at home. 
301+. The phrase is Arnold Leese's - Weekly An61es no. 89 
(30 September 1939). The antisemitic world had cam- 
paigned against 'Jewish' evacuation before the war 
started. George Pitt-Rivers, Your Horse Is Threatened 
(London, 1939), commented on the threat of bolshev- 
isation by alien billeting and at the Nordic League 
in June 1939 h. P. Cole said evacuation was a Jewish-- 
Bolshevik plot - 11. Laski report, 27 June 1939 in 
110 141/22545/50-2. The B. U. F's Action carried out 
a less conspiratorial (but equally gutter-like) cam- 
paign against Jewish evacuee: until its demise in 
June 1940. See Action no. 186 (23 'September 1939) - 
"Jews Flood Brighton"; no-193,9 November 1939 on 
the "second exodus" and no. 196 (30 November 1939) 0 
305, The phra"e is Paul Addison' in The Pcmd to 194171 
(London, 1977), 73. 
306, The originator of' the movement was. Clarence Streit 
vhose Union flow (London, 1939) was popular on both 
aides of the Atlantic. 
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307. tii. B. Curry, The Case for Federal Union (Hiarmondsworth, 
Uiddle.: ex, 1939)- Curry was headmaster at the contro- 
versial Dartington School. 
308. Social Crediter, vol. 3 no . l4 
(7 October 1939) and Free 
Press no. 1t1 (November, 1939) . The latter al: o com- 
mented that such schemes "are anti-British stunts 
boosted by left-wing and Jewish elements who are taking 
no real part in the war"* 
309. See notes 64 and 5 above. 
310. The Idea Statesman vol. 18 (9 December 1939) pointed out 
the parallel campaign of Mosley and Free Press against 
Federal Union. For other examples see Weekly Angles 
no. 101 (23 December 1939)-'aFederal Union - Europe 
under Jewish Control', The Patriot no-936 (18 January 
1940) - 'Beware of Federal Union , and no. 91t6 
(28 
March 1940)9 no-1007 (29 May 19)l), no. 104.7 (5 March 
1942) and no-1142 (30 December 1943) for more cases. 
Captain Ramsay warned that if Federal Union was ad- 
opted it would mean the setting up of a Jewish Masonic 
super-state - Hansard INC vol. 360 col. 1200,8 May 1940. 
Clarence Streit's second book, Union Now With Britain 
(London, 1941), 90, commented on how the Nazi answer to 
Federal Union "is to cry 'Jewish propaganda"'. 
31].. Social Crediter vol. 3 no-5 (ltd October 1939)- 
312, For example Free Press no. 40 (October 1939) commented 
that 16B marked the death of habeas corpus, and warned 
that it could be used against criticism of Jews such 
as Hore-Belisha. 
313. Leading the way in the 18B/Portocols linkage was The 
Patriot. It pursued a constant anti-18B policy from 
1941 onwards, often pointing out the supposed Jewish 
origin of the Regulation. See particularly . 
Cuthbert 
Reavely's article in no-1015 (24 July 1941), and C. F. 
Ashton's comment that the Zionists were underneath 
it, in no. 1068 (30 July 1911-2) and G. F. Green's similar 
point in 11oel]1a7 (3 February 19LIt. ). Where The Patriot 
went, the Social. Crediter was usually also to be found 
and editorial comment, vol. 10 no. 3 (27 March 1943) 
asked why no Jews had been imprisoned under 1OB. 
Douglas Heed, A Pro het at Home (London, 19111), 78-80 
and All Our Tomorrows London, 19112), 311-2 suggested 
that the Regulation was to silence so-called anti- 
semites. 
311g. The British National Party attacked 18B as vicious 
persecution; it was "unßritish" . See its 'foundations' (191i2) in British I, ibr. wy, British National Party - 
miscellaneous leaflets in £31£: i;. a. 8. It. o, sister organ- 
ization, ! few Order no. 11 (11. July 1911ý3), claimed that 
l8B was to punish antiseinitism. The Duke of Bedford's 
campaign against ReLulation l£3B also hinted that this 
was its raison d'etrc. See his Is This Justice? 
(Glasgow, 19113) and Rewuiation 18B Glasgow, 19111}). 
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The latter was a speech to the House of Lords, 25 
January 1944. 
315. For the reception to the Beveridge Report see Paul 
Addison, The Road to 19QG5 (London, 1977), 218. 
316. INF 1/292 no. l1l. (1 -8 December 1942)o 
317. This is the title of a Social Credit pamphlet of C. H. 
Douglas, (Liverpool, 1943)- 
318, The phrase is R. J. Iiorthin's, The Beveridge R. -,, )opt: 
War and Finance (Bradford, 1943), 2. 
319, Question !. luster, The jyolutioni^t' ,. in Trust: Vlhat 
the B. R. C. Omitted Edinburgh, 1943), 24 stated that 
out of 'Jewi: h controlled Federal Union, Atlantic 
Charter, Lease and Lend, Compulsory Communism and 
Fascism' and 18B "a silly Beveridge Report is born", 
C. H. Douglas, The Beverridf e Plot, 7, suggested i. t was 
a plan to control all aspects of human life. Indiv- 
idual initiative, warned Douglas, was the most danger- 
ous weapon against the plan, according' to The Proto- 
cols. The 5ieff link was stressed by the People's 
Co1. uaon Law'Parliament . See the Jewish Chronicle, 12 
March 1943 for a repoet on this. 
320. Despite the fuss that the I. I. P. A. created, it has until 
recently been neglected by medical historians. Frank 
lionigobaum, The Division in Bri. ti -1hi Medicine: A his- 
tory of the ; eparati on of general practice from ho: L)- ital care 1911. - 1918 (London, 1978 , 275-283', re- 
medies that bal.. ) though he perhaps; overstresses; the 
importance of the M. P. A. 
3210 These viere the brothers Russell and Basil Steele. In- 
formation supplied by Basil Steele to the author, 29 
August 198Li. Russell Steele contributed to The Pat- 
riot throughout the war - see no. 900 (6 July 1939 , 
noo937 (25 January 19! 1.0) and no-3-034 
(L;. 
Deceuber 19L}1. ) . 
322. This was the Australian, Bryan hloynihara. Bee his The 
Probler. t of the Medical Profession (Liverpool, 19ti. 33 
published by Douglas ', s. K. F. P. Publications and now 
obtainable from The Briton: succeL; uovs, }3loornl ielcd' 
Boole. 
323. Alexander Rugg-Gunn. Rugg-Gunn via,;; a strange mixture 
of Viking r"c: ac. ntuciý, t ui. ýI it j. iUaerr: i, i on: "er of contact 
lens-es . See The Times Ui, i tuul"y, 73 Üel, t. ýa,: l; er l 72 or 
The Lý. ncet, l U, _ptc;:! bc. t" 1972. His ': ny:; ticul' is best illustrated in his O: ir"ic; and Odin: Thc: "'OrixT1rt 
of Kiný. wliip (London, 191; 0) which arintE: (l -)t" ' the T märenes or tli" t final ec:; tocy x-ji: iclt i:; " mystical 
union' (pp. 163). His i.: . P. A. cei, trib: i ýiUt. 17d:: I3ri t9:: h Medicine andt f1l iet.. Planý-i (Liverpool, 19'; 3).. 
324, Bulletin nool can be found in the IT. C. 'G. L. archive 
315/-6. It sUFý; Et: oted that 1711i.: tf: vc3T' tllf.. ' oi'l. (; i'1"1: of The 
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Protocols "there is no doubt that they are effective 
plans" o 
325. Iionigsbaum, op. cit.; 274-80. 
326. ibid.; 280. 
327. A plebiscite carried out by the M. P. A. in 1943 found 
that 77% of doctors were against state control. See 
B. 1. Monahan in The Fib Tree no. 1 (June 19510. The 
B. M. A. in September 1943 voted 200 to 10 against the 
Beveridge Report, the News Chronicle. 27 September 
1943 
328, Its first Bulletin, 'The Opponents of the Medical Pro- 
fession' suggested that all planning groups were inter- 
connected and funded by International Jewish Financiers. 
It did not claim that The Protocols were not a forgery 
but suggested that they were still 'an effective plan' 
and that they explained the 'threat' to the medical 
profession. The Bulletin is available in the N. C. C. L. 
archive 310/6. Later issues maintained a conspiracy 
theory but did not mention The Protocols by name - 
see no. 10 on the goverrunent1 white paper on health 
in the Social Creditor, vol. ll no. 26 (4 March 191; 1) 
and no. 12 'Tire Apostacy of the B. M. A. in the same 
journal vol. 12 no-14 and 15 (June 10 and 17,1944)- 
329. In the Evening Standard, 9 September 1913, an inter- 
view with the 1j. doctors produced the remarkable com- 
ment from the M. P. A. "Vie are not aLairrst the Jews, 
we are against Jewish Fascism". The impact of the 
L. P. A. is difficult to assess. Their bulletins had 
a maximum circulation of 2,500 (information supplied 
to the author from Basil Steele, the General Secre- 
tary of the M. P. A., letter of 29 hugust 198)4), though 
their influence may have been much greater as promin- 
ent B. M. A. delegates were targets of their propa- 
ganda. Certainly the contemporary press felt it im- 
portant - see The Spectator vol. 173 (29 SepLer, ibcr 
191111) and the comment of' he Dail orker, 5 May 19! i. 5 
on its "astoundingly successful activities". The 
Social. Creditor vol. 17 no. 16 (21 December 19L6) claimed 
it had stopped the B. M. A. from negotiating with the 
government over the II. II. 3. Act and 11oni. gebsum, op. 
cit.; 271, agrees with this analysis. 
330- Iiarold Laski': article wus in the New Statesman vol- 
24 (11 July l912). 
3310 In the Social Crc: ciitF`r, vol. 8 no. 20 (25 July 3.91E2). 
Ld:. ki. 's ºai: quotcsd ." tý, tement.. joiiiQd othcr ' clas: ic' 
Jewish : tateºaent:. supposedly accidentally c)t4, uj. ij,, ijjg 
the Jewish plot. S(, e The Britonu, V1ll:. t thc: Ji: y1:, Stº. ýZ 
About Thc; º, º:; elve:: (Loººdon, 19113), in the Briton.. l, iis, 
celluneouc; Pamphlets in the 13riti:; li Librury, V1. P. 
6762. 
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332. In a letter to Henry Williamson, 24 November 1942 
quoted in E. Wrench, op. cit.; 257-8. For less op- 
timistic comments from Yeats-Brown see loc. cit.; 259 
or the comments of C. I1. Stoddard in a letter to Miss 
Blbömfield 27 October 1942. In the British Library 
X529/18340- 
333- At the start of the war the B. U. F. dismissed the Gov- 
ernment White Paper on German atrocities as "hate 
propaganda".. See Action, no. 192 and 193,2 Laid 9 Nov- 
ember 1939. The I . I"' . L's Weekly Angles went further 
saying it was "a Jewish plot to help aliens here". 
Social Credit organs denied Nazi persecution of Jews 
throughout the war - see the Social Crediter vol. 9 
no. 18 (9 January 19143) and vol. 14 no. 12 2 May 1945) 
or Reality no. 27 (14 July 19LI11. ) - suggesting there was no 
evidence of the Jewish atrocity reports and it was all 
a design to get British and U. S. sympathy. Perhaps 
the most notorious case of denial was Alexander Rat- 
cliffe'.. Truth About the Jews (Glasgow, 194.3), 15-6 
which stated that there was not one single autliciiti- 
cated case of a Jew being massacred under the Hitler 
regime. The atrocity stories were 95; forgeries and 
the invention of the Jewish mind. Although journals 
such as Truth, The British Lion, The Hew Pioneer and 
Time Patriot were dubious about the reality of Jewish 
persecution, the (luasi-fascist Weekly Review con- 
demned Nazi atrocities -see vol. 3 no. 13 23 December 
1912) - editorial on 'Mass-Murder' . 
334- References to the Jewish responsibility for the Rus- 
sian t: evolutian were constant, but other s iLnifieant 
events in antiseiai tic history such as the Marconi 
Scandal were also referred to - see Weekly Review 
vol-30 no. 18 (25 January 191E0) which saw a Aural] el 
between the IIore-Belisha case and the Marconi Scandal 
or C. II. Douglas, The Bij Idea (Liverpool, 19L. 2), lit 
for another mention of this incident. Past anti- 
semite. s such as Cobbett, Ices to Webster and Elizabeth 
Fry were popular . source.: of quotes.. However, new 
dangers such us Federal Union, the Beveridge Plan, 
15B, the Black Market, the influence of Harold Laski, 
and other topical is sue: were added to the old con- 
cerns. 
335. Despite their similarities dis tributists felt that 
Social Creditor:. accepted the "vicious principles of 
industrial capitatli s m" - Weekly Revievw, vo1.31. nu. 5 (30 October 1%1). 
336. Sec A. K. Chesterton's attack on A. Ratcliffe's 
'crankiness' in the Weekly Review, vol. 38 no. 25 (16 March 1911Q. Tho Social Creditor u, 'gested on 
several occasions that Arnold LOe: e was controlled 
by Jews - vo]. h no-7 (27 April, 19140), vol. 8 no-5 (1]. April 19142). Leese returned the compliments 
telling his readers to look at Douglau's portrait 
and "to learn to recognise kosher when you see it". 
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Gothic Ri ppl. e:: 1o. 7 (30 November 1945)- See also 
issue no. 8 (22 December 191+5) for similar coºmnents q 
337. The right-wing Catholic World, represented by the 
Catholic Herald and The Tijblet and even further to 
the right, the Weehly Review, saw Jewi h Communism 
as the threat to the world. To Alexander Ratcliffe, 
however, Britain was fighting 'for World Jewry and 
the Papacy", Vantmard no. 259 (11 November 1939)- 
Leese in the war attacked Mosley's policy of re- 
turning the former German colonies - see Weekly Anr; - 
le:; no. 93 (28 October 1939), and how with peace the 
I . F. L. 
' would have to compete with "Icos her anti- 
se'llitism" - ibid.; no-95 
(1] November 1939). 
3380 However, there wet-e anonymous circulars advocating 
extermination, such us one sent to "the Jew-paid 
editor" of Tribune. It stated "All Jew Pigs will be 
exterminated the Hitler way - the only way to get rid 
of the Yids. P. J. " Reported by George Orwell, 'As I 
Please'. Tribune, 19 May 191111. In private Hitler's 
extermination policy was supported. In Mass- 
Observation directives on Jews in October 1940 and 
March 191139 three or four respondents agreed with 
Hitler's final solution. See M-OA: DR 2535, DR 111x5, 
DR 2102, October 191+0 and DI? 2090, DP. 2265, DR 2829, 
March 191+3. 
339, Leese's earliei" solution was. in The Fascist, no. 69 
(February, 1935) . His war declaration was in Weekly 
Anyºles no. 91 (11i October 1939). 
3140. The Social Creditor, vol. 9 no. 13 (9 January 1943) sug- 
gested that "Madagascar is the obvious place for the 
Hew Jerusalem". An H. C. C. L. report on the Social 
Credit movement commented that the Britons Press also 
supported this idea. N. C. C. L. archive 310/2. 
341. In the first hearing, 2 July 191.0,110 283/13/1ýO-2. 
342. ibid. 
3! }3. This was the attitude of Truth as will be later exam- 
ined. However, one article by ite editor, Collin 
Brooks, need:; to be c xuminc: d at tiiic point a:; it 
played a role in a move extreme world. The article 
was 'Anti-uemitism and treachery' wirich appeared in 
Trutt: nu. 311JQ (5 June 19112) and it was circulated by 
the ßriti:. Ii Ilr. tioiial Party. Brook: warned that Jews 
were essentially alien and that Lheir power in Brit- 
ain needed to be controlled. In the Acton by-election, 
Edwaird Godfrey mac_te : irailaar comments, waging that the 
Jews were "1A stuLu within a state" and should. be 
treated line "alien(.; ) in our midst". Interview in 
the ,. cton Gazette, 10 1)ecenll, er : t9! 43. A. K. Chc terton 
also carte to anppurt a ., y;; tei. i of upurtlieid in tlic. war. 
Lice the Yleekiv IN-view vol. 36, no-25 (16 March lyltlt) 
219, 
where he suggested that the Jews as 'guests' should 
be more respectful of their British hosts. 
344, Brooks, op. cit.; suggested expulsion could be a final 
solution, and Godfrey was of similar mind; indeed, he 
supported Edward I's expulsion of the Jews - Acton 
Gazette, 10 December 1943. 
345. Arnold Leese and Richard Burton were two of the most 
extreme antisemites in modern British history and both 
were pro-Arhbists. Throughout the war The Patriot 
made play of Jewish sponsored 'atrocities' in Pales- 
tine and the dangers of Zionism - see no. 911.11,14 March 
19110, no. 9116,28 March 19110, no. 1035,11 December 191.1.1, 
no. 111i9,17 February 1911.11. The Militant Christian 
Patriots were also violently anti-Zionist and pro- 
Arab - see Free Press no. 36, (March 1939), and no. 10ý- 
5 (February and !, larch 19110). 
346. Although fascist in name, the I.. F. L's main concern 
was the Jews. As one of its war pamphlets stated: 
'Race is the true basis of politics' - from 'Fascism: 
Why Vie Require It' in M-OA: TC Politics Box 10 File E. 
347.2 July 19110 meeting in HO 283/13/36-9. Mosley used 
the classic B. U. F. defence that Jews were not attacked 
because of what they were, but on account of what they 
did. 
348. In the fourth meeting, 22 July 1940, Mosley stated that 
"anti-semitism is an old English grcwth". In HO 283/ 
16/30. 
3119- R. Thurlovi, 'Ideology of Obsession', Patterns of Pre- 
judice vol. 8 (November - December 1974 25. Michael 
Banton has argued that the term 'racism' should not be 
applied unless- biological determinism is involved - 
The Ideca or Rare (Cambridge, 1977), 159-61, whilst 
John Rex has suggested that other forms of determinism 
can operate - such as on religious, cultural, histor- 
ical, ideological and sociological grounds. In Race 
} elatioiu. in Uociolot%i cal Theory (London, 1978), 159. 
Although there is s oi, te strength in Rex's pragmatic ap- 
proach, his refusal to separate genetic racism is a 
wealniess, for it does have totally different con- 
notations as Banton siigg; es ts. 
3508 E. D. Hart, 'The Menace of the Nomad' B. U. Quarterly 
vo. l. IV nc,. l (Spring 19110). For the impact of SpenL- 
lerian 'cultural anti: emitisrn' on Mosley, and his 
Larnurckian outlook : ce R. Thurlow, 'Deotiny and Doom: 
Spengler, Hitler ; end 'British' Fascism' . Patterns of Prejudice vol. 15 (October 1981), 25. 
351. J. L. Finlay, The 11 n: li is h OI. ip; ina of Soci: zl. Credit 
(London, 19? 2)ihas argued that "to Douglas Jew- 
ishness vita: not a 1"acial terra at all" and that his 
conspiracy thence catmot "be called anti-s e; nitic in 
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the normal sense - loc. cit.; pp. 103-4. Such explan- 
ations are not convincing as Douglas's antisemitism 
took many forms. 
352. C. H. Douglas, The Big Idea (; Liverpool, . 
1942), 20. 
353. C. H. Douglas, The Brief for the Prosecution (Liver- 
pool, 1945), 79. 
354. For a brief history of these groups see R. Griffiths, 
op. cit.; 317-21. New Pioneer was published until 
January 1940- Its opposition to Jewish refugees was 
on "eugenic grounds" vol. 1 no. 10 (September 1939). 
Rolf Gardiner, a member of the English Array, sug- 
gested that there were two alternatives - the soil 
or alien values - En, ciand Herself (London, 1943), 165. 
JLymington in his Alternative to Death (London, 1943), 
agreed, talking of a Golden Age based on "race memory"- 
E-14. Race was a "biological truth" although Hitler 
had distorted it - p. 22. What was needed was a "unity 
of blood, language and customs - p. 23. It is ironic 
that these groups volkisch Sumter camps continued 
throughout the Nazi war - see Gardiner op. Cit.; 39, 
and that a new group called the 'League of Roland' 
was set up in the war. Reported by Home Intelligence 
in INF 192 no. 22 (5 - 12 March, 1941). The group 
was described as a "neo-fascist organization". 
355" As has been suggested, as far as the B. U. F. was con- 
cerned, there was an increased tendency towards the 
conspiratorial after the outbreak of war. This ten- 
dency was also true of other fascist. and antisemitic 
groups, ! perhaps not surprisingly given the problems 
that the war created for these groups. As far as 
pure racial anti semitisia was concerned, with the ex- 
ception of the I. P. L., only a few iter. u were printed 
in the war. J. II. Harvey's, The IIeritar_e of Britain 
(Little Bookhar. ý, Surrey, 19110), was based on the 
racialist writings of L. Waddell and H. Gunther. A. 
racialist publication by Alfred G. Pape, Entllnand's 
Answer, advertised by 'The (i. uestion Master', The 
Evolutionist's Brains Trust (Edinburgh, 19113) never 
appeared as far as the author has been able to find 
out. 
356. For Chestcrtun'o career scc R. Thurlow, 'Ideology of 
Obsession' , and David Baker, 'The flaking of a Briti.: h Fa: ucist' Up to the war Clicutertoll was capable of 
gutter raciut antiuemit. i:: m. In a Iiordic League meet- 
ing in July 1939 Cht:.. tcrtoic told the audience treat 
' lamp, Pouts' . huu ld be 'tt; ed to solve the Jewiuh pro- 
bleat. See J. D. (;. report in 06/2/5. In Free Preus 
no-38 (June 1939) he :"t ttcd "V; ovl. d Jewry once again 
grows into the vi t-u1:,.. (, f the Ue riaan people and poi:: ons 
the blood-utreLL uc oi' tliý: ir economy". Vli tlh the war, 
Chesterton iI. td. tutiiaLei: j juiut; d up 4nd upon his release 
he wrote for T, ui. h, "`ile Patriot and VJeel: ly Review. 
iris main concern was the pre., erva tion of British 
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sovereignty against alien (Jewish) attack via Federal 
Union or similar plots. See for example The Patriot 
no. 11142 (30 December 1943). Although Chesterton felt 
that Jew., could never be British, he abandoned a Iiazi- 
racial form of antisemitis m that had been present in 
the 1930s, 
3570 Arnold Leese, it has been pointed out, was profoundly 
shocked with Hitler's war actions but after the war 
he returned. to his support of Hitler and even of 
William Joyce whom he had attacked at the start of 
the ware See Gothic Ripples no. ti. (13 October 19)t5). 
Many B. U. P. stalwarts such as "flick" Clarke lost int- 
erest in politics after their 18B experiences - see 
R. Skidel. ky, op. cit.; tt90. Others returned but 
were still. profoundly affected by the war. 
358" See F. W. S. Craig, Minor Partics, 12 for the B. U. F. 
results and British Parliamentary Election Results, 
I}2l for Godfrey. 
3590 Stuart Rawnsley, 'Fascism and Fascists', 25-6. 
360. Diary entry for 23 February 191i. 3 in J. L. Hodson, IIome 
Front (London, 1%14', 298-302. 
361. Malcolm Muggeridge, The Thirties: 123. Q-40 in Great 
Britain (London, 1911-0).. 210-1, commented how recently 
Mosley has stopped emphasising the corporate stute. 
At the Uiivertown by-election, February 19! 10, Mass- 
ObuervaLion pointed out that the public was not i sure 
what fascian was, or what its links to Nazism were. 
Iii-OA: FR no. 39 3ilvertown by-election. 
362. Report of the Jewish Chronicle, 16 February 1940. 
363. See Home Intelligence reports of 17 January, 19 Jan- 
uwry and ]. February 19110 for the D. U. F. campaign in 
Norfolk and Suffolk. In IIJF1/319. 
361E. See the Jewish Chronicle, 3 May 1940 for the British 
Traders' Bureau iinpn. ct on Bettina]. Green, where many 
11o11-Jewish shop-owners felt a Jewish threat. Edward 
Godfrey in the Acton by-election also got some local 
support for this issue. See LI-OA: FR 1983 Acton By- 
election. 
3650 At Brighton, 13 May 1940, a hO the audience warmed 
to the B. U. F' ur: ti: emitisr: but not to its foreign 
policy in ger: eral0 J. U. C. re-oort in C6, '5/1/ 10 
J. U. C. report a day '. later coi. imcnted tha h, the man on 
the atrcot was anti-faucis t but definitely not pro- 
Jewish - loc 0 cit 0 As a Home Intelligence report 
suggested, the faasc. i-ts' only popular appe: a] is the 
alitiserni tisin" - I. ýý 1"ß: i+ 1.9110 In IJIFl/319. 
366. lIarvej's link to Llie I. F. L. is unclear. It seems 
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certain that the articles in its organ The Fascist 
no. 86 and no. 104 (July 1936 and January 19383 signed 
'J. H. II. ' were Harvey's. A J. D. C. report on the 
I . F_. L. for 1937 stated that Harvey was on the lit- 
erary committee of the I. F. L. - Board of Deputies, 
Defence Committee records, I. F. L. File; The Herit- 
asre of Britain was advertised by Arnold Leese and 
was available frcni its h. q., the White House. See 
advert. in 110 45/249G7/G74960. However, Count 
Potocki published the book in ?. larch 19110. Not many 
could have been cold, only 50 of the vellum copies, 
anti most of the remainder were des troyed in a bomb 
raid - the Right Review no-15 (Spring 19113). How- 
ever, at this point a paperback edition was produced. 
Copies have been found only at the British Library 
and at Cambridge University Library by the author. 
367, The Herita;; e of Britain, 6. 
368. Weekly Review vol. 37 no. 24 (11 March 1943). 
369. Potocki achieved some noteriety in the 1930s for an 
obscenity trial. He was also a familiar figure due 
to his eccentricity of dress and manner. For a 
sympathetic account of his life see R. T. Risk, It jr, 
the Choice of the Gods: The femark ible Life of Count 
Potocki of Montalk Francetovln, Hew Ilarmpshire, 197 
Potocki published his o vin paper, The Rigllt Review, 
from 1936 to 1973. It was viciously antisemitic, 
anti-coi:, munist, pro-Polish and with a tendency to the 
pornol rapliic. 
3704 Bor: loran was in Jaime. Maxton'a word.;: a Conservative 
who began to think about politics: "a disastrous 
thing for a Conservative to do". He was impreos ed 
by the ])iul: e of Bedford and was imprisoned under 18B - 
Hansard vol. 381 coll1i62,2]. July 1942. His Liver- 
pool journal, The Tal ki njr Picture Nevis, advocated a 
negotiated peace and also doubted the atrocity stor- 
ies - SOC no-1326 (25 Mit: it 
18B file HO 45/25729.1-9)15). 
Sue also his 
3710 The report of the knighthood is. . i. 'rc. r, i the Daily Exnress, 29 March 1943, 
372. See note 197 above. 
,ý:. ... 3ýýc '1 ct no ttý^ joirýt article w»-I t. torc vii tli his father, 
'ý1i11i«m Ilarvc: y, I: ri: ter fIiwh linriinci (Loiidun, i. 936) 
ohii cti upº)ezirt: d oi-igi-ai ]y in v(1t1r1ý)1 s: -; r, ur (Jtult: 1936). 
371E Ilenrj Yevele (Loliclý, ri, 191M pijblislic: d by D. T. 
Batt-IC o., ýCCt, `-1 t. arý cl,: ilac d t;: f; boo1- vti.: "ac- 
cur"--. te, cnthus icý: tic (; ai3. ) fully doctimented", 
375o Hai"ve; ý in the Iiuri tu}"; c)f Tic. I ta;. n, 8 had, ::;.:;; c; d "i'or 
convenience u11,1 :, ihiolicity 1 liave u: cü the words 
l Goth' and 'Gothic' ti: rc, u611ou t to indicate the pure 
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Aryans of the ancient royal caste and their tradit- 
ion". For Harvey's philosophy in Henry Yevele see 
the preface, vi - vii and P-77- 
376. J. ir. Harvey, Gothic En =land: A Survey of National 
Culture: 1300 - 1550, (London, 1947).. 15. The book 
was again published by Batsfordho. 
377. The Plantagenets was first published by Batsfords in 
1948 as part: of a six volume series - 'The British 
Monarchy'. The book has been revised in 1959 and 
1981, and is in its 18th impression, now being pub- 
lished by Fontana. For objections to it in 197th by 
the C. C. J. and the recent controversy over The Plan- 
tagenets see the Jewish Chronicle, 16,23,30 Novem- 
ber 1981.. See also C. Holmes and T. Kushner, 'The 
Charge is ritual murder', Jewish Chronicle, 29 l. farch 
1985, which draws the issue together. 
37ßo The Plantagenets, (London, 1972 edition), 1]8-20. 
379. For its withdrawal by Fontana see the Jewish Chron- 
icle, 111 December 19811. o 
3ß0o The Social Crediter had a circulation of 1,000 in 
the 1war. See Special Branch report of 11. October 191.19 
in HO 115/2ti966/671i. 112/50-Zi . Weekly Angles probably 
had a lovh; r circulation. Its successor, Gothic Rin- 
les, had between 500 - 600 readers according to an 
M15 estimate in March 19! 16 - in HO 115/2tj. 967/109. 
The Van guard had a circulation of 2,000 in 19112 
}come Office minute, 12 March 19112), risin 1 to 2,5C0 
in 191+t} (Home Office; minute 7 October 19111ý. Both 
in HO 115/25398/38 and 288-9. 
381. An intelligence report in the Spector documents 
'The Captuin' in the Wiener Library estiiaa Led that 
the circulation of The Patriot was 5,000. 
382. Hansard 1IC vol. 360 col-355,25 April 1910. 
383. Truth was to be found according to a J. D. C. report 
' it n every club and most messes" . 
Memo of 1941 in 
CIS/3/33. See the Tribune, 1 October 191i. 3 and 29 
December 1944 for its impact in army and navy wards. 
For the links to the Conservative Party see Time and 
Tide vol. 22 no. 1i7 (22 November 191.1) and Sir Thomas 
Douglas's comments to Collin Brooks in March 191i. 1, 
quoted in Stephan Koss, 'i'lie Rise and Pail of the Pol- 
itical. Press in Britain vol. 2, The T iel. f. th Century 
London, 19811. 
' 
611. Dugdul. c, the new Tory Chairman, 
told-Brooks that Truth was the "nearest to a depend- 
able organ" of the Purty. 
38t1.. See Brook's 'Anti-: emiti. sm and Treachery' in Truth 
no. 311S0 (5 June 1%2) and Douglas Reed, A Prophet At 
Home (London, 1941), 78-80 for the Jewish 18B link. 
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385. For the Federal Union link see Truth no. 3512 (31 Dec- 
ember, 1943). For opposition to the Beveridge lan. 
and P. E. P. seeissue no. 3388 (15 August 1941) anti no. 
314513_ (20 November 1942). 
386. Truth no-3107 (1 March 19142 and Douglas Reed, All 
Our Tomorrows (London, 19143 , 148. 
387. Truth no. 3295-3298 (3 - 214 November 1939) had corres- 
pondence and editorials doubting Nazi atrocities. 
Reed, in Lest We Iterret (London, 1943), 250, commented 
on the exaggerated atrocities. 
388. Reed, Lest Vie Regret, 261. The Social Crecliter ap- 
proved of Reed; see vol. 5 no. 19 1.8 January 1.9141) . ' vol. 10 no. 1 (13 March 1943)- 
389. Derek Stanford remembered Potocki as a familiar 
Bloornabury figure of the 1930s with his "flowing cloak 
and peakles:: velvet cap" - Inside the Forties: Liter- 
ary Memoirs, 1951-57 (London, 1977 , 14. 
390. Morrison when asked about Potocki and the Polish Roy- 
alist Ausociation called it "an imaginary projection" 
and said that Potocki's 'nonsense' shouldn't receive 
too much attention: Hansard vo1.389 col. 1248,20 May 
1943. 
391. Douglas Hyde stressed Potocki's importance due to his 
printing abilities. Interview withh author, 17 Septem- 
ber 1983. Potocki printed Jane Zedd's 1: 1agna Carta in 
ti, e lluuU In and Henry Ut. Georgge: In Search of Justice: 
18B for the Council in 19ä2. Ile later fell out with 
there. See Ri . ht Review no-15 (Spring, 1943). 
392. F. Newsard minute, 9 Septcriber 1943 in 110 45/25398/191. 
393. Jewish Chronicle, 9 April 1943. 
394 A. Ratcliffe The Truth About the Jews (Little Bookh: rn, 
Surrey, 19435. *. )I -9 
395. ibid.; 15-6. 
396. Glasgow C. I. ll. report, 29 May 19143 in 110 45/25398/286-7. 
3970 For details on Essential Books see the Jewish Chronicle, 
3 Iiover: iber 1911! 4.. A Special Branch report of 28 April 
1943 co, -merited on their distribution of Ratcliffe s book and the same report for Godfrey' .a link. Both in 
110 45/25398/213-7. 
39L Lice the 1)n: i. ]y I; rorec::, '19 March 1913 and Sitrvo. 3vcr- 
ti:: ci" and Connor Times, 10 October 191iß for i;: forau: tion 
on Harvey' cot1u e ,.. t Little Bookhur., Üi; rrcy, "ICI it:. inhabitants. 
399, Admiral Barry Dornvile' s disaric:; at Greenwich give it 
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rare insight into the antisemitic underworld. It 
is obvious that The Patriot and The Vanj, uard gave 
him much pleasure and he enjoyed his weekly meeting 
viith fellow ex-detainees at The Patriot's offices. 
See Dom 86 and 7, diary entries for 27 October 19143, 
18 February, 1 April, 14 May, 111 June all in 19LIll 
and 6 January 19145, 
1400. See M-OA: D8296, September 1939, January i943, Feb- 
ruary 1943. It is interesting that her diary entry 
for 15 September 1939 commented on how she and her 
husband started the war by re-reading Eye Witness 
for the last vwar, showing the deep rooted tradition 
of antisemitism in Britain and the persistence of 
its ideas. 
401. The Patriot no-1030 (6 November 19141). See no-1173 
(3 August 1944) for a similar appeal and warning. 
1102. The Britons published a 1941 edition of 1,500 
copies with a reprint of 1,000 in 1943. See the 
Evening Stanchard, 8 October 19143. A copy is avail- 
able in the John Rylands Library, University of Man- 
chester. The only addition to the 1941 edition was 
a note urr p. 5 showing the Protocols to be proved by 
Disraeli in his 'Lord George Bentinck' . For further 
information on The Britons activities in the war, 
see Tribune, 17 December 19143. For the German use 
of Tha Protocols in the war see L. P. Lochner (ed. ), 
The_Goebbel Diaries (London, 19D8), 296-7 diary 
entry for 13 May 1942. 
1403, In the Daily porker, 27 l. ipril 191i5. 
404, Hyde himself listed these in the Daily tlorker, 5 May 
19145 - Central London (The Britons ?, Edgware (Cor- 
porate Utilities. ), Liverpool. (The Social Crediter), 
Glaabow. (Ratcliffe) and Taunton (Essential Books 
405, Frederick Hullally, 'Political Extremism in Britain' , 46, estimated Britain's potential fascist support at 
about 5,000. A year litter Sidney Salomon of the 
Board of Deputies put the figure slightly higher at 
6-7.000 - see C6/7/3/2. The government's, and par- 
ticularly the Home; Uecretary Ilerbert, Morrison's fear 
of antisentitism will be dealt with later. Ftorrison's 
comments at a Cabinet meeting at the end of the war 
"that he was seriously alarmed rut; aard. i. ng the pos sibil- 
ity of anti-s erti tisim in this country" illustrates 
the point in CAB 95/1.15 JIl (! 5), 16 May 19145. Richard 
Law, an under-Uecretary in the Foreign Office, also 
voiced his concern th,... 1; ouitiset. iiti: m feeling would 
soon become organised in Britain -" note on the Ber- 
muda Conference, 7 May 19113 in PO 371/36731 1'16, +53. 
Recently released i>uZýer:; reveal tha4 the, 1Iomt: U'1'ice 
was relucta: tt to release men such ah, Je! 'früy Hamm raid 
John Beckett for fear that they v ou: Ld lead. a fascist 
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revival in Britain. See HO 45/257408262/541/2, 
1415 report, 15 June 1944 for Hamm and minute:; of 
14 June 1943 in 110 45/25693/840167/114 for Beckett. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The East End and Evacuation Experiences : Concentrated 
Jewish-Gentile Relations in Britain During the War. 
The East End had been of central importance in modern 
Anglo-Jewish history up to the declaration-of the war. 
The Aliens Question, the riots of World War I and the 
battles with the B. U. F. in the 1930's were all staged at 
their most dramatic level in this concentrated part of the 
Metropolis. Indeed when in late 1938 Mass-Observation 
decided to undertake a detailed study of an'tisemitism in 
Britain, it decided to base its study in Stepney. 
1 
The complexity of Jewish-Gentile relations in the 
East End has not stopped contemporary or modern observers 
making unsubtle generalizations about the subject. 
2 As 
a Times correspondent perceptively pointed out at the 
height of the B. U. F. campaign in 1936: "(they) have seen 
what they would have liked to see and heard what they 
wanted to hear. " 
3 The Mass-Observation survey was no 
exception, with Tom Ilarrisson's anthropological background 
coming to the fore. To liarrisson, the East End was like 
another foreign expedition, with the tribes concerned being 
Jewish or Gentile, or perhaps Lascar and Chinese. 
4 
Jewish behaviour patterns were observed and compared to 
their 'Cockney' equivalents. The complicating factor at 
some Jews saw themselves as Cockneys, and that there were 
'Irish' cockneys as well Ew 'English' cockneys- never 
occurred to "these innocents abroad". 
5 
However the thorough report did provide an indication 
of the position of Jews in East End society in the period 
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immediately before the war. Socially Jews and non-Jews 
did not mix very often and the image of the pub as a 
f, 
Gentile preserve was not without foundation. ' East 
End Jews, contrary to popular belief, were not flashier 
than 'Cockneys',. although they were smarter. Generally 
what emerges from the study is the similarities, rather 
than the differences, between the two communities. Both 
liked the cinema, music-hall, boxing and billiards and 
although there were peculiarities distinct to each 
community, there was also common ground. 
7 The reading 
of newspapers most clearly indicates this point. The 
Yiddish (but Anglicized) Jewish Times was a Jewish preserve, 
as were the Irish papers on the 'Cockney' side. Yet the 
News-Chronicle was the most widely read paper marking "the 
meeting point of politics" of the two communities. 
8 This 
could be seen in local politics with a right-wing Labour 
group dominating Stepney Borough council, made up of Irish 
Catholics but also of moderate Jews. Further to the left 
was a group of more radical Jewish councillors, including 
from 1938 a communist, Phil Piratin. 
9 
The Stepney Communist Party was not totally dominated 
by Jews; in fact, it aimed to give the impression of 
Jewish-Gentile cooperation. Of 500 members in 1939 "half 
or more were Jewish". 
10 However whilst the Catholic 
world was largely anti-Communist in the East End, the 
Jewish Community was at least tolerant. of the Communist 
Party. 11 In 'ýJhitechapel Library, the Daily Worker was 
read eighteen times more by Jews than by Gentiles. 
12 
With the Stepney Tenants' Defence League, the Communist 
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Party did succeed in uniting Jews and non-Jews in political 
action, and by June 1939 its membership had risen to 
7500.13 Up to £45,000 had been refunded to Stepney 
tenants with rent and rates rebates, proving that it was 
not true that the working class Gentile cockney "recoiled 
from active combination" with Jews, as The Times had 
claimed three years earlier. 
14 
Thus by the summer of 1939 Jewish-Gentile cooperation 
was as common, if not more significant than the conflict 
represented by the clashes with the B. U. F. However, within 
the East End there were other factors which complicated 
the overall pattern of community relations. The Mass- 
Observation Survey of 1939 found that women were less 
antisemitic than men, and that 13% of females compared to 
2% of men actually liked Jews socially. 
15 Moreover both 
men and women were capable of ambivalence on Jews and 
families could often be split on the subject; a resident 
of Ernest Street felt that antisemitism "was a shame's even 
though her husband was a Mosleyite. 
16 The most common 
response (16% women and 9% men) was "live and let live". 
17 
A resident of Maryland'Street who "did not agree" with 
antisemitism, but "didn't like Jews" was typical of many 
East Enders' attitudes, showing both the strengths and 
weaknesses of toleration. 
18 
On top of individual and gender issues, the Mass- 
Observation survey showed how antisemitism could vary 
from'street to street. Poplar, an area which had given 
strong support to the British Brothers' League's anti- 
alien campaign at the turn of the century, still remained 
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a hostile region, as did Bethnal Green. 
19 The threat of 
a Jewish 'invasion', or perceptions of Jewish entry into 
these areas remained strong and antagonistic. However, 
even in Bethnal Green the Mass-Observation team did not 
really find the blatant antisemitism that they had 
expected to find. 
20 As a Jewish East Ender put it: "those 
who like are as abnormal as those who hate, and the average 
absence of liking must not be interpreted as the presence 
of disliking. " 
21 In areas of Jewish concentration such 
as Stepney, social relations were good and the B. U. F. was 
despised because it was "trying to destroy the feeling of 
neighbourliness". 
22 In other areas, such as Bethnal Green 
where Jews remained on the periphery of society the B. U. F. 
was generally tolerated. However, despite the higher 
tension, Bethnal Green Jews were largely left alone. A 
comment of a thirty year old Bethnal Green woman that the 
Jews have as much right to live in Bethnal Green as any 
other foreigner" shows the social distance between the two 
communities, but also the limitations to hostility. 
23 
The success of the B. U. F. in the East End in the 
middle 1930's showed the potential for organised antisemitism 
in the area. By 1939, however, the Mosleyites were in 
general retreat from the East End, having failed to perman- 
ently mobilize the economic and social tensions of this 
poorest of areas. The earlier crisis in the East End at 
the time of mass immigration had also showed the possibilities 
for antisemitic agitation. Would the Second World War, which 
had such a devastating impact on East London, bring another 
wave of antisemitism to the area? 
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The initial impact of the war was to bring some 
chaos to East End life. The population of Stepney, which 
had stood a fraction under 200,000 before September 1939, 
declined to 139,000 by the end of that month. 
24 The fall 
in numbers was largely attributable to the evacuation of 
children and women, and although many of these were to 
return by Christmas 1939, the general population of the 
borough was never to recover. Indeed by 1942 at 72,000 it 
was at a level of just over one third of the pre-war total. 
25 
It seems doubtful that East End Jews left at a greater rate 
than their non-Jewish neighbours (despite the fascist 
rumours of a Jewish panic from the metropolis). 
26 Given 
that the Jewish population had been declining faster 
throughout the 1930's a liberal estimate of the Jewish 
population until mid-1940 would be around 60,000, or 45% 
of the Stepney population. 
27 By the end of the war only 
25,000 - 30,000 Jews would remain in what had been the 
heart of the immigrant quarter just half a century earlier. 
28 
Whilst the war was to show the disorganisation and 
corruption of Stepney Borough Council, 
29 it also had a 
compensating effect. As the official government historian 
was to write: "unsuspected, and hitherto unused resources 
of leadership :: sere thrown up in the back-streets of Stepney. "30 
Amongst this grass-roots movement were to be many Jews. 
Whilst the First World War had shown the general isolation 
of the Jewish population in the East End, the start of the 
Second showed that Jewish East Enders, as the Jewish Chronicle 
gladly pointed out, were "playing their part". 
31 How then 
were Jews accepted in the local civil defence forces? 
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Corresponding to the variations in the concentration 
of Jews in the East End, some A. R. P. stations were either 
totally Jewish, Gentile, or a mixture of both. The first 
category was shown by Wardens Post C125, Poplar. In its 
satirical organ 'Ye Olde Belle and Rattle' it made fun 
of its own ethnic make-up demanding "Freedom for the 
Aryan minority in Burcham Street" - showing perhaps not 
only a strong self-confidence but also a high degree of 
acceptance from amongst the surrounding population. 
32 
Jews were undoubtedly prominent in the civil defence forces 
of the East End. However, the estimate given by the Jewish 
Defence Committee, that they represented some 85% of all 
such workers was probably an exaggeration. 
33 Relations 
between Jewish and non-Jewish units appear to have been 
generally amicable, although there was also a competitive 
edge that could contain an element of antisemitism. 
34 
In 'mixed' civil defence units in the East End relations 
were more complex. Jack Miller, an A. H. P. man in Brick Lane, 
where 75% of the station was Jewish, stated that the atmos- 
phere was "excellent". 
35 In White Horse Lane Auxiliary 
Ambulance Service Station 101, Bert Snow commented on the 
interesting variety of Jews and Christians, and the general 
harmony within the unit. Despite ideological differences 
between Jews and Catholics, antisemitism was "an interesting 
and valuable topic for discussion at Station 101". With 
the first Christmas of the war the Jewish members of the 
unit came forward to man the station so that 'their colleagues 
could celebrate the festival. 
36 Such cooperation was not 
unique to Station 101.37 
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Elsewhere such harmony was not so evident. Fascists 
within civil defence units often succeeded in creating 
antisemitic friction. Several were reported as saying 
that "I shan't help Jews who get hurt, don't you worry", 
whilst a section of an A. F. S. station were found to be 
spreading rumours about Jews and the white slave traffic. 
38 
Within these units antisemitism was not necessarily aimed 
at fellow Jewish workers. An antisemitic A. F. S. man was 
reported as stating "you'll never convince me that Yids 
ain't bastards. Mind you, I don't say there aren't 
exceptions, like young Solly here and Nat". 
39 Nevertheless, 
in the same unit the Jewish instructor came in for a great 
deal of racial abuse. 
40 To further complicate the pattern, 
in another A. F. S. unit in the docks, where 75% of the 
Station was Jewish, relations were generally good, although 
the Company Officer was a Mosleyite: 
41 
Up to the blitz the relations between Jews and Gentiles 
in East End civil defence units were influenced by two 
generally conflicting factors. Firstly, the negative force 
of past prejudices against Jews (arid also of Jews for 
Gentiles) carrying on into the war. Secondly, contact 
between the two elements within the stations which acted 
as an integrating force and to an extent counteracted 
hostilities. As a generalization the involvement of Jews 
in East End civil defence duties helped to improve relations 
within these units. However, up to the blitz, this 
integration was not a model for the East End as a whole. 
In the phoney war period, morale in Britain was probably 
at its lowest ebb. This was reflected in the East End where 
government reports indicated that although "Mosley ha(d) 
lost substantial ground ... anti-Jewish feeling appear (ed) 
42 to be growing". 
The very presence of substantial numbers of Jews in 
the civil defence groups of the East End created tensions. 
A largely Jewish A. F. S. unit in the dock area were greeted 
by onlookers by the shout "Windy Yids", showing that the 
image of Jews as army dodgers in the earlier conflict had 
not been forgotten. 
43 The tensions of waiting for the 
war to begin 'properly' were reflected in other adverse 
ways as far as the Jewish community was concerned. With 
only 30,000 shelters provided for a population six times 
that size, the already tense relations between landlord 
and tenant in the East End were made even more fraught. 
By the first few months of the war this conflict was 
assuming an antisemitic air as Jewish landlords were being 
selected for attack in their failure to provide air raid 
protection. 
44 Realizing that this was an issue upon which 
the fascists could favourably exploit, the Stepney Tenants' 
Defence League (S. T. D. L. ) organized rent strikes until 
satisfactory air raid protection was provided. 
45 
That 
such action was generally successful is shown by the rise 
in membership of the League to 11,000 in the summer of 
1940.46 Attacking both Jewish and non-Jewish landlords 
and being based on inter-community cooperation, the S. T. D. L. 
helped to minimise the racial aspect of complaints about 
housing and shelters. 
47 
Other economic-based tensions threatened to endanger 
the relations between Jew and non-Jew in the East End. By 
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the second month of the war there were also rumours of 
profiteering by Jewish shopkeepers. Although the S. T. D. L. - 
did its best to stop such abuses and the allegations, the 
idea that Jews were making financial gains from the war 
persisted to well after the blitz. 
48 The difficulties the 
war created for small shopkeepers was also exploited by 
fascists, despite the similar problems faced by Jewish 
traders. 49 
Up to August 1940, whilst the war had united the 
East End in some ways, most clearly shown by cooperation 
in civil defence units, it had not brought the Jewish and 
Gentile communities closer in general. Indeed, the petty 
tensions of the phoney war period helped to create more 
strain. Even on the spiritual side there were problems 
between Jewish and Christian clergymen. Clarence Kaye 
of the East London Tabernacle stated that such relations 
were "decidedly frigid in the first part of 1940". As 
one observer in the East End put it "Antagonism between 
Jews and Christians was one of the evident but less 
admirable aspects of life". 
50 
In February and April 1940 Mass-Observation carried 
out two surveys on attitudes to Jews in the East End 
districts of Silvertovm and Limehouse. In the former, an 
area of very few Jews, 31°% were categorized as "definitely 
antisemitic". In the latter, where more Jews resided, 15% 
were placed in this category. Only 275o of Silvertown's 
population was pro-Jewish compared to 40; ý in Limehouse. 51 
Such figures give an indication of the fact that the level 
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of antisemitism did not necessarily correspond to the 
proportion of Jews in the population of East London. 
However, -the intensity of antisemitic feeling was higher 
52 in Limehouse, giving some credence to those that 
believed that the bombing of the East End, with'its high 
Jewish population, was bound to lead to an antisemitic 
reaction. Would the blitz create a further deterioration 
of Jewish-Gentile relations as many people feared? 
53 
How the East End Jews would behave under intensive 
bombing was a question that created widespread concern 
even at a governmental level. At the height of the invasion 
fear in May 1940, Home Secretary Anderson told the Cabinet 
that in the East'End, with its large 'alien' population, 
"it was of value to have some aliens in services like the 
Warden's in order to pacify and calm their fellow aliens 
in time of emergency". 
54 Frank Lewey, mayor of Stepney 
in the blitz, believed that "there was a pretty prevalent 
belief among numbers of Londoners that the Jews would 
panic if ever raiding became very bad". 
55. Thus when the 
blitz began in earnest in early September 1940, there were 
both fears of how the "volatile aliens" of the East End 
would behave, and also of the possibility of "anti-Jewish 
riots" from their non-Jewish neighbours. 
56 
By the end of September it was clear that these two 
pessimistic forecasts had been proved wrong. However, all 
was not sweetness and light. Of all the domestic episodes 
of the Second World War, memories of the blitz have become 
the most mythical. Part of this process of distortion has 
been to emphasize the cheerfulness and unity that was born 
out of the constant aerial bombardment. 57 It actually 
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began in the war itself and can be found in the contemporary 
descriptions of Jewish-Gentile relations in the East End. 
Leading the field in this matter was what could be called 
the Toynbee Hall approach, summarized by its warden, 
J. J. Mallon, in an article written in 1942. Mallon, talking 
of the blitz, referred to "a common sympathy, a common 
humanity in which differences, including the differences 
between Jews and Gentiles were submerged and lost". 
58 
The reality was more complex. 
The pressure cooker effect of war on minority relations 
was to be seen at the most clearest level, as far as the 
Anglo-Jewish community was concerned, in the intensive 
bombing of the East End in September and October 1940. The 
first raid was on 23 August 1940 but the real blitz did not 
start until 7 September. 
59 In this two week period tempers 
were frayed and the strain of waiting led onto some 
unpleasant antisemitic incidents. Quarrels broke out jr. 
queues for the shelters with the Jewish origins of anti- 
social offenders being unnecessarily brought into the 
arguments. 
60 On 7 September, the night that the suspense 
finally ended (now known as 'Black Saturday'), antisemitism 
did not disappear. One observer heard curses against Jews 
as the occasional Jewish shopkeeper left to escape the 
area in a taxi - "Another Yid saving his skin". The 
61 
image of the cowardly selfish Jew running away or 
monopolising Shelter space was to persist throughout the 
A0 
blitz. " 
If antisemitism was to reach serious proportions in 
Britain, the conditions in Stepney in September 1940 were 
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to offer its best chances of success. In London as a 
" whole there were 76 continuous nights of raids after 
63 
'Black Saturday', with 27,500 bombs. From 7-14 September 
6000 people in the capital were seriously injured or killed. 
64 
Stepney was to bear the brunt of this attack, and well over a 
quarter of its population were left homeless for over a 
day. 
65 Conditions in the big shelters such as the Tilbury 
warehouse were appalling and added to the general misery. 
The blitz itself then provided the potential for anti- 
semitism and there is much evidence that the East End 
community was at times divided on racial lines. Late in 
September an incident occurred outside a Stepney shelter 
where 500 people were waiting to get in. Two non-Jews 
of Cable Street, Mary Cini and Mary Owen picked fights 
with Jewish women claiming that "You Jews are all the same 
pushing and shoving". Despite the fact that the two women 
were deliberately trying to start trouble, the crowd took 
sides, the non-Jewish minority siding with Cini and Owen. 
66 
Such incidents were not isolated; according to a J. D. C. 
report there were countless other examples in the tubes 
and shelters. 
67 
However, the Toynbee Hall-type analysis was also not 
without foundation. Despite Lord Haw-Haw's threats, German 
bombs could not distinguish between Jew and Gentile, and 
the obvious common suffering of both communities did make 
an impact on their inter-relationship. An A. F. S. officer 
reported that the previous antisemitism of his unit "failed 
to survive the first month of the blitz". Those that had 
said they wouldn't help Jews "learned sense at the fires 
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in Whitechapel". 
68 Within the shelters close contact 
between Jew and non-Jew brought tensions, but it also 
proved that-despite their differences, the two communities 
had much in common. By the end of the first month of 
bombing the East End Jewish community had shown that it 
was as able "to take it" as well as the non-Jewish popul- 
ation. 
69 Idiosyncrasies remained. One young Jewish warden, 
whose shelter had just been hit, "suddenly burst into 
Yiddish" as he shouted instructions, showing that old world 
influences had not disappeared from the East End, even 
70 
amongst the younger generation. Yet Jews and non-Jews 
were also discovering what they had in common. A conversation 
reported by Mass-Observation found that whilst Jews 
referred to bombs as "somebody dropping potato ludkies", 
to the 'Cockney' it was the same, only with peanuts being 
dropped. 71 Adversity could create harmony. 
Even with the notorious Tilbury shelter, where up 
to 15,000 found refuge from the bombs, no prolonged anti- 
semitism occurred. 
72 Blanche Dugdale visited this shelter 
on 12 September 1940, when sanitary conditions and general 
organization were at their worst. She reported that 
"morale ... was perfectly good and enquiry elicited no 
sign of antisemitism due to present conditions". 
73 Indeed, 
one observer found that the race feeling at Tilbury was 
not so much Jew versus Gentile, but white against black, 
with the Indian contingent being the centre of attack from 
both "the white communities. 
74 However, antisemitism was 
not absent and it would appear that the awful environment 
was responsible for the occasional outbursts aimed at the 
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Jewish shelterers, who were roughly half of Tilbury's 
residents. 
75 
At first the only medical services at Tilbury were 
provided voluntarily by one Jewish doctor and three 
Jewish nurses, 
76 but as the blitz progressed conditions 
slowly improved. At the forefront of the movement to 
improve shelter conditions was the Stepney Communist Party. 
The Communist campaign for adequate air-raid protection 
had begun in 1937 and it had continued throughout the 
war. 
77 Given the success of the'Tenants' Defence 
Leagues, it is not surprising that the Stepney Communist 
Party set up committees in all the main shelters aimed at 
protesting to the authorities about the conditions. 
78 
These shelter committees operated on two levels, firstly 
aiming to improve the state of the shelters by organising 
food and entertainment, secondly by publicizing the 
conditions of the East End to the outside world. 
79 In 
late September the most famous incident of the latter 
policy occurred with the march of 100 East Enders to the 
Savoy Hotel. 80 Although the immediate impact of this 
protest was negligible-owing to an all-clear, the message 
struck home with the Cabinet, and a Committee was set up 
to improve conditions and ensure such demonstrations did 
81 
not recur. 
In this way, through the actions of the local 
Communist Party, which was, according to its secretary, 
"tempering the Party Line to the needs of the people", 
82 
anger at the conditions of the shelters was channelled riot 
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at an immediate scapegoat, but at its real cause - the 
authorities. The Communist Party was not alone in 
fighting for better conditions; the Settlement movements 
and the Churches were also active. However, within 
83 
the last category there was tremendous hostility to the 
activities of the Communist Party, especially from the 
local Catholic Church. This antagonism, following earlier 
Catholic opposition to left wing East End activities, was 
soon to be identified with antisemitism. 
Reflecting on the impact of the blitz, Tom Harrisson 
wrote that it "confirmed hatred already felt by some, 
extended others, leaving many more barely touched". 
84 
The first two categories certainly apply to certain aspects 
of Catholic relations with Jews in the East End. In the 
Catholic Herald in October 1940, two priests launched an 
attack against Jewish Communist activities in the shelters, 
on the grounds that such activities were ultimately 
defeatist. Further articles accused the East End Jews of 
cowardice and low morality - the latter due to the fact 
that Jews were 'Oriental' and had thus a different attitude 
F 
to sex! ' Jews, as has been pointed out, were prominent 
in the local Communist Party, but they by no means 
dominated the shelter committees. Indeed, such activities 
were consciously split between Jews and non-Jews. This 
was illustrated by the Savoy March where there were equal 
numbers of Jews arid non-Jews, the Communist Party attempting 
86 to present an image of working-class unity. 
This was only one aspect of Catholic-Jewish relations 
in the East End, for there was also a great deal of 
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cooperation. Food, clothing, and buildings were shared, 
and religious leaders of both communities helped each 
other to oigänize services. 
87 The Mayor of Stepney, 
observing this positive side of the blitz, contrasted it 
to their previous relations when "they had long been a 
byword in Stepney as mortal opponents". 
88 However, the 
antagonism to what was seen as Jewish communism did not 
disappear from the Catholic community. As late as 1943 
Father Groser, once of the Tenants' Defence League, reported 
that one priest, formally sympathetic to Jews, was 
becoming antisemitic due to their activities in the East 
End shelter committees. 
89 There were thus limits to the 
new understanding between Jewish and Christian communities. 
With the improvement in shelter conditions and with 
better all-round planning, Jewish-Gentile relations fell 
into a more settled pattern after the initial blitz. 
Visiting Liverpool Street, one of the biggest deep shelters 
in London, the Marquess of Donegall was impressed with the 
good organisation and cooperation within the shelter. 
90 
At this point in early October 1940, Liverpool Street had 
its own Rabbi, although there were also common prayers 
delivered by all the clergy. To some this cooperation was 
not just a passing occurrence but "was a promise. Here 
was humanity - internationally at peace. Mixed races, 
foreign languages, were not used as barriers. Here was a 
new brotherhood, and a common heart". 
91 Such comments 
appear idealist given the concomitant misery that the 
blitz created, but it shows how far the East End was from 
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the antisemitic riots that some had feared. Rather than 
panicking aliens, the bombings produced stories of Jewish" 
bravery and-courage. Of the first list of George Crosses, 
two out of thirteen were awarded to Jews. 
92 If Jews 
admitted to nervousness at the start of a raid, 
93 
so did 
Gentile East Enders. 
94 Although antisemitism did not 
disappear, it never succeeded in being more than localised 
and at that aimed at individuals rather than at the whole 
of Jewry. 
95 Those who attempted to spread the rumour of 
the Jews' War were laughed down, and the aggression created 
by the shelter conditions was channelled towards the 
authorities and not against the Jewish population. 
96 
After the intense bombing of September 1940 the next 
two months saw an overall decrease in air raids. 
97 
Moreover the East End, which had borne the brunt of the 
initial blitz, was not seriously bombed again until July 
1941.98 Whilst at the peak of the attacks-177,000 
Londoners were sleeping underground, only 4°ö of them were 
using public shelters at the start of 1941.99 Life in 
the East End shelters, where "it was one big happy family", 
proved to be a short-lived experience. 
100 To the novelist 
Bernard Kops, the blitz had completely destroyed the sense 
of community in the East End. Although the -shelters 
created "superficial friendliness", it was only temporary, 
and "the world as I knew it had passed away". 
101 
Kops was not alone in sensing the general depression 
of the post-blitz Stepney. A report on the morale of the 
area in January 1941 pointed to the overall gloom of the 
people who were tired and miserable. 
102 Antisemitism 
2! 4 
persisted in the shelters: some of it encouraged by fascist 
elements: some of it brought on with persistent shelter 
problems and some of it simply part of a Saturday night 
103 
exuberance. However, the Jewish Chronicle at the 
same time was able to report on an increased philosemitism 
due to the success of Jewish entertainers in the shelters. 
104 
Indeed cooperation and harmony was a more regularly reported 
phenomenon in 1941 than the reverse. Even the community 
spirit that the destruction or damage of the vast majority 
of East End houses brought was not totally destroyed. 
Inter-faith reciprocity continued 
105 
and in April 1941 a 
Passover Service in the Tilbury shelter was marked by Jews 
singing religious songs and Gentiles English folk songs. 
106 
The Yiddish poet A. N. Stencl was deeply impressed by "the 
brotherhood of the people in Whitechapel in those days". 
107 
A similar service took place in Micky Davis's shelter with 
the chairs supplied by the Convent of Mercy. 
108 
Despite these touches of humanity the East End was 
changing irreversibly. By the middle of 1942, Stepney, 
which at one point was home for a quarter of a million 
people, had only 72,000 residents and its once vibrant 
street life had disappeared. 
109 The borough was "a ghost 
of its former self" and only in the shelters and clubs of 
the area was there any sense of community. 
110 A worker 
in Toynbee Hall recalls its rest home in Sussex where 
elderly Jewish and non-Jewish East Enders came to escape. 
Despite their strong ties to Stepney these people "were 
sick of war and glad to get out". 
111 With the hardships 
of the war and the general social isolation of East Enders, 
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most people, as a Jewish Bethnal Green resident remembers, 
"were too busy to worry about the Jews". 
112 However, 
old tensions mixed with new factors still persisted. These 
can be best illustrated by a study of Jewish-Gentile 
relations in the districts immediately to the north of 
original Jewish settlement area of the East End. 
The war itself intensified two trends which had 
affected Jewish life in the East End from the 1920's. The 
first was the movement north to such areas as Hackney and 
Dalston. 113 The second was a diversification of the Jewish 
114 
occupational structure. The residential shift beyond 
_T ,_ý 
ý 
the area of primary settlement had accelerated in the 1930's, 
with the receiving population tending to be highly 
antagonistic to the Jewish arrivals. Indeed in 1939 when 
the B. U. F. 's East End support was in decline it was in 
areas of North East London such as Stoke Newington, Bethnal 
Green, Dalston and Hackney, where fascist gains were made. 
115 
With the war it was in this northern part of the East End 
that violence and tension against the Jewish co=, unity was 
to be found at its highest level. It was here that 
fascist activity was at least tolerated and at times actively 
supported. 
In the first few weeks of the war Jewish shop windows 
were smashed in Bethnal Green and the pattern of violence 
continued throughout the war. 
1116 In late May 1940 another 
such shop in the same area was destroyed, and the next month 
'retaliations' were made against Jews for the fascist 
internments. 117 Even with the blitz the violence continued, 
Jewish wardens being attacked in Hackney and Stoke 
Newington. 118 When attempts at a fascist revival were 
in ad e in the middle of the war, much of the evidence 
for it was-found in Bethnal Green where Jewish shops 
were covered in the sign 'P. J. '. 
119 However, housing 
and employment remained the two most contentious issues with 
regard to general Jewish-Gentile relations in the area. 
It was over the former matter that the most serious 
violence occurred. 
Just as the most extreme and concentrated attacks 
against the Asian population in 1980's Britain have 
occurred at the periphery of its settlement area in the 
East End, so it was with the Jews in North East London. 
120 
In Hackney the Jewish population had been increasing 
considerably since the 1930's. 
121 Indeed, the M. P. for 
Hackney North estimated in May 1943 that 60% of his 
electorate were Jewish. 
122 He was convinced that there 
was "ill-feeling between the Jews and the Christians in 
the constituency" and his analysis was proved to be correct 
by incidents in the area a few months later. A new housing 
complex, the Pembury Estate, was the scene of much anti- 
semitic violence. Non-Jews were in a majority in the 
estate, and through the use of intimidation an element 
within the Gentile community wished to make the new 
housing area free of Jews. Jewish women were beaten up, 
children attacked going to school and slogans were painted 
on Jewish houses. 
123 Some Jewish residents did apply to 
leave, 
124 but generally incidents were not reported 
because the victims feared "even worse manifestations of 
antisemitism". 
125 Eventually the police and the local 
I. P. intervened and the outward manifestations of hostility 
247 
subsided. 
126 Although an extreme case, the Pembury 
Estate issue showed the strength of local feeling against- 
the Jewish-movement into the area. Another report of a 
large flat complex in South Hackney, where 20ö of the 
residents were Jewish, pointed out that none of the Jewish 
occupants had mezuzot on their door for fear of drawing 
attention to themselves. 
127 
In analysing the course of this victimisation the 
Jewish Defence Committee suggested that "the Hackney 
Gazette has much to answer for". 
128 It was not alone in 
attacking this right-wing local paper which even managed 
to attract the support of The Patriot. 
129 During the 
war the Gazette Carried on a continuous campaign against 
Jewish gaming clubs, 
130 
accused the Jews of cowardice in 
the blitz, 131 supported discrimination against Jewish 
tenants, 132 and generally opened its letter columns to 
those antagonistic to the local Jewish population. 
133 
Such a policy from this popular tri-weekly paper cannot 
have helped inter-community relations in North-East London, 
but the antipathy that it played upon was not just of its 
own making. East End papers, like all such papers had to 
be sensitive to local opinion, and the Hackney Gazette's 
outlook is important in that it was a mirror of the 
community in which it'served. However, other East End 
papers showed the need for taking account of changing 
circumstances in their localities. The East London 
Advertiser which at the time of mass immigration was 
generally anti-alien, was now opposed to race hatred. 
134 
The East London Observer, which had attacked aliens in the 
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1914-18 conflict, was now happy, in its editor's words, 
"to put the Jewish point of view". 
135 Finally the East 
End News, which had supported the British Brothers' League 
in the 1900's, was at worst neutral on Jewish matters in 
the Second World Jar. 136 
That the Hackney Gazette was isolated in its anti- 
pathy shows the local character of antisemitism in the 
East End. Yet even within its circulation area of North 
East London all was not hostile. Within the shelters, 
although at first there had been violence against Jewish 
officials, the blitz created a sense of camaraderie between 
Jew-and-Gentile - even in Hackney. 
137 The leader of its 
A. R. P. commented that the differences between the 
communities "had been wiped out by the war", and it would 
appear that the actions of Jewish A. R. P. men did do 
something to dispel the latent antipathy towards Jews. 
138 
The warden of Bethnal Green's Victoria Park trench shelter 
commented on the "wonderful spirit" between all the 
different races and nationalities - this is an area which 
had at one point been a definite Jewish no-go area. 
139 A 
Jewish chemist of Hackney recalled that "the only 'tiffs' 
I heard during the blitz in the shelters were between 
140 Jewish people". 
However, it was in the area of North East London in 
1943 that the most serious single event of war-time 
domestic antisemitism occurred. On the evening of 3 March 
1943*"in a panic at the entrance of the Bethnal Green tube 
shelter, 173 people were killed. 
141 Although news was 
suppressed about the disaster, rumours soon spread across 
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London about the causes of the tragedy, prevalent among 
which was the idea that it was due to a Jewish panic. 
142 
Why this slander developed will be discussed at a later 
stage, but it will be necessary now to examine the Jewish 
East End aspects of the disaster. 
As the accident was in the East End it was assumed 
by many people that it took place in a Jewish area. This 
was in fact inaccurate for although there were streets or 
parts of roads such as Blythe and Teesdale Street (Jews' 
Island) that were predominantly Jewish, and close to the 
143 tube station, the area was largely Gentile. Moreover, 
the Jewish population of the area was declining propor 
tionally. to the non-Jewish as the war progressed. 
144 
Perhaps the most ironic aspect of the Jewish slander was 
the fact that the shelter was the heartland of Bethnal 
Green's B. U. F. 145 Despite this qualification, there is 
still a small question mark concerning why the Jewish death 
toll in the shelter was so small. Only 5 Jews, or fewer 
than 311ß of the total casualties, were killed in the tragedy, 
yet an estimate just after the war put the Jewish population 
of Bethnal Green at one tenth, or roughly three times 
higher than the shelter proportion. 
146 
Why were so few Jews among the victims of the tragedy? 
According to one antisemite it was because the shelter was 
already "packed full of Jews a couple of hours before the 
didaster". 147 The reality was more complex. As early as 
the start of the blitz in 1940 there had been reports of 
antisemitism in the Bethnal Green tube, 
148 
and it would 
appear that "the unpleasantness" that the Jews "were always 
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subject to" put many off using the shelter. 
149 Fascist 
bullying, or the fear of intimidation made many Jews 
prefer the Liverpool Street shelter, which although further 
away, was more Jewish orientated. 
150 The few Jews that 
used the shelter at Bethnal Green, such as the Kops 
family, felt "strangers in a strange world". 
151 
If there was antisemitism associated with the shelter 
before the disaster, then the same cannot be said of the 
locality after the tragedy. Whilst the rumours that it 
was a 'Jewish panic' spread across all parts of London, 
this was not true of Bethnal Green, where according to 
Home Intelligence "there is full knowledge that any such 
statement is untrue". 
152 One or two individuals in the 
area attempted to spread rumours against the Jews, but 
local opinion in the East End realised the absurdity of 
such lies. 
153 More credence was given to the idea that 
the disaster was instigated by fascists. 
154 Generally, 
however, in Bethnal Green the grievances and blame were 
directed towards-: the local Council, which was regarded as 
having been negligent over the safety aspects of the 
shelter. 
155 In Stepney an awareness of the small Jewish 
population of Bethnal Green also acted as a barrier to the 
success of antisemitic rumours, 
156and 
one had to go to 
the outlying areas of the East End, such as West Ham to 
find any belief in the 'Jewish panic' libel. 
157 This 
again confirms, the impression that it was areas on the edge 
of the concentrated Jewish population where prejudice was 
most profound -a clergyman in West Ham the year after the 
disaster commented that in his parish "the Jew is anathema". 
158 
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The 'Jewish Question' was one of popular discussion 
in war-time Britain, and the Bethnal Green disaster simply 
underlined hpw 'Jew-conscious' the public had become. Was 
'the Jewish Question' of much concern in the East End in 
the Second World War? In late 1939 a public meeting in 
Stepney on this issue resulted in a lively response, with 
many non-Jewish East Enders giving "petty and malicious" 
reasons for the existence of antisemitism in the locality. 
159 
At Warden's Post 13, just outside Whitechapel the four 
most popular issues discussed were racing, the war, 
religion and finally antisemitism. 
160 Moreover, in April 
1943 a reporter in the dock area of Stepney commented that 
161 "several people complained to me, unprompted about Jews". 
However, Jews or the Jewish Question was not the burning 
issue in the war that might have been expected from this 
area. with such a long tradition of hostility. The new 
warden of Bethnal Green's Oxford House was surprised how 
few manifestations of antisemitism there were in the area, 
considering its previous Mosleyite'success. 
162 Generally 
speaking apart from the start of the blitz, the non-Jewish 
East Ender was too busy surviving to worry too much about 
the Jew in his midst. 
163 Only when faced in intimate 
contact would the Jewish issue come to the fore, and as 
has been noted with the shelters and the local civil 
defence, such mixing could often be beneficial. 
In one area however there was potential for friction. 
Particularly in Stepney, but also to a lesser extent in 
the neighbouring areas, Jews were prominent as shop owners. 
164 
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In a war where there was strict rationing, especially in 
- food, shop keepers could quickly become unpopular figures. 
165 
As early as the third week of the war the Jewish Chronicle 
was reporting that a Jewish food shop in Stepney was 
creating antagonism amongst both communities by its profit- 
eering. Indeed throughout the war there was evidence of 
East End hostility to Jewish shop owners who exploited the 
shortages for their own financial ends. 
166 The image of 
the East End Jewish black marketeer was soon to replace 
that of the simple profiteer, and there was strong 
antagonism to those who were seen to have "got rich" with 
the conflict. 
167 Nevertheless, all was not negative in 
this respect. Firstly, although some people were hostile 
to the small trader there was also sympathy to the plight 
of the "little man" in his fight for survival against the 
big shopping chains. 
168 Representative of this sympathy 
was a petition signed by all the inhabitants of College 
Buildings in Whitechapel (half of whom were non-Jewish) 
when three local Jewish shopkeepers were interned in June 
1940. All three were old residents of the area who had 
never been naturalized, and their internment caused 
"regret, indignation and sorrow" from their neighbours. 
169 
Secondly, many East Enders realized that not only Jews were 
to blame for the local rackets. The mayor of Stepney, 
Councillor Pritchard, defended the Jewish traders. He 
believed that considering their prominence in the locality, 
their' proportion of offenders was surprisingly low. 170 
Finally the black market also served to meet a demand, and 
in this respect Jewish offenders were offering a service. 
ýý3 
"Indeed one resident was hostile only to West End Jews who 
were said to spoil the local illicit market! 
171 
In ecQnomic terms the East End was in a state of 
turmoil in the Second World War, and it was thus not only 
the black market that created a potential financial con- 
flict between Jews and non-Jews. The heavy bombing and 
the acute shortage of male labour acted as a catalyst to 
trends which had been in motion since the late 1920's. 
Two major features were thus outlined in the war. Firstly, 
there was a move away from Stepney by local industry, 
either to North London or as far away as the Home Counties. 
172 
Secondly, industries such as tailoring were becoming less 
specifically Jewish. 
173 The new demands of war, and the 
need for any sort of labour, thrust Jewish and non-Jewish 
workers together in areas that had previously been preserves 
of either section of the community. A Toynbee Hall report 
found that some employers were not happy about using Jewish 
workers, fearing them to be either communistic or lazy. 
174 
One East End firm actually refused to employ Jews due to 
the hostility of its staff. 
175 This was not the whole 
picture however, for elsewhere there was satisfaction. 
Several businesses actually decided that they would stay 
in Stepney because of the Jewish labour supply. 
176 V1?. thin 
the workforce, although there were reports of inter-ethnic 
conflict, 
177 
cooperation in the desire to help the war 
effort would seem to have been more cc mon. 
178 
''Harmony was also present within the Borough Council 
which had been the battleground of earlier Irish-Jewish 
clashes. At the end of December 1942 a special meeting was 
arranged in sympathy with the Jews of Europe, with the 
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Council passing a resolution asking the government to do 
all that was possible to help the persecuted. 
179 Several 
months later an extraordinary meeting was held to counter 
"antisemitic activities" in the borough, with the govern- 
ment being asked to pass legislation to make antisemitism 
illegal. 180 Also in November 1943 the Council unanimously 
denounced the government's action in releasing Mosley. 
181 
Although it was usually (left-wing) Jewish councillors 
that brought these issues into consideration, it was a 
sign of the new cooperation that all the Council acted 
sympathetically to them. There were still signs of conflict, 
such as unfair accusations that the Jews of Stepney were 
not pulling their weight in fire watching duties, 
182 but 
generally such squabbling was put aside for the duration 
of the war. 
Typical also of this cooperation were the clubs and 
settlements of the East End. With a reputation of elitism 
and of being patronizing, the war helped to bring these 
'outside' organizations more fully into EastýEnd society. 
183 
The settlements became prominent in the war, giving services 
in and after the blitz. They also offered entertainment 
in an area that was desperately short of social amenities. 
Yet even the most famous of these, Toynbee Hall had only 
a very localised appeal and it is easy to overestimate 
184 their importance. However, within Toynbee and the 
Bernhard Baron settlement there is little doubt that Jews 
and Gentiles mixed freely and that social relations were 
excellent. One East End Jew, Alexander Hartog, remembers 
that the atmosphere at Toynbee in the war "was truly 
255 
magical". 
185 Even the Jewish youth clubs were practising 
a policy of integration, and in such clubs as the Hackney" 
Jewish, Oxford and St. George and Cambridge Jewish it was 
reported that "Christian boys were mixing harmoniously 
with Jewish boys". 
186 Such fraternity was also evident 
in the slightly less establishment world of Stepney 
Communist Party. A document of 1944 summarised its 
approach - 'Jew and Gentile Together' - aimed at "Tommy 
or Issy, Sarah or Jane". 
187 Within the local Party there 
was "great comradeship" 
188 
according to its Secretary, 
189 
and "no barriers" either politically or socially. 
Although a specific attempt was aimed at winning over the 
Jewish electorate, Phil Piratin's Communist victory at 
Mile End in the 1945 election was also based on a joint 
communal campaign. 
190 
How 'typical' was the 'Toynbee' or Communist Party 
model in regard to the integration of Jews into East End 
society? There is no doubt that both the settlements and 
the Stepney Communists were enjoying much popularity by 
the end of the war, the latter having 1000 members by 
1945.191 However the free social mixing of these 
institutions was probably in advance of its time, even if 
the war had removed some social barriers. Jews and Gentiles 
were in closer proximity at work and in the shelters, but 
the home largely remained an ethnic preserve. 
lc'` An 
incident in the Troxy Cinema in Stepney at the close of 
1944 perhaps emphasises the need for caution with regard to 
evaluating the positive integrative force of the war. 
At a showing of Louis Golding's Mr Emmanuel, a disturbance 
256 
developed where elements of the non-Jewish section of the 
audience shouted approval at the scenes of Nazi persecution 
of Jews. 
193 Like earlier such cinema scuffles in the 
1930's, and like incidents in the shelters four years 
earlier, the audience divided and fought along Jewish- 
Gentile lines. 194 
This qualification is just one of many needed to show 
the difficulties in weighing the impact of the war on 
communal relations in the East End. If, as has been 
suggested, there were many 'East Ends' in a geographical 
sense, it was true also of its institutions. A perspective 
from a Gentile, Toynbee, Communist, religious, trade unionist, 
zionist or whatever point of view would produce different 
results. Each one (or more often more than one) had its 
own bearings on the individual. 
195 Yet the task of the 
historian is to generalize and in the final analysis the 
verdict has to be that the war pushed Jews and non-Jews in 
the East End closer together - more than it pulled them 
apart. If it is slightly ironic that it was German bombs 
that were largely responsible for this, it must be remem- 
bered that the humour of the situation is largely lost due 
to the simultaneous physical destruction of the East End. 
The sense of community in the area was a war phenomenon 
and was paid for both in human terms as well as in the 
damage to property. 190 Death remained a feature of East 
End life right until the end of war - the last V2 rocket 
fell in Stepney in March 1945 killing 130 people, 1.20 of 
whom were Jewish. 
197 The overall harmony of Jewish-Gentile 
relations in the area during the Second World War must thus 
257 
be seen as temporary, for after 1945 the Jewish East End 
had largely ceased to exist. 
198 
From this localised study of concentrated ethnic 
relations it is now necessary to look at a parallel 
development, one that was spread across the whole of Britain. 
Jewish Evacuees in the Second World War 
By 3 September 1939,3.5 million people. were either officially 
or privately evacuated from their homes in Britain. 
199 
Although evacuee numbers were never to reach this level 
again, either in the blitz of autumn 1940 or in the flying 
bomb raids of 1944, as a social experiment in mixing people 
of different class and background, evacuation cannot be 
200 
regarded as a successful exercise. Despite long term 
planning and the experience gained from the evacuation 
around the Munich Crisis, government and local authorities 
were not prepared to deal with the issue of selecting the 
right evacuees for the right areas - the priority was to 
shift the population in bulk. The experience of Jewish 
evacuation in the war must therefore not be seen as an 
isolated phenomenon, for although it created unique problems, 
it was also part of a troubled social dislocation in 
Britain. 201 
The idea that the Jewish population would panic out 
of the cities at the threat of war had been rehearsed in 
the 1938 Crisis. The B. U. F. had claimed that the Jews had 
fled London like "a flowiný, g river of 
202 
grey slime: "". 
258 
With the start of the real conflict the accusation revived. 
203 
The imputation was neither limited to the capital nor was 
it only made-by extremists. In the'north of England, 
Lake Windermere was known locally as "the Sea of Galilee" 
and in Wales, Llandudno as "Jerusalem by the Sea". 
204 
Mass-Observation and other sources show that'the image of 
the timid Jew, running to a safe billet, was quite widespread 
among the British people. 
205 However, taken in aggregate 
terms, there is no evidence that Jewish evacuees propor- 
tionally outnumbered their Gentile equivalents. Indeed in 
the East End there was evidence that the reverse was"true. 
206 
As more than one observer noted, there was something of a 
contradiction in arguing that London Jews crowded-not only 
the shelters but also the safe seaside zones. 
207 Yet 
looking at the question qualitatively it is true that there 
was a concentration of Jews in the Home Counties, the Lake 
District, and the West Coast of England. 
208 Even if Jews 
did not dominate these areas, their presence in fairly 
209 
large numbers made them conspicuous. 
However, although Jewish evacuees may have been at 
times conspicuous, this does not imply that antisemitism 
against them was therefore 'well-earned'. As will be 
stressed shortly, Jews had often-never been seen before in 
evacuation areas, and thus they became even more prominent 
than they would have been as mere evacuees. Moreover, as 
the latter themselves were strangers, it was easy to label 
all evacuees as Jews, or at least to overestimate the 
proportion of Jews in the new arrivals. This explains why 
as Arthur Marwick has suggested "the words 'evacuees' and 
259 
'Jews' were used interchangeably". 
210 Such generalizations 
hid the complexity of evacuation experiences which varied 
not only over time - September 1939, September 1940 and 
summer 1944 representing three separate developments - but 
also over locality - often on a village to village basis. 
211 
It was also an intensely personal experience, so much 
depending on the individual. In London alone 14,000 Jewish 
children were evacuated in September 1939.212 To make 
sense of so many individual histories it will be necessary 
to concentrate on several areas of Jewish evacuation - the 
Home Counties (especially Bedfordshire and Oxfordshire), 
East Anglia and the coastal resorts. At the same time a 
dynamic approach will be maintained, for although evacuation 
was a short-lived temporary development, it was also subject 
to constant change. 
The first evacuation of September 1939 was not a 
success either in social or governmental terms. By the 
New Year 66% of the evacuees had returned to London, and 
the country as a whole was reverberating with horror stories 
about the state of the evacuees. 
213 The Jewish community 
itself was fully aware of the difficulties that could 
follow with "the introduction (of) the Jewish problem into 
many areas in which no Jews had been seen before". 
214 
The Jewish Chronicle warned its readers to behave if they 
were away and the community was prepared for outbursts of 
rural antisemitism. 
215 Such fears were exaggerated, for 
although there was at times strong feeling against the 
Jewish evacuees, it rarely broke into violence. 
216 
The initial evacuation did create tensions that were 
specifically linked to the new Jewish arrivals. At a 
260 
farcical level, rumours were heard in the Home Counties 
concerning Jewish prostitutes seducing the innocent village 
bumpkins of-Hertfordshire, or of Jewish pawnbrokers ruining- 
the local inhabitants. Neither had any foundation. 
217 
Such exotic stories were not as common as other misconceptions 
about Jews which, for a while, created a barrier between 
host and evacuee. In Chatteris, Cambridgeshire, 700 
evacuees swelled the normal population of 5000,85% of the 
new arrivals being Jewish East Enders. 
218 There were 
initial conflicts due to the difference in habits between 
town and country dwellers, and also class problems, even 
between the agricultural and industrial poor. On top of 
this, however, the'strangeness of the previously unknown 
Jews strengthened the division between newcomer and host. 
However, by November 1939 most of the initial difficulties 
had been ironed out. 
219 In Shefford, Bedfordshire another 
large influx of Jews, this time schoolchildren, was being 
experienced as this became the new location of the Jewish 
Secondary School for the duration of the war. Over 500 
children were billeted in and around this village, the 
potential for conflict being increased by the fact that 
most of the children were German refugees. 
220 As in 
Chatteris the pattern was one of initial tension, Shefford 
being totally unprepared for this Jewish invasion. Jews 
had been seen previously either in biblical terms or less 
complementarily as "mean merchants" or even occasionally 
in demonic terms with horns on. their foreheads. 
221 The 
presence of these well-behaved schoolchildren overcame 
261 
some of the more bizarre beliefs about Jews, but their 
strict orthodoxy over ritual created much misunderstanding. 
222 
However, with tact on'the side of the school and communal 
organizers, a regular and peaceful pattern was soon 
established in this remote village. 
223 
Elsewhere this initial harmony was missing. In 
Little Eversden, Cambridgeshire, a Mass-Observer commented 
that its North-east London Jewish evacuees were generally 
"unloved" and that the locals were happy when they started 
to disperse in October 1939.224 If the evacuation of the 
Jewish Secondary School turned out to be a model of success 
and integration, then its rival Jews' Free School had a 
disastrous evacuation experience. 
225 One refugee worker 
remembers the influx of these East End schoolchildren "as 
a real cross to bear". 
226 Ely in Cambridgeshire was the 
setting for the Free School's evacuation, and whereas 
organization had been strong in Shefford, it fell apart in 
this area of East Anglia. The strong adherence to orthodoxy 
in the former school broke down in the latter, whose pupils 
were more rebellious concerning tradition. 
227 With a 
lack of mediators on the Jewish side, local animosity grew 
unabated and many children, after an unhappy few months, 
returned to the East End, or to other areas. 
228 
In general the East Anglian counties seemed less 
tolerant of the Jewish evacuees than did those in the home 
Counties such as Bedfordshire. The better organization 
I 
prevailing in the latter explains some of this discrepancy 
in treatment, although there is evidence that Norfolk, 
Suffolk and Cambridgeshire suffered more intensely from 
262 
xenophobia and insularity than most rural areas. R. M. 
Titmuss in_his official war history felt it necessary to 
comment that' "Jewish customs were unknown and misunderstood 
in the rural areas of East Anglia long settled in their 
habits and hostile to 'foreigners' though they might only 
be strangers from a neighbouring county". 
229 A farmer in 
a village near Ipswich epitomised this parochial attitude, 
telling a Jewish East Ender, "London? I've been there 
once" . 
230 One East Anglian observer felt that the Jewish 
evacuees who came to her village at the start of the war 
were "as completely Oriental and foreign to our northern 
green as so many exotic black parrots". 
231 In another 
such village, the novelist Hugh Massingham commented that 
the Jewish evacuees were being blamed for-the black market 
and the housing shortage as well as being enemy agents! 
232 
Similarly in a Norfolk village it was the Jewishness of the 
evacuees that was objected to when several newcomers 
allegedly misbehaved. Writing in January 1940 the pacifist 
J. M. Murray believed a few trivial incidents involving the 
evacuees had led to "the rumblings of anti-semitism" in the 
wilds of Norfolk. 
233 
If Ely was typical of the strained relations between 
Jewish evacuees and hosts in East Anglia, then the small 
town of Bedford was an example of the relative harmony in 
the Home Counties. Bedford's pre-war Jewish population 
was limited to one or two isolated families, and thus the 
arrival of 55 Jewish refugee children and a London secondary 
school that was over 200 Jewish, could well have created 
problems. 
234 However, as in Shefford, integration was aided 
i 
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by Jewish organizers, in the case of Bedford it being Mr 
and Mrs Harris. They were able to establish close contact. 
with the local population and to set up a Jewish evacuation 
centre, Harris House. 
235 In early 1940 the local population 
provided facilities for Passover and Arnold Harris confided 
to his diary "the 'goyim' are indeed exceptionally 
accommodating. I marvel at their spontaneity to help us 
in all our good work". ' 
236 The success of the Bedford 
experience thus owed much to the Harris's; as one of his 
charges later commented: "it is impossible to overestimate 
their importance. " 
237 However other factors were important. 
Compared to Ely, the Jewish evacuees were much smaller in 
number and were gdnerally better behaved than their Jews' 
Free school contemporaries. Polite and disciplined, they 
made ideal evacuees. 
238 On the host side several ex- 
Bedford evacuees have commented on the nonconformist 
tradition in Bedford which they felt helped the acceptance 
of the Jewish arrivals. 
239 This certainly contrasts with 
the more narrow-minded view of Jews in East Anglia. 
Bedfordshire and East Anglia can thus be seen as ideal 
types representing positive and negative features of the 
initial evacuation. However, it is necessary to repeat 
that evacuation was a very personal experience. One Jewish 
schoolgirl had a miserable time being shifted from billet 
to billet in Bedford, 240 whilst other Jewish schoolchildren 
had the times of their lives in East Anglia. 
241 Bearing 
11 in mind these complicating factors concerning generalizations, 
what was the overall impact of the phoney war Jewish 
evacuation? 
264 
The first point to note is that it is difficult to 
avoid noticing the shock aspect of the Jewish influx. 
Stories about Jews being asked about their horns abound 
- an indication of the lack of knowledge of the rural 
population as far as Jewish matters were concerned, in this 
pre-mass-television age. 
242 The confusion created by the 
fact that Jews were actually human quickly subsided, but 
other stereotypes were more persistent. The image of Jews 
as purely Biblical characters was as strong, as the writer 
Chaim Bermant found out. As a Glaswegian refugee in 
Dumfriesshire, Bermant remembers being regarded "with 
something like awe, as if I was a close relative of Jesus 
Christ". 243 Whdreas he was very religious, his fellow 
Jewish refugee was totally lax as far as observation of 
Jewish diet and other rituals was concerned. This created 
confusion, for as Bermant suggested "I at least seemed to 
conform ... to what they knew of the Jew from their reading, 
but they were never quite sure what to make of him". 
244 
If some of the rural population were discovering that 
the Jews had an absence of horns, others were finding out 
that many were just normal people, who often did not care 
for any Jewish ritual. Many friendships developed between 
evacuee and host where the Jewish origin of the former was 
simply unimportant - for either side. 
245 Whether this 
development broke down any latent prejudices is debatable. 
Respect for the individual or the fdmily did not necessarily 
ý 
mean a liking for their Jewishness. Nevertheless, it is 
highly unlikely that such intimate harmonious mixing acted 
as a negative force on the ways in which Gentiles viewed 
Jews as a whole. 
246 
265 
What happened when Jewish evacuees became more 
prominent through a desire to be religiously observant? 
In both Shef_ford and Bedford the local inhabitants definitely 
took a pride in the way their religious orthodox children 
adhered to tradition, to the extent of chastising them when 
they appeared to be slackening in their ritual. 
247 Yet in 
both these centres, the Jewish community helped to provide 
kosher meat and made sure that the hosts had little need 
to worry over the religious requirements of their guests. 
248 
There was at least respect for the religious beliefs of the 
children in both Bedford and Shefford, and cases of 
attempted proselytization were very rare. In the case of 
Chaim. Bermant and others, the respect for Jews was even 
stronger, based on-a fervent religious philosemitism. He 
remembers that the practising Christian, who were his 
hosts, "were grimly determined to keep me Jewish". 
249 
However outside the minority cases of religious philo- 
semitism, or where the Jewish community could keep a close 
eye on its children or offer financial help to the billets, 
the story was less happy. Food was the obvious source of 
conflict. Some Jewish evacuees were happy to be unleashed 
from the restrictions that Judaism created on their eating 
habits, but others dreaded the prospect of having to consume 
forbidden meat. 
250 To some children, being forced to eat 
rabbit or pork was a greater grievance than any physical 
maltreatment, and consequently many Jewish children had a 
totally miserable evacuation experience. 251 Often the 
price of being accepted into a family was to abandon Jewish 
ritual and to join the Sunday school. 
252 There could thus 
266 
be a strange ambivalence; a liking or even a loving of a 
Jewish evacuee child but an antipathy to Jews as a group. - 
Lily Joseph-, who was billeted in Welwyn Garden City, was 
subjected to antisemitic jokes every mealtime, yet the 
couple she was billeted with were desperate to adopt her. 
253 
Forced proselytization was rarer than Jewish children 
joining the Church of their own desire. Despite this, the 
orthodox Jewish community was involved in some melodramatic 
incidents, kidnapping Jewish children who were seen to be 
at risk in Christian homes. 
254 
Therefore on purely religious grounds, the Jewishness 
of the evacuees did create its own problems, though 
occasionally it could produce positive results. Such 
problems as there were could usually be ironed out, either 
by tact and understanding, or by moving billet. There were, 
however, other sources of conflict. Some of these were 
because Jewish evacuees were largely urban and usually poor. 
In this though, the Jewish evacuees were not unique, for 
the whole evacuation experience was based on a city-country 
cultural clash. This universal aspect of evacuation could 
in fact work to the benefit of the Jewish community, for 
although the East End Jews were poor and dirty by middle- 
class standards, they were probably less so than their 
Cockney neighbours. In Egham, Surrey, 80% of the evacuees 
255 
were Jewish East Enders, (hence its nickname Eghamstein), 
yet Jewish schoolchildren were often preferred because they 
were better spoken and cleaner than their Christian counter- 
parts. 
256 As the historian Forman Longmate has stated 
(although exaggerating slightly): "the evidence is 
unanimous that Roman Catholic evacuees were by far the 
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dirtiest, the most ragged, and since they tended to come 
in large family groups, the hardest to place ... Jewish 
evacuees, -by contrast, caused little trouble. " 
257 
Generally speaking, in the first year of evacuation 
the city-country clash was a more powerful source of conflict 
than the Jewish-Gentile one, with the former tending to 
subsume the latter. 
258 Chaim Bermant, when beaten up by 
local bullies in Annan, was delighted in the fact that his 
injuries "were not incurred from the fact that I was Jewish, 
but that I was a tovm boy, a Glaswegian". 
259 Similarly 
the Hallgartens, evacuated to Kings Langley in Buckingham- 
shire, found that the locals did not like them at all: "it 
was not that we were Germans, and it was not that we were 
Jewish. It was that we came from London. " 
260 However, 
at times a degree of antisemitism was brought into the con- 
flict. A young Jewish girl, evacuated into a South Wales 
village, found herself on the side of the evacuees when 
they were attacked by the locals, but there were also 
occasions "when both groups united to attack me as a 
rotten Jew". 
261 Antisemitism from fellow evacuees was 
also not an uncommon experience. 
262 
The first evacuation was not a success in national 
terms and in that sense the Jewish experience mirrored that 
of the country as a-whole. Organization was often found 
wanting, the sheer scale of the operation proving to be a 
formidable barrier. However, where some stability was 
achieved, especially in the case of child evacuees, it was 
not a total disaster as far as the Jewish community was 
concerned. Good relations and contacts were gradually built 
268 
up, and problems such as those associated with food were 
overcome. 
263 It was the short-term contact between host- 
and evacuee--that was the most fertile ground for anti- 
semitism. It was for this reason that there was more 
antagonism towards Jewish adults, who either as visitors 
to their children, or as-part-time evacuees, attracted much 
hostility. 264 It was in the seaside areas such as Brighton, 
Bournemouth, Blackpool and Llandudno, or in safe zones such 
as the Peak District, the Lake District or the West Country, 
that antagonism to Jewish evacuees was most pronounced 
throughout the war. 
265 This antipathy was of. a totally 
different variety from that which confronted East End Jewish 
evacuees, for it Was based not on opposition to their 
poverty, but to their alleged opulence, ostentation, 
vulgarity and cowardice. Summarising this approach, the 
novelist Andrew Soutar, wrote to the Western Morning News 
complaining about Jews paying extortionate rates in hotels, 
buying up property and keeping "their heads and civilian 
suits, while all about them are losing theirs". 
266 
Although not all these nouveau-riche Jews were a figment 
of Soutar's literary imagination, 
267 the distortion and 
prejudice inherent in his letter was typical of the 
misunderstandings and antipathy that were felt in holiday 
268 
areas against Jewish evacuees. Unfair accusations 
that the Jews were not pulling their weight in war charities 
in both Torquay and Blackpool, 
269 
and the policy of 
refusing Jewish guests in Bournemouth and Margate hotels 
were just a few of the symptoris of a wider antisemitic 
undertone in the coastal resorts of Britain. 
270 There 
269 
were thus two levels of antagonism to Jewish evacuees 
that had emerged by the summer of 1940; firstly against the 
poor 'Whitechapel' type Jew and secondly against the 
alleged ostentatious 'Golders Green' nouveau-riche Jew. 
Taken as a whole, negative reactions to Jewish 
evacuees by no means predominated in the first evacuation. 
However, the second dispersal at the time of the blitz was 
to bring into greater prominence both rich Jew and poor 
Jew antisemitism. With the military crisis of the summer 
of 1940, the increased threat of aerial bombardment lead 
to a return to the evacuation areas, but this movement did 
not become a flood until the actual bombing began. However, 
only 500,000 people left London in September 1940 which 
was much less than in the original evacuation at the start 
of the war. In the period from September 1940 to May 1941 
there were only 181,000 official evacuees. 
271 Taken as a 
whole, the blitz evacuation was more successful than the 
earlier attempts. Organizers had gained experience and 
both the host and evacuee had learned to be tolerant of 
each other. 
272 However, as far as Jewish evacuees were 
concerned the reverse appeared to be true. In order to 
explain this paradox, one that generally did not operate 
in the first evacuation, the experience in Oxfordshire and 
the Home Counties will be examined. 
At the height of the blitz, the Chief Constable of 
Buckinghamshire reported that the sight of London refugees 
had "aroused considerable indignation and pity". 
273 
Paradoxically, at the same time the Jewish Chronicle was 
reporting that whilst antisemitism was on the decline in 
270 
the East End, it was rising in the Home Counties. 
274 
Were then the Jewish evacuees bringing antisemitism with 
them, as the fascists liked to claim, or were the Jewish 
newcomers simply fulfilling their age-old role as scape- 
goats? 
A strong case for the latter was made by Tom Harrisson 
who believed that in September 1939 hosts tended to put 
the blame on all evacuees. With the obvious distress 
caused by the blitz, the average evacuee was no longer a 
permissible target to attack for the difficulties that 
such large population influxes inevitably created. A more 
specific outlet was needed and thus Jewish evacuees were 
blamed collectively for any problems that arose. 
275 
Harrisson's model is useful in that it explains the report 
by Home Intelligence, that antisemitic feeling against 
evacuees "was out of all proportion to the Jews arousing 
it,,. 276 It does, however, oversimplify the complexity of 
the issue, for in areas like Oxfordshire, the Jewish 
presence was significant. 
The intensity of the blitz in London, and particularly 
in the East End led onto a spontaneous unofficial evacuation 
in September 1940. On 15 September 1940 alone, 25,000 
such evacuees left for Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and 
Oxfordshire. 277 The latter county, and particularly its 
major town, wnc the centre of this movement and by the 
middle of September up to 20,000 evacuees had arrived in 
Oxford. 270 Many of these were East Enders, half of whom 
were probably Jewish. 
279 As most of the arrivals were 
unofficial evacuees, Oxford became chaotic, its former 
271 
sleepy existence transformed into a confused state with a 
dire shortage of accommodation. This problem spread to 
the small-villages such as Chipping Norton and Woodstock. 
In some of the latter the local population blamed the lack 
of room available on the Jewish evacuees. 
280 Feeling was 
strong, a resident of Banford commenting "round here 'East 
End Jew' are words of abuse". 
281 It was not only poorer 
Jews who were the subject of hostility. In Oxford, the 
luxurious Randolph hotel had guests, who were, according 
to its receptionist, "unfortunately Jews". 
282 Indeed the 
editor of the Oxford Times felt that the antagonism from 
the local population was not aimed at the poorer Jewish 
evacuees, but at'"the very large numbers of the wealthy, 
purse-proud and pushful type". 
283 Sometimes all Jewish 
evacuees were lumped together and attacked because of 
their "extraordinary bad manners - noisy, aggressive, loud 
and tactless". 
284 
There is no evidence that Jewish evacuees, even rich 
Jewish, evacuees were any more vulgar than non-Jewish 
evacuees. However, those that did fit the nouveau-riche 
image soon came to typify the whole community. One local 
Mass-Observer tried to analyse her own hostility to the 
new arrivals. She admitted that she could not "help 
feeling anger at well-dressed Jews and Jewesses" in her 
district, stating that "if they weren't Jews I shouldnt 
notice them" and that there were plenty of non-Jewish 
evacuees whoia she ignored. 
285 In this process of distor- 
tation, the term. evacuee and Jew could be used inter- 
changeably, and Jews blamed for all the problems that 
272 
evacuation had caused. 
286 However one should not ignore 
the genuine conflict that could exist between the host and 
the Jewish evacuee. Many of the latter found the country- 
side backward and tedious, and were not afraid to'air 
their complaints. 
287 In this they did not differ dramat- 
ically from non-Jewish town evacuees. 
288 In Oxfordshire, 
the higher concentration of London evacuees, added to the 
larger Jewish presence than in equivalent evacuation areas, 
gave the potential for a stronger local antisemitic feeling. 
In other Home County areas, where conditions were generally 
better, and Jews less prominent as evacuees, relations were 
more congenial, and hostility aimed more at the evacuees 
as a whole. 
289 
The Jewish evacuation experience by the end of 1940 
had thus created three problem areas in a geographical 
sense - seaside and resort regions, East Anglia and Oxford- 
shire. However, even in these problem spots, the dynamic 
nature of evacuation needs to be taken account of again. 
For throughout 1941 there was a general improvement in 
Jewish-Gentile relations in evacuation areas. Again there 
was a settling in period, the most unhappy evacuees went 
home and as the blitz lessened in its intensity, more 
people returned. By February 1941 Mass-Observation noted 
that only a minority of both the hosts and evacuees 
continued to hold grievances, which were no'longer part of 
mainstream evacuation life. 
290 As part of this improvement 
in relations, antisemitism had subsided. 
291 
In general if host and guest could get through the 
initial traumatic period, then their relationship would, 
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in the words of a Jewish evacuee to Berkhempstead, 
"mellow". -292 Certain areas might have a sudden rash of 
antisemitism if there was a new influx of Jewish arrivals, 
but as 1941 progressed these became rarer. 
293 In the 
problem areas such as East Anglia and Oxford, a similar 
pattern was being followed. The Jewish community would 
gradually set up evacuation centres and difficulties would 
be ironed out. 
294 In East Anglia a report in 1944 
suggested that the earlier problems had been settled and 
that Jewish-Gentile relations were now "natural and 
friendly". 295 Where there was conflict it tended to be 
on specific questions, such as food or business matters. 
As regards the former, the problem of evacuees having much 
time and little to do could create tension. Jewish 
evacuees were particularly eager to queue early for such 
kosher commodities as fish, and thus it was often reported 
that queues were the source and the scene of antisemitisrn. 
296 
Jewish evacuees attempting to set up businesses also 
created local antagonism, usually based on exaggerated 
fears. 297 However, although antisemitic incidents were 
reported in evacuation areas in the years from 1941 - 1943, 
they were sporadic and should not overshadow the general 
harmony that existed in the small towns and countryside. 
2 9a 
In 1944 the final stage in evacuation occurred. The 
gradual and near complete return to the cities was reversed 
as over a million Londoners sought refuge from the macabre 
threat of the flying bombs. 
299 The reactions to Jewish 
evacuees the third time round is interesting and it generallyv 
emphasizes the degree of integration that had taken place 
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by 1944. Mass-Observation believed it to be the most 
successful of the evacuations. 
300 Moreover, unlike the 
1940 blitz-period, the Jewish experience seems to fit into 
this wider pattern. Jewish representatives stated that 
there were very few problems in 1944, giving the reason 
that "since 1940 there are few areas in Great Britain which 
are not now accustomed to have Jews as residents and 
neighbours". 
301 There were minor reports of tensions, 
302 
and regional variety - Northampton, Nottingham and Luton 
had good relations, despite the doubling of their Jewish 
population, whilst Leicester was regarded as being fairly 
antisemitic. 
303 The Board of Deputies believed that the 
latter was due to' past fascist activities, which had made 
the local population hostile, whereas a town like Luton 
welcomed Jewish evacuees, who could provide business and 
jobs. The amount of Jewish public relations work was also 
much higher in Luton than in Leicester. 
304 
Another negative aspect of a generally bright picture 
was the continuing hostility to Jews in holiday areas. 
Some improvement in attitudes had occurred since the 1940 
blitz. For example, surveys from Blackpool and the Lake 
District reported no problems in districts which had been 
bitterly hostile. 305 In Brighton local antagonism 
continued with rumours that Jews were monopolizing all 
available goods, local housing, petrol and even the 
cinemas. 
306 Across the coast in Devon, a member of the 
4 
Torquay District Council reported "a general increase in 
feeling against Jews", an analysis shared by a Mass- 
Observer. 307 It must be suggested that these Southern 
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resorts, within easy reach of London, were subject to 
virulent antisemitism against evacuees because, unlike 
many rural evacuation areas, the Jewish presence in these 
coast towns was unsettled, and thus there was less time 
for good relationships to be built up. With'the Jewish 
population in these resorts constantly changing, there 
was more room for misunderstandings about the evacuees. 
Another factor explaining Brighton's reaction to Jewish 
evacuees, was the existence of an antisemitic tradition 
in the town, fostered ds in Leicester by the B. U. F. 308 
The Brightons, Oxfords, Torquays and Leicesters must 
not disguise the national trend, which by 1944 was one of 
good integration of Jewish evacuees into the reception 
areas. In the last months of the war the population 
returned once again to its own homes, yet by then strong 
bonds had been formed by many Jewish evacuees with their 
hosts. In Shefford many tears were shed when the refugee 
choldren finally returned to London in the summer 1945, a 
far cry from the hostile response they had received at the 
outbreak of war. 
309 Often evacuee and host would remain 
lifelong friends -a sign of some of the positive results 
of Jewish evacuation. 
310 Was this typical of the overall 
impact of Jewish evacuation, and how did evacuation change 
people's perceptions of Jews? 
Drawing a balance sheet of Jewish-Gentile relations 
is always difficult and also a dangerous pursuit. General- 
izing even about an area or a town is hard enough, given 
the diversity of human responses. Applying this on a 
national scale becomes near impossible. One cannot subtract 
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the antagonism of a Brighton from the harmony of a 
Shefford and come up with a final net result. Nevertheless 
a Board of-Deputies summary of evacuation suggested that 
although it had created some problems, it had also 
"demonstrated that the Jew is very much the same as his 
Christian neighbour". 
311 This was a basically sound 
analysis, especially in areas where locals previously 
"possessed thoughts that the Jew was born to do harm 
only". 
312 However several qualifications need to be made 
to this. Firstly, good relations often depended on a 
degree of permanence of the Jewish arrivals, and where the 
Jewish numbers were great, good organization. In areas 
such as Oxfordshire where neither factor really operated, 
a long standing grievance against the evacuees could 
result. 
313 Also as children were more likely to stay in 
one place than adults, Jewish youngsters were often better 
received than their parents. Secondly close and harmonious 
relations did not necessarily change overall attitudes to 
the Jewish people. With the Jewish Secondary School in 
Bedfordshire, despite the love of the children and the 
respect for their religious observance, a social worker 
still found that there were problems from the householders 
stemming from "prejudice against the Jews". Some villagers 
could not accept that the school was short of money and' 
resources, believing that the Jewish community was inherently 
wealthy. 
314 Similarly in Staines there was a strong 
Jewish presence in the town throughout the war. However 
as late as 1944 there were complaints against the local 
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Yeshiva, with "the somewhat unusual appearance of the 
students" causing local suspicion. 
315 
Nevertheless even in areas where relations between 
Jews and non-Jews were bad, violence was rare and limited. 
More commonly, hostility was manifested in a refusal to 
give billets to Jewish evacuees. 
316 The village pogrom 
in Hugh Massingham's fictionalised account of Jewish 
evacuation, The Harp and the Oak never materialised or 
even looked a likely possibility. 
317 However, evacuation 
could still be a traumatic time for Jewish evacuees. In 
East Anglia a group of English born Jews were so unhinged 
by evacuation that at first they would speak only Yiddish 
and were taken tobe refugees. 
318 Others attending non- 
Jewish schools for the first time were "first made aware 
more starkly of being Jewish". 
319 Given the pressures of 
living in a totally Christian atmosphere, and with the near 
impossible task of organizing children right across Britain, 
the Second World War years were disastrous as far as Jewish 
education was concerned. The legacy of these absent years 
is still felt today and it has been suggested that "the 
damage done ... at that time is incalculable". 
'20 However 
little of it was done by deliberate malice from the Gentile 
population, indeed the Jewish children were often happy 
to drift into a secular or Christian world. Although some 
Jewish children suffered miserably in the war trying to 
preserve their background, many more were happy to follow 
the path of integration. Another category fcun dhemselves 
accepted fully as Jewish children, whose foster parents 
encouraged their religious beliefs. 
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If evacuation tended to integrate the Jewish population, 
often at the cost of religious observance, 'it also acted 
as a catalyst in breaking down the areas of Jewish 
concentration. As the Jewish East End disappeared new 
areas of settlement such as Leicester, Northampton and 
Nottingham emerged. 
321 Both the blitz and its concomitant 
evacuation thus pushed Jew and Gentile into close proximity. 
The net result was that barriers and prejudices on both 
sides were overcome. Yet this process was not an easy one 
and its price was high. In the case of the East End it 
came through tremendous physical and human destruction, and 
in the evacuation areas often at the cost of Jewish tradition. 
Both blitz and evacuation brought tensions which created 
antisemitism, some ofwhich, like the hatred of the parvenu 
Jewish evacuee, persisted after the war. Yet taken as a 
whole these two great domestic war developments pushed 
Jews more firmly into the wider British community. It is 
to the question of how British society as a whole viewed 
its Jewish minority in the war that we must now turn. 
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round of evacuees in the billeting of 1939 inevitably 
resulted in every conceivable kind of social and 
psychological misfit. Conservative and Labour 
supporters, Roman Catholics and Presbyterians, lonely 
spinsters and loud-mouthed, boisterous mothers, the 
rich and the poor, city-bred Jews and agricultural 
labourers, the lazy and the hard-working, the sensitive 
and the tough", op. cit., 112. 
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of the potential danger of Jews living in the country. 
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CHAPTER w1 
Jews in British Society (1) 
The Jewish Question in Britain 1939 - 1945 
In the first week of the war Torn Ilarri. sson decided to 
terminate Mass-Observation's survey on antisemitism in 
Britain. Writing to the Board of Deputies he suggested 
that "all our work points to the present conflict as 
pointing away from antisemitism". 
1 Iiarrisson's common 
sense belief that a war against the Jew-persecuting PJazis 
was bound to end domestic prejudice is one that still 
persists nearly half a century liter. 
2 However, as Mass- 
Observation were 'themselves to shortly find out, the real- 
ity was somewhat different. An observer in London, writing 
in October 1939, referred to an "almost universal anti- 
3 
semitic feeling" in the capital. It was soon apparent 
that the Jew-consciousness of the late 1930's was going to 
continue throughout the war. 
4 Whilst rarely a total 
obsession, the 'Jewish Question' was one that was to recur 
frequently, albeit in many different forms, in the years 
between 1939 and 1945. 
A brief examination of the quantity of contemporary 
debate on the Jewish issue will illustrate how widespread 
public concern was over the subject. Two anthologies were 
produced - Gentile and Jew tend '1'}ie Putuve of the Jews, (both 
c 
with wide-ranting ideas from many contributor's. In 
addition much of the contempol"ary pees:., from the News 
Chronicle to the Dundee Fveninrr 'Po; lef'r npp},, presented major 
debates on the subject. 
6 indeed no major periodical in 
Britain wnn free from heated nrjruments on the Jewish 
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Question. 7 George Orwell, who himself wrote regularly on 
antisemitism, commented that the issue was "discussed 
interminably in the press". So great was the public 
interest in the area, that anyone daring to mention Jews 
in print, however indirectly, was besieged by a flood of 
letters. 9 Adding to this general fixation on matters 
Jewish, the war saw a proliferation of Jewish defence 
literature. Some of this was produced by Jewish organizations, 
but much of the defence material come from left-wing elements 
in British society. This anti-antisemitic literature will 
be dealt with separately, but it will be sufficient now to 
point out that it was just one of many elements that made 
up an atmosphere where 'Jews were news'. 
The vast amount written and spoken on the Jewish 
Question in Britain during the war necessitates a clear 
analytical framework for its evaluation. Otherwise there 
is a danger of losing sight of the many heterogeneous 
attitudes that were present, but which could be lost in 
the sheer volume of material. It has been pointed out that 
it is important to differentiate between forms of anti- 
semitism, 
10 
and the constant presence of antisemitism in 
the war should not hide the fact that this antipathy took 
a wide variety of forms. 
11 
Attempts to draw a clear political spectrum from right 
to left are always fraught with danger. The ideologies of 
both organized antisemitism and fascism illustrate this 
point. Although most readily identified with the extreme 
right, antisemiti. sm has not been absent from liberal and 
socialist circles. Furthermore it is difficult to subsume 
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the antipathy to Jewish power from either the Chesterbelloc 
circle or the B. U. F. under the category of conservatism. 
To quote a-virulently antisemitic follower of the former 
school: "What am Il Anything but Tory. " 
12 As Lord 
Rothermere and others were to find, Mosley's organization 
was not simply an anti-communist bulwark, but was a radical 
movement in itself. 
13 However, if caution is employed, 
it is possible to divide attitudes to Jews into the three 
categories of right, left and centre. It is by no means 
the only way in which hostility towards Jews in British 
society can be compartmentalised nor is it a watertight 
model. However, as long as the other factors which cut 
across these subdivisions - such as class, sex, age, 
religion and locality -are taken into account then it is 
satisfactory to use it as a working model. 
In the dogma of the extreme left, antisemitism was 
identified as a reactionary force, being an indirect 
attack on the workers and a "secret weapon of the Ruling 
Class". 14 As even the Daily Worker was to realise, anti- 
semitism was not just a monopoly of the right15 but neverthe- 
less it remains a fact that much of the most blatant attacks 
on Jews in the war could be identified with conservative 
sources. The grounds of the Right's attack on Jews were 
based on two central objections containing one essential 
ingredient - the ultimate loyalty of the Jews. Firstly 
Jews were identified with radical and revolutionary world 
forges, and secondly they were perceived as essentially 
unBritish. 
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As we have seen after 1918 the leading spirits of High 
Toryism - The Times, the Morning Post and The Spectator 
were quick-to accuse Jews of being the central force behind 
16 Bolshevism and a generally malevolent world power. 
After the discrediting of The Protocols in 1921, the 
identification became less respectable and by the outbreak 
of war both The Times and The Spectator were more liberal 
on Jewish matters, and the Morning Post had ceased to 
function. However not all conservative organs had forgotten 
the issue by 1939. 
At the forefront of the campaign against the subversive 
Jewish influence was The Patriot. Although priding itself 
on its widespread presence in Conservative clubs, this 
weekly journal, which continued to peddle the argument of 
The Protocols throughout the war, cannot be seriously 
regarded as part of mainstream British society. 
17 Slightly 
more respectable were the ultra-patriotic and reactionary 
British Empire Union (B. E. U. ) and National Citizens Union 
(N. C. U. ). Both had dabbled in Jewish conspiracy arguments 
in the late 1930's but by the outbreak of hostilities had 
generally stopped attacking Jews as international revolutio: - 
aries. 
18 Nevertheless, the 13. E. U. 's journal, Empire Record, 
whilst attacking German persecution of Jews, reminded its 
readers that "the great majority of the founders of 
Bolshevism in Russia were Geri man Jevwst". 
19 Similarly the 
1lational Review denounced 11azi antisemi. tisr but suggested 
that history "will perhaps not hold rn subversive Jewish 
element blameless - Communism has much to answer for". 
20 
Its long standing antagonism against German Jews continued 
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through the war, this respectable journal attacking "the 
Communism daily spoken to Germany in the rich Jewish 
voices of the men Hitler flung out six years ago'!. 
21 
The only other mdjor grouping that consistently blamed 
Jewry for Communism centred around the right-*ing Catholic 
Herald. A long-standing thorn in the side of Anglo-Jewry, 
it did little to modify its attacks on Jewry in the war. 
22 
It dismissed the stories of Jewish persecution, 
23 
and 
preferred instead to open its columns to a lengthy debate 
over Jewish responsibility for the Russian Revolution. 
24 
In so doing, the paper revealed the strong interest on the 
subject from a sizeable proportion of the Catholic population 
and its intelligentsia. 
25 Elsewhere social commentators 
such as Wickham Steed, Arthur Keith, Arthur Bryant and 
Douglas Reed revived the Jewish-Bolshevik myth, but generally 
speaking, outside the Tory diehard and right-wing Catholic 
worlds, the matter had ceased to be one of public concern. 
26 
Whilst Mass-Observation's numerous social surveys on Jews 
between 1939 and 1943 revealed widespread fears about 
Jewish power in society, not once did this include the Jewish 
Communist bogey. 27 
If Tory diehard thinking on the Bolshevik revolution 
was becoming anachronistic, it did not follow that Conner- 
vative antisemitic conspiracy thinking was also a thing of 
the past. In the war the Conservative Party was split in 
a similar manner to that of the 198O's., with a dominant 
nineteenth century individualist section, but with a 
ýý£ý cignificr: nt oocinl. reform group in opposition. 1t was 
within the former section that an influential grouping, 
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centred around the weekly Truth, and in opposition to 
the alleged Jewish influence in }Britain, could be found. 
The Conservative Party had close financial connections to 
Truth, which were the subject of anti-fascist scrutiny 
in the war. `9 In addition there is evidence that the 
deputy editor of Truth, the ex-13. U. 1?. director A. K. 
Chesterton, was employed by the Conservatives in 1945.30 
It was within Truth that right-wing opposition to 
any form of government planning was most clearly articulated. 
Its two leading contributors, Collin Brooks and Sir Ernest 
Benn, formed two pressure groups in the war - Aims of 
Industry and the Society of Individualists -both to preserve 
free enterprise. '31 The latter claimed 10,000 members in 
1942 32 and George Orwell was not alone in believing Truth 
to be a dangerous and "distinctly influential paper". 
33 
Antisemitism had become prominent in the weekly from the 
late 1930's and throughout the war Truth "indulged lavishly 
in it,,. 34 
Its hostility to Jews was based on the belief that 
Jews were essentially foreigners and a dangerous force in 
society. These two elements were forged together in an 
article "Contrasts in Patriotism" where the war record of 
a group of Conservative peers was compared to that of 
three left-wing Jews - Gollancz, Laski and Strauss. 
35 
The resulting heavy libel. fines did little to stop Truth': 
innuendos which suggested that the British were fighting 
so that alien Jeers would rain at home. 
36 following in 
the path of the Cheaterbell oc circle, 't'ruth deemed that 
Jews, whether they had arrived in Britain recently or 
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several centuries ago, were essentially alien to British 
life. To Collin Brooks, its editor, the real Jewish 
question was whether an alien race should be allowed 
unlimited power and influence over society. It is 
revealing how in 1940 Truth saw the IIore-Belisha case in 
terms of the Dreyfus affair. 
37 
Again in Belloc's footsteps 
Brooks saw the solution in terms of a form of apartheid 
where Jews "would, metaphorically, wear the Star of Judah 
proudly ... and withdraw from the normal life of the 
nation". 
38 If this was not carried out then the Jews 
would face an antisemitic backlash and be expelled from 
Britain again. 
There is no 'doubt that Truth was widely regarded as 
"a reputable weekly periodical", 
39 but in Jewish matters 
how far was it reflecting public opinion? Claude Claremont, 
an anti-Freudian, declared his conversion to Belloc's 
analysis in a major work in 1940,40 but as a Mass-Observation 
survey in 1914 showed, his views were fairly isolated. Out 
of 155 people questioned, only 3 believed that Jewish 
activities should be circumscribed as they were a danger 
to the country. 
41 Yet the same sample showed that up to 
100/, * believed that Jews were a power in society. 
42 Further- 
more, other similar surveys showed that Jews were seen as 
unBritish by a large proportion of the population. A Mass- 
Observation report on attitudes to foreigners in 1943 
brought the response "I cannot understand the inclusion 
of Jews" from one man, but it wrl: one of only two out of 
a sample of 68.43 
It would thus seem that only a small minority of the 
population actually wanted laws against Jews in Britain. 
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Yet paradoxically, a similarly small percentage considered, 
as did-one Mass-Observer, that Jews "were no different to. 
other people" or that "British Jews" were "British". 
44 
In failing to differentiate between alien and Jew, Truth 
was in tune with the views of much of the population. In 
suggesting apartheid or expulsion it was satisfying the 
desires of only a fragment of the British public. 
In its attitude to government social policy Truth 
found itself in a difficult dilemma. On the one hand it 
represented a strong segment of Tory opinion, on the other 
this feeling was swimming in the opposite direction to 
public opinion. Whilst Truth accused Beveridge of wanting 
"to force securities upon people whose sole desire is for 
risk and adventure", 
45 88ö of the population disagreed. 
46 
In this area Truth represented what Home Intelligence saw 
as a small "hostile minority", compared to the general 
nationwide support for the Beveridge report. 
47 Truth, 
in blaming P. E. P. for the success of planning in the war, 
and in suggesting as Sir Ernest Henn did that this 
organization was "sinister, semi-secret" with a pronouncedly 
"Jewish influence", was probably only preaching to a small, 
already converted minority. 
48 Nevertheless, it succeeded 
in presenting Jewish conspiracy ideas and warnings about 
Jewish power to a large public in the war. 
49 
Realising that there was little chance of getting the 
paper to change its policies, the Board of Deputies attempted 
to Fet the government to suppress 't'ruth. 
50 Herbeirt 
Morrison, the Home Secretary, whilst agreeing to keep a 
careful watch on the paper, decided that banning Truth would 
be too great an interference with the liberty of the 
Press. 51 An attampt was made to get the Conservative 
Party to renounce Truth, because, in the Board of Deputies' 
words, "there is still a very strong feeling that the 
Central Office is interested in that paper". 
52 11o such 
repudiation came from the Conservatives. Indeed there is 
some evidence that the Conservative Party had encouraged 
Truth's antisemitic attack on Hore-Belisha in 1940. 
Moreover it has been suggested that the sacking of the 
Jewish War Minister was due to "Conservative Party unwilling- 
ness to resist antisemitism in the Foreign Office and among 
the army generals". 
53 It is significant that the Tory 
Chairman, Sir Thomas Dugdale, told the editor of Truth in 
1942 that "The (Conservative) Party had no press at all 
- either daily or periodical - Truth being nearest to a 
dependable organ". 
54 
The Conservative Party was more troubled by the 
activities and imprisonment of one of its M. P. 's, Captain 
Ramsay. Although Ramsay was never disowned by the 
Conservatives, he was, even in terms of the Conservative 
antipathy towards Jews at the time, "clearly in a class of 
his own". 
55 Ramsay by the end of the war was becoming an 
electoral embarassment and his local Party had no qualms 
about replacing him. 
56 Although Ramsay's constituents 
57 had rejected his conspiratorial antisemitism, there is 
no evidence that other Conservative constituency parties 
were' restrain ir. g social prejudice against Jews. For 
example in 1937 Daniel Lip^on had been refused the candidate- 
ship of the Conservative Party at Cheltenham due to his 
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Jewish background. 58 It has been suggested that through- 
out the 1930's and 40's as local constituency parties had. 
more control over the selection of candidates (who had 
previously nominated themselves via personal finance), that 
the demise of the Jewish Conservative was ensured. 
59 It 
is significant that in the 1945 election there were no 
Jewish Conservative M. P. 's elected at all. 
60 
The problem of Conservative antisemitism was great 
enough even to stir the Board of Deputies into action. 
Despite its past reluctance to involve itself in Party 
politics (to the extent of refusing to attack the B. U. F. ), 
61 
its President Selig Brodetsky approached R. A. Butler in 
1943 on the issue-. Butler, representing the more liberal 
element within the Party, told Brodetsky that he would 
consider getting the Conservatives to tell its members of 
the dangers of antisemitism. 
62 
It would appear however, 
that Butler's more progressive attitude was not typical of 
the Party as a whole. A group of Conservative M. P. 's, who 
claimed to be representative of the Party, wrote to the 
Prime Minister in February 1940, giving an indication of 
Conservative antipathy to the Jews in Britain. They 
wrote hoping that the refugees present in Britain would 
not be naturalized as it would "result in a permanent 
increase of our already over-large Jewish population. 
Most of us feel that we would rather hand down to posterity 
a slowly denuding number of people of British stock than 
4 
provide new material for increasing the stock of Jewish 
or Jew-British population". '. VI,, latter was already "a most 
unhealthy symptom in the body politic. The Jewish vote is 
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so strong in some constituencies that the Member has no 
freedom of action". 
63 
With-this sort of attitude, it is not surprising that 
the prominence of Harold Laski in the Labour Party, as 
Chairman of the Labour Party Conference in 1945, attracted 
right-wing antisemitic hostility. The national Review 
commented "anything less like the British working man than 
an international Jew could not well be imagined ... he has 
so much contempt for this country ... with no idea about 
the land he happened to be born in, save to make a revolution 
in it". 
64 Lord Croft, the old man of Tory diehardism 
followed suit, writing in the popular press that Laski was 
"a fine representative of the old British working class". 
65 
This was the sort of language that had been used after the 
end of the First World War, but nevertheless a change had 
taken place in Conservative thinking on the subject. 
Churchill, who had been at the forefront of the attack 
against 'Jewish' Bolshevism after 1918,66 now warned Croft 
to "be careful, whatever the temptation, not to be drawn 
into any campaign that might be represented as anti-semitic". 
It would appear that Churchill, although sympathetic to 
Croft's remarks, realised they were no longer respectable 
in a political climate that was discovering the Nazi 
concentration camps. 
67 
In any evaluation of antisemiti. sm along a political 
spectrum in the war, one must agree with Orwell, who wrote 
in 194` that "antiserniti sm come: more naturally to people 
of Conservative tendency, who suspect Jews of wenkening 
national morale and diluting the national culture". 
68 
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In the press world it was the Conservative Rothermere, 
Beaverbrook and Kemsley empires that showed the greatest 
hostility-to Jews in the war, and, via Truth, respectable 
Toryism and antisemitic extremism were given a common 
platform. 
69 
Moreover just as the 1980's have seen a 
degree of entryism from National Front supporters into the 
Conservative Party, so in the 1945 election the latter 
received support from ex-B. U. F. members. 
70 
Orwell's belief that antisemitism was mainly associated 
with the Right did not blind him from acknowledging that 
"People of Left opinions are not immune to it,,. 
71 However, 
Orwell's self-critical stance on his fellow Socialists has 
not been one that has gained many followers. It has 
recently been written that "any attempt to raise even a 
discussion about the anti-semitic nature of ... socialist 
practice is almost invariably met with apoplexy and 
vilification. It is virtually a taboo subject". 
72 
Whilst Orwell was happy to generalize that within the 
right-wing "rieo-tories and political Catholics are always 
liable to succumb to antisemitism", 
73 he was unsure why 
those on the left indulged in it, generally ascribing it 
to irrational personal prejudice. 
74 There is some truth 
in this argument, James Robb, for example, in his post-wwar 
survey of antisemitism in Bethnal Green, found no difference 
between liberals, socialists or conservatives in regard to 
personal prejudice. 
75 In the B. U. P. by-elections, Nlass- 
Observation found that Labour supporters in Siivertown "wer e 
frequently strongly anti-Jewish" 
76 
and that in Leeds 
antisemitism was as common in Labour voters as "ariong , st the 
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general average". 
77 
In the former, 31L of the population 
were 'definitely' antisemitic, in the latter, 14%. 
78 
Nor 
was pathological prejudice a monopoly of the extreme right. 
Recently released Home Office papers have revealed that 
the Labour M. P. Richard Stokes was a member of Captain 
Ramsay's antisemitic Right Club, 
79 
and Labour Party 
archives disclose that a Labour supporter from Stoke was 
active in the equally extremist Militant Christian Patriots. 
30 
It would thus seem that socialists were not immune 
from the prevailing antipathy in British society towards 
Jews, nor were certain individuals free from severe anti- 
Jewish complexes. 
al 
Can one go further, however, and 
suggest that therb was a form of antisemitism specifically 
associated with the Left in Britain? I have already 
commented on the need for caution when discussing the 
possibility of a socialist antisemitic tradition in Britain. 
82 
Nevertheless the persistence of this strain of thought into 
the Second World War shows the necessity of taking the 
matter seriously. However, it is important to evaluate 
the nature and extent of this hostility, and then to see 
if it has any unique features. 
In June 1939 the radical I. L. P. supporting journal, 
The Foiwrard, attacked tho "Jewish control of British foreign 
policy". 
83 
This onslaught on the alleged power of inter- 
national Jewish finance bears a resemblance to the left- 
wing campaign at the time of the Boer Vlrrr. Indeed it has 
been described as "striking a radical theme of earlier 
times". 
84 
However The 1''orwnrd had not made up its own 
mind. In July 1939, when answering the question "Do Jews 
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Want War? ", it suggested that even if they did "Jews are 
everywhere an unimportant and far from determining factor 
in such ckrdinal questions as war and peace". 
85 
The journal's ambivalence continued throughout the 
war - attacking the international financiers - "the Shylock- 
in-waiting" for promoting war, the House of hothschilds, 
and "the Hebrew leaders of the Money-lending business", 
86 
yet dismissing as "absurd" the idea that "our financial 
system being dominated by Jews". 
87 
The'Forward was unable 
to give up a long-standing antipathy to the bogey of 
international Jewish finance. At the same time, however, 
it was incapable of putting this in the context of the Nazi 
persecution of Jews. 
The attack on Jewish financiers was one not specifically 
linked to the left, indeed it was one of the most prominent 
aspects of the propaganda of the B. U. F. and other fascist 
and antisemitic groups in the 1930's and 40's. However, 
these latter organizations did not attack the Jewish 
financier in isolation, for it was seen as only'part of 
the international Jewish power, which was directly linked 
to Jewish Communism. To all groups on the left to attack 
socialists such no Harold Laski and LAanny Shinwell as 
international Jewish Bolsheviks was an anathema. 
88 
Despite 
this vital difference, left-wing groups such as the I. L. P. 
and the United Socialist Movement, which were hostile to 
the war could co-operate with quasi-fascists like the 
Duke of Bedford and John Beckett. Indeed in 1939 there was 
talk of a coalition between the I. L. P. and the B. U. F. 
89 
In the words of the Duke of Bedford "adversity can 
make strange bedfellows" 
9o 
and the major pacifist organization 
318 
the Peace Pledge Union (P. P. U. ) saw the involvement of 
the extremes of Left and Right in the war. Although the 
P. P. U. had_& strong connection to the I. L. P., 
91 it also 
received the attention of Nazi appeasement groups ranging 
from the antisemitic Link 
92 
and Vordic League 
93 to the 
slightly more moderate British Council for Christian 
Settlement. 94 The conflict between Left and Right, between 
Socialist pacifists and those sympathetic to the Nazis 
threatened to split the P. P. U. The editor of Peace News, 
John Middleton Murry, wrote in 1942 that he was "astonished 
by the apparent intolerance displayed by pacifists towards 
one another". 
95 
Nevertheless, although some socialists abhorred the 
linking of P. P. U. to individuals such as Bedford, others 
were willing to cooperate. As we have seen, prominent 
members of the I. L. P. supported the latter's peace mission 
to Ireland, 96 and John McGovern M. P. was active'in getting 
the government to release Nazi sympathizers interned under 
18B. 97 Bedford's links with Guy'Aldred's United Socialist 
Movement were even stronger. Bedford was allowed to 
contribute financially to this socialist-anarchist organ- 
ization. In addition he was permitted to attack Jewish 
Financiers in its journal, The Word. 
98 Stranger still 
were the contributions of Alexander Ratcliffe to The Word. 
99 
Ratcliffe's antisemitic anti-war Vanguard was circulated 
by the Anarchist Federation. 
100 There was thus some 
4 
peculiar contacts made between the extreme (but anti-Soviet) 
left wing and the nntisemitic fascist appeasement movements 
in Britain. 101 
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These connections could be dismissed as a result of 
the desire for peace at any price, but there was to an 
extent some-ideological agreement. Whilst Peace News 
opened its columns to attacks on international Jewish 
finance from quasi-fascists such as Edward Godfrey and the 
Duke of Bedford, 
102 there were similar sentiments expressed 
by Murry himself and the novelist Ethel Mannin, both of 
whom had I. L. P. connections. 
103 Furthermore Murry's other 
journal, The Adelphi, a "Christian" Socialist pacifist 
review, engaged in what Orwell called "Jew-baiting of a 
mild kind". 
104 It is important not to overstress the 
connections between the pacifist left and appeasement right 
over the Jewish Question -a significant socialist element 
in the P. P. U. were active in fighting antisemitism inside 
and outside the movement. 
105 However to a prominent 
group within the peace movement there could'be cooperation 
between the left and the right. To these individuals, 
attacks on international Jewish finance were perfectly 
acceptable. 
106 
Ido such contact was ever considered in the more 
orthodox IAarxist world of the Communist party. 
107 Even 
so rich Jew antisemitism did not disappear amongst its 
supporters. In 1940 Malcolm Muggeridge wrote that "when a 
Rothschild was spoiled of his possessions in Vienna, 
socialists must complain". 
108 The Daily Worker did not 
seem to agree, launching bitter attacks on the Barons 
Maurice and Edouard de Rothschild when they arrived in 
Britain from Europe in 1940.109 The fact that the European 
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Houses of Rothschild had been destroyed by the Nazis, and 
that they had arrived in Britain having lost most of their 
possessions (and nearly their lives) did not occur to the 
Communist Party's organ. 
110 Instead, the Daily Worker 
attacked the support which other sections of the press 
gave for the Rothschilds. It saw this press sympathy as 
an indication of who the real enemies of Britain were. 
The Daily t! orker believed this was not Germany, but those 
who wanted to set up fascism at home - the defenders of 
international finance. 
111 
This crude 'social fascist' argument did not stop the 
Daily Worker from attacking antisemitism, which it had 
done consistently from the'1930's. 
112 However until its 
suppression in 1941 it continued to attack Jewish finance. 
To the Daily Worker "bankers (were) bankers and business 
(was) business", 113 regardless of the Nazi persecution of 
all types of Jews . Even so, the Communist Party did find 
it necessary to warn its members that not all Jews were 
capitalists 
114 
and that Jews did not control international 
finance. 115 
Fears that Communists and fellow travellers harboured 
such views would appear to have been justified. Many 
left-wingers could simultaneously attack fascism and 
antisemitism yet show strong signs of rich-Jew antisemitism.. 
One Hass-Ob;, erver wrote -in 19410 that "as a Communist (I do) 
not like Jewish influence and activity in finance and 
industry ... I think the Jews as capitalists are a nuisance 
arid re(; wire strict control". 
117 Many other examples could 
be cited of Communists who were as "obsessed with 'Jewish 
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capitalism' as (was) Hilaire Belloc". 
118 Some went further 
believing "Jews have too much power as so many of them 
control finance and finance ... controls us". 
119 Others 
blamed international Jewish financiers for the war. 
120 
Douglas Hyde, who was the anti-fascist correspondent 
for the Daily Worker, remarked after the war that "nowhere 
will one find a more cynical anti-semitism than in the 
(Communist) Party itself". 121 Hyde's remark needs to be 
put in the context of his bitter attack on his former 
employer, but it would seem to contain an element of truth. 
122 
The association of Jews with finance capitalism (despite 
the historical inaccuracy of this belief by the 1930's), 
would appear to have been deeply ingrained into the 
Communist mentality in war-time Britain. Nevertheless the 
Communist Party did change its attitude in the latter part 
of the war. Walter Holmes, who had earlier attacked the 
refugee Rothschilds in the Daily Worker, was now forced to 
admit that in Dachau concentration camp, rich Jews had 
been killed as well as their poorer brethren. 
123 Within 
the Communist Party a section for sympathetic Jewish 
businessmen was set up, although not without strong 
opposition. 
124 The Communist Party had begun to realise 
that flazi antisemitism knew no class barriers and that 
Jews as a whole should be enlisted in the fight against 
reactionary forces. 
However, it is important to stress that not all on 
the left-wing had come to realise that a simple class 
analysis could not expl: -ii. n antisemi. tism. To many, Jews 
were not victims but oppressors and thus they could not 
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suffer from Nazi attaclcs. 
125 At worst only working class 
Jews would be victims. Thus some left-wing anti-wur organs 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the atrocity reports. They 
suggested, when the news of the Nazi extermination 
programme first became public at the end of 1942, that 
"exaggerations can only harm Jews", 
126 
and that the 
reports were just propaganda justifying an imperialist war. 
127 
The'Trotskyite Socialist Appeal showed its total failure 
to grasp the nature of Nazism when it claimed, after the 
liberation of Belsen, that the worst victims were the 
German working class. 
128 Mass-Observation surveys confirm 
that left-wing distrust of Jewish atrocity stories was not 
uncommon - one correspondent suggesting that they were in 
fact organized by rich Jews. 
129 Others believed that the 
Jews deserved the treatment they were getting because of 
their role in finance, 
130 
and that it was "a great pity 
that the opposition to the Jews in Germany has been so 
emphasised to the exclusion of socialists, anti-Nazis, 
liberals and anti-Nazi Christians"; 
131 the latter being 
examples of those who deserved genuine sympathy. 
Vie must now return to the original question: how 
unique was socialist antisemitism and how extensive was 
it? With the first point we have seen how it was only the 
left that attacked international Jewish finance, not as an 
attack cn world do ry, but as an nssnult on the capitalist 
system. This socialist antisemitism was part of a general 
attack on the rich, but where Jewish capitalists were 
specifically singled out for being particularly vulgar and 
powerful. 
132 Blcewhere socialist nntisemitism was 
generally part of a wider hostility to Jews in British society. 
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In the war itself one Labour M. P. attacked Jews for their 
Communist activities, 
133 
and another prominent Labour 
official in-a fit of xenophobia told his Jewish colleagues 
"to go back to Palestine". 
134 
Turning to the extent of socialist antipathy it is 
vital to point out that the above instances were fairly 
isolated. 135 1lhilst the Board of Deputies was forced to 
make a general 4ppeal to the Conservative Party to try to 
control its antisemitism, it was only concerning specific 
instances that complaints were made to the Labour Party; 
ones that shocked the latter as much as the Jewish 
community. 
136 Also although the identification of Jews 
with international finance was made across the Labour 
movement, it appears that it was only prominent amongst 
the extreme left-wing. 
137 Journals such as The Forward, 
which regularly made this linkage were becoming rare, 
contrasting dramatically to the position in the left-wing 
press forty years earlier. 
138 Finally, although we have 
been warned against drawing "a'balance sheet with any 
form of racism" (that is subtracting anti-racist statements 
from the hostile in a movement), 
139 it must not be forgotten 
that the left-wing movement was at the forefront of the 
battle against antisernitism in Britain. This will be dealt 
with in a separate chapter, but it is necessary to point 
out at this stage that if left-wing hostility to Jews is 
to be directly compared to that of the Right in the war, 
not only was Socialist tinticeniiti= of a less intensive 
nature and nlso more sporadic, but Conservatives, with a 
few notable exceptions, played little part in fighting 
antisemitism. 
140 
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If for a significant section of the right-wing world 
the Jew could never be an Englishman (at best he would be 
Jew-British), 141 and was furthermore a diluter of the 
"Anglo-Saxon heritage" 142 the converse was believed by 
both liberals and socialists. To many Conservatives not 
only should Jews remain Jews but they should be recognizable 
as such. Changing a 'Jewish' name to an 'English' one was 
"an outrageous state of affairs". 
143 Amongst more 
progressive forces in Britain the solution to the problem 
was seen in terms of not more, but less Jewishness. 
It has been suggested that "the liberal compromise 
offered emancipation in the expectation that Jews would 
cease to be Jewish and move closer to British society". 
144 
Such an interpretation of emancipation was not accepted by 
all liberals, 
145 
nor by the established Jewish community 
itself. However it remained true for the nineteenth 
century (and. also for the first half of the twentieth 
century) that those who wanted to be totally accepted in 
British society had to adopt Christianity. 
146 
In the liberal creed there was theoretically neither 
room for antisemitism nor a distinctively Jewish population. 
In practice liberals have not been immune from various 
forms of antisemitism. In the Eastern Crisis of the 1870's, 
and the Boer War agitation at the turn of the century, 
liberals were prominent in attacking what was seen a: the 
undue Jewish influence. 
111.7 At a more local level, several 
Liberal constituencies discriminated against Jews. 
148 
Even as late as 19414 the Tottenham Liberal. and Radical 
Working Mens' Club deemed it necessary to ask its members 
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if they were "of Jewish birth". 
149 Indeed, there is no 
evidence that liberals were any less prone to personal 
prejudice-against Jews than other sections of the British 
population, 
150 despite the official Party line that 
"antisemitism was against the principles of Liberalism" 
and that the Party would "always denounce antisemitism". 
151 
However, it is not on these more universal forms of 
hostility to Jews but on the more specific 'liberal' 
objections to Judaism that we must now concentrate. There 
is a paradox that the most extreme forms of antisemitism 
and the mildest attitudes to Jews have the same long-term 
goal - the ultimate removal of Jews 
from society. 
152 
Whilst most liberals abhorred the Nazi extermination 
programme, there was simultaneously a macabre (though self- 
ashamed) satisfaction at Hitler's attempt to solve finally 
the Jewish question. 
153 Most people repressed such 
thoughts and were genuinely moved by the suffering of Euro- 
154 Nevertheless such feelings were often pean Jewry. 
ambivalent and there was "a tendency", in the words of a 
liberal novelist, "to think serve them right before one 
can catch oneself up". 
155 
Such attitudes came not so much from cold-heartedness 
but from the liberal critique of Jewishness. Implicit in 
this belief was the idea that antisemitism would only end 
when society started to tolerate Jews, and for the Jews to 
subsequently give up their religion. The corollary of 
which was that the survival of antisemitism in a tolerant 
society such as Britain was due to the Jews themselves. 
The premise that Jews, by refusing to fully integrate into 
society, were responsible for the hostility towards 
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themselves is an example of the 'well-earned' theory of 
antisemitism; part of what Bill Williams has recently 
called "the antisemitism of tolerance". 
156 
Prom the social surveys, diaries, literature and even 
government records of the war years it appears that the 
most dominant feelings about Jews were not of their being 
an unassimilatable foreign body in British society, but of 
the reverse. Jews were attacked for refusing to integrate, 
for being clannish and for ultimately creating antisemitism. 
A survey carried out in April 1943 on "the means of over- 
coming antisemitism" found that all the replies amounted 
"to a statement that it was up to the Jews themselves to 
combat antisemitism". 
157 Most of the suggestions to the 
Jewish community were that they should "mix freely with 
the inhabitants of the country of their adoption". 
158 
In the attacks on Jewish exclusivity, the ideas of 
H. G. Wells were often cited. In Well's world-view the idea 
of any 'chosen people' was an anathema, and his works, 
right up to his death, reveal a deep antipathy primarily 
towards Catholicism but also towards Judaism. 
159 Wells 
had no time for Nazi antisemitism, but then regarded it in 
such books as The Fate of Homo Sapiens 
160 
and All Aboard 
for Ararat, 161 as a response to the Jetties' claim to be the 
Chosen race. Although Wells's influence as a socialist 
was on the wane by the Second \lorld liar, his attitude to 
Jews appears to have gained popular support. 
162 Furtherrnoref 
wren' General Sikorski quoted Wells in support of his belief 
that it would be playing the Nazi game in treating Jews as 
a separate nationality, both Ministry of Information and 
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Foreign Office officials were in full agreement. 
163 
Other 'liberal' socialists, such as George Bernard 
Shaw and George Orwell, were united with Wells in his 
opposition to Jewish exclusivity, the former remarking on 
several occasions in the war that Nazi antisemitism was a 
natural development from Mosaic Law. 
164 Wells went 
further than simply attacking the exclusive tendencies of 
Judaism, to him it was the only factor that kept an 
essentially anachronistic people together. 
165 Again the 
public would seem to have agreed. That Judaism had 
nothing worthwhile to offer as a religious creed after the 
arrival of Christianity was an assumption that most of 
the public shared. A small minority of the population had 
a genuine interest and admiration for Jewish religious 
customs, 
166 but more typical was the reaction of novelist 
Hamilton Fyfe, who admonished Jews to "give up their Kosher 
meat and their worship of a bloodthirsty, revengeful, 
anthromorpic deity ... 
(Your) troubles are due to (your) 
exclusiveness". 
167 At the end of an anthology on the 
Jewish question, the editor, Chaim Newman, despairingly 
made a plea for a solution "in which the Jew can face the 
world with pride, confidence, peace of mind and remain a 
Jew". 168 In this symposium of over twenty replies, only 
two contributors made it clear that the Jewish religion 
had a legitimate future. 
169 The rest adhered in varying; 
degrees to a strict interpretation of the emancipation 
'Y Iý 
doctrine, that is the ultimate disappearance of Jewishnes: 3.1' 
Attempting to counter this, Ne mari suggested that "there 
must be ... toleration which does not expect rigidity". 
171 
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Although these attitudes to the Jewish religion show 
the important difference between tolerance and acceptance, 
it must not be forgotten that the former still operated as 
an effective barrier against attacks on Jewish religious 
freedom. As will be shown later, the Government bent over 
backwards to make sure that the hardships imposed by war 
did-not hit the Jewish community unduly. 
172 Moreover, the 
general disdain of the public against Judaism in no way 
affected the rights of British Jews to practice their 
religion. In only one sphere, over Jewish ritual slaughter, 
or shechita, was there anything like fin organized campaign 
against Jewish religious practice. 
The subject pf minorities and their religious slaughter 
of animals is one that has produced an emotional public 
reaction in the 1980's, a reaction that shows certain 
similarities to the opposition to shechita in the late 
1930's and the Second World Vlar. 
173 Then, as now, animal 
rights enthusiasts have been accused of racism, 
174 
a matter 
made more complicated due to the-involvement of antisemitic 
and fascist groups in the general campaign. 
175 Both have 
occurred in an atmosphere of general race tension and in 
each case the attacks on ritual slaughter have suffered 
from serious distortion. 
176 
In the recent debate the potential accusation of anti- 
semitisnn has been a source of embarasament, and, to an 
r 
extent, a stumbling block to animal welfare organizations. 
l 
In the 1930's - 40's this was not the case, indeed such 
groups used thefear of creating antisemitism as a weapon 
against shechita. : ritin to the Board of Deputies in June 
1939, the chairman of the IISPCA claimed that in "the last 
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couple of years there (has been) growing up a very strong 
feeling of antagonism towards the continuation of the 
Jewish method of slaughter in this country". 
178 At a 
meeting in June 1939 a mini-emancipation contract was 
proposed by the RSPCA, who claimed that if the Jews 
voluntarily gave up shechita it would improve Jewish 
relations with the wider society. 
179 
Part of the "very strong feeling of antagonism" that 
the RSPCA had referred to had been deliberately stirred up 
by antisemitic organisations. At the forefront of this 
campaign was the Nordic League who were distributing a 
German antisemitic anti-shechita film in public meetings. 
180 
Adding to the emotional atmosphere a speaker referred to 
"Jewish Ritual Slaughter, or call it Ritual murder if you 
like: it is one and the same thing" carried out by "sadistic, 
armenoid, mongroid aliens". 
181 Links were made via such 
activities between respectable animal rights groups and 
the extremist Nordic League. As a result antisemitism 
entered the shechita debate quite. freely. 
182 In a 1944 
pamphlet I. A. Dudley Ward, who had connections with the 
RSPCA and the Animal Defence Society, could write in 
language inspired by The Protocols concerning ritual 
slaughter. Suggesting that most Jews would be against 
shechita "but they (were) dupes of a crafty* and obdurate 
rabbinical ring and mass hypnotism", she believed that 
"there is money in Kosher - oodles of it., Plenty of plums; 
itching; palms; ferocious vested interests". 
183 
The war itself created negative and positive factors 
as regards the maintenance of shechita. On the one hand, 
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the RSPCA decided to delay any attempt at banning religious 
slaughter until the end of the hostilities; 
184 
on the 
other the-dispersion of the Jewish population with evacuation 
brought shechita into prominence in new areas. It was 
particularly in the Home Counties that shechita became a 
major issue, with arguments raging in both the Northampshire 
and Oxfordshire press. 
185 In the latter a heated debate 
continued for four months, giving some insight into how 
far antisernitism was a factor in the anti-shechita camp. 
186 
Not surprisingly, the latter denied any such intent, 
187 
yet several correspondents enlarged their attack on 
shechita to a general assault on Judaism. It was indicated 
that the Jewish religion was as outdated as shechita, and, 
as the latter was barbaric, it should be outlawed. 
188 As 
was the case with the RSPCA, the emancipation contract was 
indirectly cited. To quote one correspondent: "Jews have 
sanctuary and protection in this country and they should 
therefore be compelled to toe the line, and to adopt British 
methods of slaughter, " 
189 
or else in the words of another 
"a general feeling of resentment is likely to arise against 
any body of alien who ... do not ... conform to the 
standard of public opinion". 
190 
The Board of 'Deputies was in little doubt that 
opposition to shechita was strong in war-time Britain. Two 
defence leaflets on the subject were produced and its 
concern would appear to have been justified. 
191 
A News 
Chronicle debate on antisemitism in 1943 found that many 
of the 'reasoned' antisemitic letters were based on a 
hostility to shechita. 
192 The shechita debate itself 
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reveals the limitations of liberal attitudes to Jews. For 
although liberalism was opposed to antisemitism, due to 
its intolerance and the threat it posed to democracy, the 
threat of antisemitism could also be used to control the 
freedom of the Jewish community. This ambivalent approach 
in some ways offered the greatest threat to Britain's 
Jewish minority, for although it ensured that the State 
would be opposed to violent manifestation of antisemitism 
from the far right, it also suggested that a form of 
appeasement would operate to forces hostile to Jewish 
activities in Britain. The government wanted to make sure 
that amorphous antisemitism did not become an organized 
threat to liberal. democracy. We will see later that such 
thinking operated in government circles in regard to such 
issues as the black market, Sunday Trading, domestic anti- 
semitism, internment of aliens and policy to European Jews. 
193 
Most people in Britain theoretically wanted Jews to 
stop being separate. Was it possible for Jews to have 
assimilated if they had wanted? -In other words, it is 
important to analyse the strength of the barriers to the 
entry of Jews into the social and economic life of Britain. 
This is an attempt to ask: was the emancipation contract 
honoured from the non-Jewish side? 
So far we have concentrated on attitudes and hostilities 
associated with specific political standpoints. However, 
when social attitudes to Jews are examined such categorization 
is impossible to maintain. The sentiments of Lady Mosley's 
blunt statement to the Advisory Committee in 1940 that she 
was "not fond of Jews" 
194 
were shared by many on the Left. 
Mass-Observation found that many Communists "nevertheless 
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confess a secret contempt or dislike" of Jews. In the more 
moderate Labour world, Hugh Dalton could describe Barnett 
Janner as "a malodorous Jewish solicitor". 
195 It could 
be argued that although Dalton and Lady Mosley were on 
opposite sides of the political spectrum, they shared the 
same upper middle-class background, where it has been 
196 
claimed "anti-semitism was very common". Indeed Mollie 
Panter-Downes, the London correspondent of the New Yorker, 
wrote at the start of 1940 that antisemitism was strong in 
Britain, "especially in the upper-classes". 
197 However, 
it must be pointed out that Panter-Downes moved predomin- 
antly in such circles, and observers had a tendency of 
locating antisemitism in groups with which they were most 
familiar. Thus George Orwell believed the working-class 
or more specifically Irish labourers to be the most anti- 
semitic, whereas Cyril Connolly confined it to the middle 
classes. 
198 Mass-Observation went as far as concluding 
that personal dislike of Jews could be found equally among 
"working class, middle class and upper class Observers, for 
all ages, sexes, areas, occupations, political views, 
educational standards". 
199 Vevertheless, it has been shown 
that in some districts of the working class East End, 
relations between Jews and non-Jews were very amicable. 
One had often to go to upper class preserves to find blatant 
social discrimination against JE. ws. 
200 
A. J. P. Taylor has commented that many were "annoyed 
at having to repudiate the antisemitisrn which they had 
secretly cherished" because of Nazi persecution of Jews. 
201 
Taylor was referring to the "quiet" antisemitism of the Golf 
club or the public school, yet there is no evidence that 
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any such change took place either in the 1930's or the 
war itself. Clubs such as Les Arnbassadeurs in Mayfair 
refused Jewish members as late as 1943.202 Many golf 
clubs followed a similar policy and a numerous clausus 
operated in some private schools. 
203 The fact of the 
persecution of European Jewry was not one that was likely 
to remove deeply ingrained social snobbery, especially in 
an age where the notion of privilege was under serious 
attack. However discrimination could also be found lower 
down the social scale particularly in middle class 
preserves such as medical schools. 
204 Indeed a case 
could be made that the most serious antisemitism was located 
amongst the lower middle classes, who felt threatened by 
the increasingly mobile Jewish population in the professions 
and in occupations such as shop-keeping, taxi driving and 
clerical positions. 
205 
It is difficult to quantify the exact impact job 
discrimination had on Anglo-Jewish development in the 
period around the war. 
206 A refusal to employ Jews 
occurred in many sections of the economy. Indeed such 
discrimination was probably increasing during and after 
the war. 
207 It would seem this had a net effect of both 
slowing down the entry of the descendants of the East 
'European Jews into the professions, and of encouraging Jews 
to continue a tradition of economic independence. `'08 Tip 
the housing sphere, blatant discrimination against Jews 
ensured that the movement from primary or secondary 
settlement z. rer: s would follow an explicitly Jewish pattern, 
209 
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Areas such as Golders Green, 1)idsbury in Iianchester and 
Moortown in Leeds thus became in some ways "gilded ghettos", 
anglicized but not totally integrated into the wider 
society. 
210 This pattern can be expanded to'cover Anglo- 
Jewry as a whole in the war. The hostilities opened up 
social and economic opportunities, but continuing hostility 
to Jews meant that the Anglo-Jewish population would remain 
in many ways separate, though nevertheless more equal, 
members of British society. 
Vie have thus seen that although antisemitism cut 
across class barriers there were still unique features in 
social prejudice. For example, working class social 
snobbery against Jews was not necessarily the same as the 
middle class variety. 
211 However, two other factors need 
now to be taken into consideration in qualifying the nature 
of social prejudice in Britain. The first is one that has 
been emphasised before - that it is vital to take into 
account ambivalence both regarding attitudes and 
behaviour to Jews. 212 Social surveys on Jews in the war 
found that only one in a hundred people could be said to 
be totally pro-Jewish, and the same could be equally said 
of the reverse. 
213 A study of Mass-Observation's war 
diaries reveals that only one diarist out of 500 showed 
214 Indeed other constant negative attitudes to Jews. 
surveys carried out by this social survey group suggest 
that up to 50; L of the population were as philosemitic as 
they were anti. emitic. 
! l` The reply that whilst some Jews 
were "nice" but that "there (were) others that even I would 
liquidate" was typical of many. 
216 
Comparisons between 
cultured intelligent Jews like Proud, and "fat, greasy 
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assertive second hand Jews" 
217 
were also common. Another 
favourite dichotomy was to show sympathy to European Jews 
whilst attacking the alleged malpractices of those in 
Britain. 218 
Adding confusion to this picture was the fact that 
many people who admitted their antisemitism still mixed 
intimately with Jews. 
219 Some were consistent, their 
private hostility reflected in their exclusively non-Jewish 
company, or in an unsympathetic attitude to persecuted 
Jews, typified by the army exploits of Evelyn Waugh. 
220 
Others, like Harold Nicolson, warned 'publicly against 
the dangers of antisemitism at any level, yet privately 
hated the very presence of Jews. 
221 Thus. iio clear equation 
can be drawn between thought, speech and behaviour patterns, 
which was probably to the advantage of the Jewish community 
itself. Purely 'private' hostility to Jews was widespread, 
if the alarming findings of Mass-Observation are to be 
believed (with over 55;, of the population feeling in some 
way antagonistic to Jews). However this antipathy does 
not seem to be reflected as far as public behaviour to Jews 
?? _2 was concerned. A restraining factor was often at work, 
typified by the actions of a Scottish novelist and her 
friends who attacked Jewish refugees in private "so that 
22ý 
one can get it off one's chest and not say (it) in public''. 
This same author also revealed another aspect of 
attitudes to Jews when she added that "1 try never to feel 
art . -Semite". 
224 This indicates the second qualification 
that needs to be made as rer*ards social tint iseruitism in the 
war - its dynamic element. Vdhulst Nazi antisemitism 
ý 
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succeeded in making Britain more Jew-conscious (and 
possibly actually increased domestic prejudice in some 
people), 
? ý5 it also made a significant part of the 
population rethink its attitudes to Jews. It has been 
written that "it was the Second ; 'World War ... which really 
precipitated Orwell's critical reappraisal of his attitudes 
to Jews", 226 yet Orwell was not alone in this, for a large 
number of Lass-Observers showed similar tendencies. Like 
Orwell they were not always totally successful in over- 
coming their prejudices, 
227 but as a report in 1943 
indicated, although "many people dislike Jews ... the 
majority ... feel uncomfortable and ashamed of feelings 
that they recognise as having little basis". 
228 Thus 
although philosemitism changed little between surveys 
carried out in 1940 and 1943, unfavourable attitudes to 
Jews declined by half, and were replaced in the latter year 
by a greater ambivalence. 
229 To some people the impact 
of the news of Nazi extermination of Jews in December 1942 
lasted only a couple of hours, 
230 to many others it was 
part of a slow realisation that antisemitism was a dangerous 
problem and that efforts should be made not only to attack 
its political, but also its personal manifestations. It 
is significant that individuals such as T. S. Eliot, Lord 
Alfred Douglas and John Buchan, who were at the forefront 
of British antisemnitism in the 1920's, had rcpudiated such 
sentiments by the Second World War. 
231 
4 
There was thus a private form of censorship as regards 
antisemitic sentiments in the war, but how far was anti- 
semitism unacceptable in society as a whole? There is no 
doubt that some change had taken place in the respectability 
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of antisemitism in Britain by the war compared to a 
generation earlier. In Oxford University before 1914 overt 
antisemitism was almost the norm amongst students, whereas 
in 1939 an undergraduate at Cambridge could write that 
whilst many were still privately disdainful of Jews "it 
is almost blasphemy in the University to be openly anti- 
semitic". 
232 However it is easy to be too optimistic as 
regards society's intolerance of antisemitism, for as 
Angus Calder has written about the Second Vforld War "the 
connection between Nazism-Fascism and antisemitism was not 
233 
widely grasped in Britain". 
The career of Douglas Reed illustrates the need for 
caution when evaluating the unrespectability of antisemitism 
in the war. Vie have seen in the case of John Hooper Harvey 
how it was possible for an extreme antisemite to successfully 
move from the world of fringe fascism to wider society. 
234 
In the case of Douglas Reed the reverse process is 
observable, yet not until well after the war was this 
popular author dropped by his publisher, Jonathon Cape. 
235 
Cape's reluctance to dispose of Reed in some ways is not 
surprising, for his Insanity Fair of 1938, which predicted 
the Anschluss, was one that gained tremendous public interest, 
with up to 100 reprintings before the war. 
236 Yet Reed's 
work was also marked by a blatant antisemitism, one that 
pervaded throughout even his early books for Cape. 
237 
His publishers were well aware of his hostility to Jews, 
and-in Disgrace Abounding, published in 1939, Reed had 
been told to rewrite certain sections of the book because 
of its antisemitism. Cape were satisfied with Reed's 
revisions which seems surprising in view of the final 
product. 
238 As in Insanity Pnir, Reed warned that Jews 
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were trying to take over London as they had Berlin, he 
cast doubt on the authenticity of German antisemitiem and 
suggested that the public should be more worried about 
the power of Jews in England. 
239 
In the war itself Reed's work became even more 
obsessed with the Jewish peril. Influenced it would seem 
by extremist social credit ideas, Reed became convinced 
that the Protocols were being enacted, "the evidence becomes 
too strong to ignore". 
240 The idea of a combined Jewish- 
Fascist-Bolshevik conspiracy appeared in his work, just- 
ifying his belief that antisemitism'was a total sham, and 
that atrocity stories were a plot to gain sympathy for the 
Jewish cause. 
241 All this was mixed in with an infantile 
gutter antisemitism with Jews being accused of panic, 
cowardice, the cultural degeneration of Britain and of 
controlling the black market. 
242 Reed was the source of 
much anger and alarm in the Jewish community, but there 
was little they could do to stem the flow of Reed's anti- 
semitismo243 By the middle of -the war, Reed had become a 
convinced antisemite and it is doubtful whether he would 
have responded to attempts to curb his hostility. 
244 How- 
ever, there is no evidence to suggest that Cape even tried 
to restrain Reedo245 Indeed, in their journal Now and 
Then, Reed was still being warmly promoted by his pub- 
lisherso246 
Turning to the impact of Reed, a Jewish Chronicle, 
editorial commentcd that his war-books had "gained praise 
from unexpected quarters". 
247 It is true that many 
reviewers took Reed to task for his antisemitism, 
248 
but others were either silent or supportive of his views 
on the Jews. 
249 As far as the public was concerned, 
,.. - -i It. .............. + ... a +1. n+ 
11tFýaa nnl"r rýyý*ncrnn'1 t: nl 
In 
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(my books) met was directed against the parts of them which 
deal with the Jewish Question". 
250 However Reed also 
gained much support on this issue. Predictably the extreme 
antisemitic world became increasingly impressed by Reed, 
251 
but he was also quoted by many respectable bommentators such 
as the Reverends Bulman and Huxley-Williams (of Cricklewood 
and Brondesbury) in their campaign against aliens in North- 
West London. 252 To some, Reed merely confirmed their belief 
that Jewish atrocity stories were false and that "the 
Jewish menace will continue to grow", 
253 but his writings 
also shaped attitudes. A Mass-Observer in 1943 commented 
that he had no opinion on Jews at all until reading Reed 
and that "I now have decided views about them ... In short 
I don't like Jews". 254 
By the end of the war Reed was, like John Hooper 
Harvey, working in several milieux, being Foreign editor 
of Kemsley newspapers, yet at the same time forging links 
with fringe antisemitic organisations. 
255 On some 
occasions he only hinted at the existence of the Jewish 
conspiracy, 
256 
at others he used his reputation as an 
able journalist to give explicit warnings about Jewish 
power to a wide audience. 
257 Reed's continued success, 
and the refusal of his not unprogressive publishers to 
remove him, suggests strongly that Nazi persecution of 
Jews had not made manifestations of antisemitism necessarily 
beyond the pale in viar-time Britain. 
Cape were not alone in giving a public forum to an 
antisemite in the wnr. In February 1943 the Daily Dispatch 
opened its letter columns to J. B. ltothwell, who accused 
3ho 
Jews of controlling the black market arid all the war 
rackets, refusing to join the fighting forces and warned 
of an anti-Jewish backlash in Britain. 
2583 The letter, 
according to bass-Observation, ga. ined some support although 
it also led to mass protest meetings in I. -lanchester. 
259 
The editor of the paper defended his decision to publish 
the letter, urging that it was necessary to give "full 
to both sides of a case". 
260 This reason expression ... 
was riven by several editors who felt the 'Jewish Question' 
was one that could be legitimately al red, and that it was 
only fair to give a platform to the ctntisemitic side of 
the argument. 
261 Characteristic of this approach v las a 
review of Reed's 'Lost We kejrret in The Spectator by J). ' . 
Brogan. Brogan attacked the tlntisemitislll of the book, but 
believed this was no reason to silence heed, who should be 
allowed to have his say. 
`"(6" The cnlnpaign by the Communist 
Party and the PCCL to make ul, tisemitl sm a libel offence 
appears to have t, eell similarly ullpopui. ar with the public, 
who wanted the right to remain ctntisemitic, regardless of 
what wns happening in Europe. 
263 lllusti'uting this 
attitude, when 131ttuche. Uhj; dale went to coo the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, Oliver : 3it: rlley, concerning 
Anti sclll: iti. c remarks deuce by the High Commissioner for 
Palestine, Lord Gort, : itnnley remarked "llot everybody 
likes a1evisi't. 
(i1 
Thus even ill goverr, llleilt eire lu.; social. 
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of the British population rethink its attitude to Jews, 
but it did not put an end to social antisemitism or make 
(non-fasaizt) hostility to Jews unacceptable. Those 
publishers that removed antisemitism from books, 
267 those 
individuals such as E. M. Forster that refused to have any 
social contact with antisemites, 
268 
and those actors that 
portrayed Shylock in a sympathetic manner, 
269 
were still 
in a minority in Britain at war-- despite the prevailing 
anti-fascist spirit. 
Antisemitism in Britain cannot be measured therefore 
simply by looking at the success (or lack of success) of 
organized fascist and antisemitic groups during the war. 
It is still necessary, however, to evaluate the strength 
of hostility to Jews and to see how near domestic anti- 
semitism was to being a serious problem. Measuring anti- 
semitism, whether on an individual or a societal level is 
always fraught with danger. 
270 To talk of levels of 
antisemitism in British society also ignores the fact that 
there were many types of hostility to Jews in the six 
years of the war - that associated with the Jews''-War 
accusation, with the blitz and evacuation, with the 
refugees, with the black market and army dodging, with 
literary and social forms of prejudice, with the various 
political antipathies to Jews, as well as with unique 
events such as the Bethnal Green tube disaster and the 
assassination of Lord II. 'loyne. All were in come way related, 
but many were such distant cousing that direct comparison 
makes little sense. 
271 
However if caution is applied a tentative chronological 
map of war antisemitism can be drawn. At first the nervous 
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tensions of the war, with the anticipation of what was to 
come, added to the nuisance of restrictions such as the 
blackout, seem to have created antisemitism. Jews were 
blamed for the problems of the 'phoney war' period it 
would seem because they were seen to be also somehow 
responsible for the war itself. 
272 This was the time 
when 'morale' was probably at its lowest in Britain. 273 
It was largely for this reason that Leslie Hore-Belisha was 
not offered the Ministry of Information, in case his 
appointment would give any support to the defeatist Jews' 
War line. 274 Defeatist antisemitism was also one of the 
reasons for the government's suppression of the B. U. P., 
although it needed the threat of invasion to make the 
Cabinet act on the matter. 
275 Nevertheless in the first 
six months of the war, although antisemitism had certainly 
not decreased compared to the pre-war period, it was not 
a serious problem for the Jewish community. 
276 
However, in the months from April to August 1940 the 
fifth column panic threw Jews, and particularly alien Jews, 
into the spotlight, the general xenophobia affected the 
whole Jewish community. 
277 Government fears of riots 
against alien Jews at this time were possibly exaggerated, 
although attacks on Italians in June 1940 show the need to 
take such a possibility seriously. 
278 The period was also 
notable for the disintegration of liberal forces within 
British society. This hostility to aliens continued during 
ý the blitz in the autumn of 1940, and maintained its earlier 
antisemitic character. 
279 It has been shown that before 
the blitz it was thought that intensive bombing might lead 
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to an antisemitic reaction, but although it did create n 
general feeling of hostility to Jews in London (with 
accusations-that Jews were crowding the shelters), the 
East End remained calm. 
280 The evacuation associated 
with the blitz was a more important factor in creating a 
higher level of antisemitism in Britain, but its dispersed 
nature limited its potential as an organized feeling. 281 
Throughout 1941 food and other shortages created 
growing bitterness amongst the British public, and in turn 
282 As with the initial a scapegoat figure was sought out. 
problems of the war, Jews were blamed, but this antisemitism 
was essentially sporadic until the following year. 
283 The 
year 1942 saw the crystallization of the concept of the 
black market, public hostility to this being encouraged by 
the government. 
284 Before long Jews were being strongly 
identified with the black market, a linkage that was to be 
the dominant factor determining the strength of antisemitic 
sentiment in Britain for the rest of the war. The ogre of a 
black market in itself acted as ä. safety valve mechanism, 
releasing the tension caused by rationing. 
285 Within this 
feeling Jews, and particularly alien Jews, became a hate 
figure, enabling a 'foreign' scapegoat to be blamed for 
all shortages. 
286 
In suggesting that the antisemitism associated with 
the black market was due to a scapegoat mnechanisin does not 
imply that there was no Jewish involvement in it, for as 
will be shown later, this was substantial. `87 however 
after 1943, when the black market ceased to be of public 
concern, antisemitism seems to have generally declined, 
31141 
yet there is no evidence that Jewish black marketeers became 
any less prominent. 
288 It was thus in the periods when 
the black market was at its most unpopular - in the spring 
of 1942 and in the winter of 1942, that antisemitism was 
most commonly reported to be at its highest level. 
289 In 
the latter period, the news of the extermination of European 
Jewry appears to have increased Jew-consciousness in 
Britain, creating on the one-hand sympathy, but on the 
other, increased hostility especially aimed at Jewish 
black marketeers. 
290 This ambivalence would explain the 
apparent contradiction found by B. I. P. O. in January 1943. 
At this point, according to B. I. P. O., 255% of the population 
believed antisemitism was increasing, whilst 16% thought 
it was on the decrease - the highest levels for both 
categories throughout the war. 
291 
It was in early 1943 that the Jewish community became 
most concerned about the dangers of domestic antisemitism. 
292 
However, with the military progress of the Allies throughout 
the rest of the year, the attention of the public moved 
away from the domestic problems and more to worrying about 
the post-war world. 
293 Antisemitism thus seems to have 
tailed off by the end of 1943 and to have become sporadic 
by the following year. 
294 Only in 1943 did it appear to 
have become dangerous and it would probably have needed 
a large military disaster to make it very serious. As it 
was., the Bethnal Green Tube disaster, led to widespread 
accusations against the Jetics, but this heated reaction 
never became physical. 
25', Similarly the assassination of 
Lord Moyne in Tdovember 1944 brought antisemitic comment 
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back into prominence, but again there were no violent 
disturbances in Britain such as those which followed the 
Hanging Sergeants incident in 1947.296 
With hindsight, one can see that the government's 
fear, which operated throughout the war, of an organized 
antisemitic feeling in Britain gaining strength, was a 
long way off happening on a national scale. 
297 However 
was there a possibility of a local reaction? Late in 
1943 a Foreign Office official reported Home Secretary 
Morris on's concern of "the growth of antisemitic feeling 
in certain towns". 
298 The most obvious centres for this 
would be the cities of Jewish concentration such as 
London, Manchester, Leeds and to a lesser extent, Glasgow. 
However, it has been noted that the strength of antisemitic 
sentiment does not necessarily correspond directly to the 
number, or concentration, of Jews in a particular locality. 
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Whilst all three of these provincial towns witnessed some 
antisemitism, especially against Jews who were trying to 
advance economically and socially, nothing like an organised 
movement came into existence. 
300 Only in IIorth-West 
London, at the end of the war, did this take place. Here 
the 'Ifampstead petition movement' aimed at removing the 
'aliens' from this area of London, and a strong degree of 
antisemitism was linked to this popular organization. 
301 
It would appear that antisemitism was actually higher 
in towns with a small Jewish population such as Sheffield, 
p ool or Oxford. 
0`ý LiveThe lack of familiarity with 
Jews could create the opportunities for serious misunder- 
standings. In Sheffield, Jews were accused of evading 
3Zi 6 
fire watching duties and of profiteering in blitzed 
property, both of which allegations were totally without 
foundation, _ 
303 Criticism of Jews appears to have been a 
regular occurrence, although there were only 2200 Jews in 
the city. 
304 Nevertheless despite personal insults and 
social ostracism, the local Jewish representatives could 
report that "overt anti-semitism in Sheffield is not 
particularly troublesome". 
305 Again, even on a localised 
level there was a limit to haw far hostility to Jews could 
be channelled. However the Hampstead movement (admittedly 
in unique circumstances) shows that Morrison's fear was 
not totally without foundation. 
The relative lack of violence should not lead us to 
believe that antisemitism was of no consequence in war-time 
Britain. The Jewish Question was to the fore in this 
period, yet the solutions that were offered were contradictory 
and left Jews in an impossible dilemma. An element of the 
population told the Jew to remain separate,, a more powerful 
section urged him to stop being exclusive. 
306 Yet Jews 
who attempted to move freely in British society found that 
there were still substantial barriers in their way. Faced 
with a hostile atmosphere in the war, Jews were told that 
antisemitism was their own fault. 
307 Hot surprisingly a 
degree of neuroticism, verging on self-hatred could develop 
in the lunglo-Jewish community. Thus Nathan Laski was 
pleased that . I-lore-Belisha was sacked, as it removed a potential 
turret for antisemites, 
308 Lord Rothschild could refrain 
from sending; his children to Americo, lest "the world should 
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say that seven million Jews are cowards" 
309 
and Lewis 
Namier would "hope to God the fellow is not a Jew" when 
reading a-black market report. 
310 
Nevertheless Nazi antisemitism had some impact on 
British attitudes to Jews. On an individual level, more 
progressive people were rethinking their opinions on the 
issue, and even some Conservatives were beginning to 
realise that open antisemitism was unacceptable by 1945. 
At the other extreme, the Communist Party was also reassessing 
its attitude to Jews, and, with the setting up of its 
National Jewish Committee in 1943, it started to reject a 
totally assimilationist approach to the subject. 
311 Yet 
one can overplay the impact of the Nazi factor. Many 
actually doubted the authenticity of Jewish persecution, 
312 
and fears about Jewish power persisted throughout the war. 
As late as 1944 a survey showed that 9; o' of the British 
population felt threatened by Jews. 
313 
Antisemitic stereo- 
types thus had a strong degree of persistence and it is 
necessary now to see how the Jewish image as a whole 
changed in British society during the war. 
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see Andrew Boyle, Poor Dear Brendan. The Quest for 
Brendan Bracken (London, 1974), 339 and Peter Alexan er, 
Roy Campbell: A Critical Biography (Oxford, 1982), 
198-9 for an accoun of this antisemitic poet's 
friendship with Jews in the war. George Orwell was a 
classic example pf a man, who in Malcolm I. 1uggeridge's 
words was "at heart strongly anti-Semitic" yet who 
attracted ninny Jewish friends. Quoted by T. R. Fyvel, 
George Orwell: A Personal Memoir (London, 1984), 178. 
220. An nntisemitic Mass-Observer, Ll. 1036 remarked that 
"I have been fortunate in not meeting very many of 
them" - Directive October 1940, and similarly M-O A: 
DR 3360, DR 1056 (who refused Jews as tenants) and 
1)11 1313 in March 1943. For Vlaugh's antipathy to Jews 
see Michael Davies (ed. ), The Diaries of Evelyn Wau h 
(London, 1976), 486 (11 November 1940), 447 (23 October 
1939) and 523 (26 May 1942). His attitudes would 
appear to have affected his behaviour in the war. 
Stationed in Jugoslavia he refused to help the Jews 
of Croatia, preferring to support their persecutors, 
the Catholic clergy - even though some were fascist 
collaborators. See diary entry for 24 October 1944, 
p. 586 and comments of Christopher Sykes, Evelyn Waugh: 
A Biography (Glasgow, 1975), 275. 
221. have already commented on Nicolson's ambivalence, 
see the introduction, p. 3. I"licolson regularly 
warned against the dangers of antisemitism see his 
column in The Spectator vol. 168 (16 January 1942); 
" vol. 163 (27 October 1939); vol. 170 (28 May 1943) 
yet he had to snake a special effort to be nice to a 
Jewish soldier after the Commons announcement on 
the destruction of Polish Jewry. See Nigel llicolson 
(ed. ), Herold 11i. c: ol: on: Diaries and Letters vol. 2 
1939-194`; T, ondouu, 1967), 268 diary entry of 20 
December 1942. For couuucnt orº ilicolson's attitudes 
to Jews see the introduction by Eigýe1 1H1i. colson ill loc. 
cit; vol. 1 1930-"3) (London, 1966), 2'i-5. 
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222. A Hass-Observation survey in October 1940 found 27; 1 
of the sample describing Jews in unfavourable terms, 
with a further 29`, ý showed "half and half attitudes". - 
11-0 A: FR 523B. This was also their finding in 
Silvertown with 31`, &', "definitely antisemitic" and a 
further 265 ambivalent - PR no. 78 - February 1940, 
and in Harch 1943 Nass-Observation found 12'0 of the 
sample strongly in disfavour of Jews, 181,,, slightly 
disfavourable and 28, 'ý mixed, making 54; IJ in total. 
223. H-0 A: DR 1534, Harch 1943. The critic James Agate 
showed similar restraint threatening to write that 
to I now agree that the hordes of well-fed, fat and 
oily young Jews to be seen in Piccadilly--every 
evening after seven o'clock are engaged in war-work 
of one kind or another. I agree that the vigorous 
young Yids blowing for hours on end into the 
Saxophones of dance bands are in the last stages of 
consumption. I agree that the decks of our battle- 
ships and merchant vessels are swarming with Jews ... 
in his published diaries Ego 6. However this threat 
delivered to Sidney Salomon was not carried out. 
Sec 1i of D. C6/9/1/3 FS letter of 30 November 1942 
for the whole version of Agate's private vindictive. 
Holmes, op. cit., 217-8 comments on the social 
restraints operating on public expression of anti- 
semitism. 
224.11-0 A: DR 1534, March 1943. This contrasts with her 
statement in October 1940 that "I have felt rather 
anti-semite (sic) for some time". - DR 1534, October 
1940. 
225. For example those listening to broadcasts from 
Germany were found to be more likely-to believe'that 
the Jews would benefit from the war - 215 compared 
to the 175L" who never listened to Hamburg radio. B13C 
written archives, Listener Research, 8 Iiarch 1940 
in 1: 9/13/5/1" Many contemporaries felt that Nazi 
propaganda was making Britain antisemitic -- see 
J. J. McCall in the Glasgow Daily Record, 28 Ma " 1943; 
Time and Tide vol. 22 no. 48 (29 Ilovember 1941 ; the 
Jewish Chronicle, 12 Jarur, ry 1940 iznd Harold Hicolson 
in The Spectator,, vol. 164 (2 February 1940). One 
Mass- cerver was certainly impressed by the broadcasts 
commenting in June 1945 "If they try Haw-Haw because 
of bis anti-Jewish and anti-vested interests they 
ought to try me and 1000's of others in this land" - 
H-0 A: D 5296,1 June 1945. A Jewish worker from the 
ltolls Royce factory in Millington told the NCCL that 
his fellow workers "repeated German wireless 
utterances without thinking". IýCCL 311/1,1943. 
226. David Walton, 'George Orwell and Antisemitism', 
Patterns of Prejudice vol. 16 no. 1 (January 1982), 24. 
227. ticrnnrd crick in his George Orwell.: A Life (London, 
1980), 307 is simplifying when he claims Orwell ýN 
review articles in the Observer, 30 January 1944 arid 
Tribune, 11 February 1944 'show hiin fully purged of 
the mild and conventional, but none the less clear, 
anti-semitism which appeared early in Down and Out 
in Paris and London and lingered in his ' Vlnr-Time 
iiinriec ". Walton, op. cit; 34 concludes that while 
Ch -well made a large effort to remove his own 
nrejlldivec "his efforts at self-: twzn erless Was not 
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altogether successful". T. R. Fyvel, op. cit., 140 
comments on an example of Orwell's late war anti- 
semitism and also suggests that Orwell "always 
liked retaining his thoughts in the identical 
words" - loc. cit; 182. 
228.11-0 A: FR 1648. For example from the March 1943 
directive, DR 2685 "1 must admit to slight anti- 
semitism of which I am ashamed. I don't know why, 
I look at horror at Nazi persecution ... yet ... I 
am rather apt to make rude jokes about Jews"; DR 3437 
"I find it difficult to like the Jews for which I am 
ashamed"; DR 3052 "I must admit that I have a certain 
repugnance to Jews as a whole" yet "it is-pure 
prejudice"; DR 2930 "1 cannot conceal from myself 
that I do not like Jews"; DR 2874 "It is astonishing 
to find that I am unfortunately antisemitic when I 
think of Jews in the mass" and DR 2905 "Collectively 
I dislike them (though) my intellect tells me this 
is absurd, my instinct can feel no other way". 
229. M-0 A: FR 1648 compares feeling between 1943 and 
1940. The report suggested that in 1943 replies 
"frequently show how irritated people are with their 
own feelings and prejudices on the subject". 
230. Henry 'Chips' Channon M. P. was greatly moved by 
Eden's declaration on the extermination of the Jews 
and the minute's silence that followed. He wrote 
in his diary "It was a fine moment and my back 
tingled". Later in the day the effect seems to have 
worn off, with Channon's main concern' at a cocktail 
party of whether he was being socially accepted, 
U. R. James (ed. ), Chips: The Diary of Sir Iienr 
Channon (London, 1967), 347 entry for 17 Decern er 1942. 
231. For T. S. Eliot see J. A. Morris, 'T. S. Eliot and 
Anti-Semitism', Journal of European Studies 11 (1972), 
172-82 and Bernard Bergonzi, T. S. Eliot New York, 
1972), 123-6. Bergonzi claims that , liot is "tactfully 
silent on the position of 'free-thinking Jews' " in 
The Idea of a Christian Societ (London, 1939) and 
in the Christian l! ews Letter, 3 September 1941 he 
attacked the Vichy government's endctment of 
antisemitic laws. It could also be suggested that 
Eliot was it restraining influence on antisemitism in 
the social credit, New English Weekly of which he 
was connected in the war. See the editorial attacking 
ontiserni. tisra in issue vol. 16 no. 18 (22 February 
1940). Lord Alfred Douglas's change of heart can be 
followed in his Autobiography (London, 1931), 302 
arid his statement in the war itself that he was 
prejudiced when lie wrote in Plain English in the 
1920's but v: r: s not now. In C. Newman, op. cit., 84. 
Ills biographer concludes "in his last years he regretted 
that he had ever soiled his hands with (antisemitism), 
lotithiiij; hi, tziicnº with it hearty and verbose hatred that 
comes out -iii 
his letters". - Rupert Croft-Cooke, 
ßosie: The ;; tore of Lord Alfred Douglas : His Friends 
,;: id i: rýc: rri e^ Lor: cion, 196-3), ? 93 Gertrude Nin1nc1farb , 'John I: uclicn: An Untimely Appreciation', Encounter 
367 
vol. XV no. 3, (September 1960), 46-53 concludes 
that Buchan had changed his views on Jews after the 
Nazis had come to power and that Sick Heart River, 
his-last book published in 1940 had no references 
to Jews despite its large number of financiers. 
Roy Campbell appears to have maintained his anti- 
semitism whilst actually fighting for the Allied 
cause. Campbell had earlier supported Pranco. 
See Peter Alexander, op. cit., and for his anti- 
semitism, The Collected Poems of Roy Campbell vol. 2 
(London, 197517,74-5; 67-70; 76-83. 
232. See A. N. VIllson, op. cit., 82 for a description of 
this antisemitic atmosphere in Oxford and M-0 A: 
F11 A12 for the later Cambridge comments. 
233. A. Calder, op. cit., 498. Norman Longmate also 
suggests that although the British people were 
"violently anti-Nazi" this did not necessarily imply 
an anti-antisemitism. See his If Britain Had Fallen 
(London, 1972), 201-2. 
234. See chapter 1, p. 180-1. 
235. Jonathan Cape's files on Reed, now deposited at the 
University of Reading Library, suggest that Cape 
stopped publishing Reed because his later books did 
not sell well. There-is no. evidence that Cape and 
Reed ever fell out. 
236. Cape themselves commented on "the incredible 
enthusiasm for Insanity Fair ... all tlix"ough the Crisis and the slump in the book market, it continued 
to be a best-seller, in England and abroad". - Now 
and Then no. 62 (Spring 1939). See also Michael 
Howard, Jonathan Cape, Publisher (London, 1971), 
170 and 189. 
237. R. Thurlow, 'Anti-Ilazi Antisemite', op. cit., 29 has 
commented that "in both Insanity Pair and Disgrace 
Abounding his chapters on the Jews seem totally out 
of con ext with the rest of the argument". I would 
disagree slightly with this for although the anti- 
semitism in these books was concentrated in these 
chapters - '11o Jews is Good Jews' and 'How Odd of 
God to chose the Jews' respectively, one can find 
consistent antisemitism elsewhere. Thus in Insanity 
Fair (London, 1938), 83 and 415 Reed accuses Jews 
of contI tilling Berlin and Vienna and on page 217 
there is an nntisemitic description of Brighton. 
In llis race Abounding (London, 1939), 200,263,278-9 
there arc attacks on Jewish power. 
238. See Guy Chapman's autobiography, A Kind of Survivor 
(London, 1975), 174-76 for an account of his mission 
to Prague to get Reed to rewrite. Reed, in Ghtrpman's 
words, "proved to be sensible and tumenable". Howard, 
op. cit., 172-3 for a less explicit account. 
239. Insanity Pair, 232-3 ! teed warmed that anti-gentilism 
crime before anti eeini tiom and that "while people in 
gl rind arc l: J,: ei, tir, g the fate of the Jews in Germany, 
they do not notice that the Jews in England are 
becoming more powerful than ever before" - lec. cit; 263. 
The obituary in The Times, 23 September 1.976 commented 
that "the pertinent and salutary things the author 
had to say were still more markedly beset by prejudice". 
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240. Reed in Lest We Regret (London, 1943), 85. Reed 
did not directly quote Social Credit ideas but he was 
in touch with some of the most obscure and extremist 
social credit journals. See his comments in the 
Social Crediter vol. 10 no. 3 (27 March 1943). For 
other social credit approval of Reed see the same 
journal vol. 5 no. 19 (18 January 1941); vol. 6 no. 8 
(3 May 1941); vol. 7 no. 2 (20 September 1941); 
vol. 8 no. 19 (18 July 1942); vol. 10 no. 1 (13 March 
1943); and Reality no. 282 (22 September 1944) and 
no. 295 (22 December 1944). 
241. See All Our Tomorrows (London, 1942), 336 and Lest 
We Regret, 261. This idea seems to have 'appealed to 
Roy Campbell as well. In his poem 'Jungle Eclogue 
(1945? ) Campbell states "Between the Jewish Fascism 
of Russia, and Gentile Bolshevism farmed on Prussia, 
I see no difference save in their salutes". Collected 
Poems vol. 2,83. 
242. In A Prophet At Home (London, 1941), 48 Reed talked 
of ITThe a. lienization of English life (having) reached 
its highest point in the picture-theatre, the theatre 
and the radio". In the seine book he hccused Jews of 
army dodging - loc. cit., 120 and cowardice - p. 321. 
In All Our Tomorrows similar attacks were made with 
an additional attack on vulgar Jewish evacuees (p. 39) 
and the Black Market (p. 148). Lest lie Regret was 
dedicated to a more conspiratorial antisemitism, see 
particularly pp. 239-279. 
243. At the start of the war, the Jewish Chronicle, 22 
September 1939 warned against "Douglas Reedism", 
that is anti-Ilazi antisemitism. See also the Jewish 
Chronicle, 7 August 1942 for Sidney- Salomon's 
comment that "Al]. Our Tomorrows was worrying all Jews". 
Reed was regarded as a "very dangerous personality" 
by the Board of Deputies, memo of 2 February 1945 
to P. Weiss in 13 of 1) C6/2/13p. Attempts were made 
to "flush him out" and link him to pro-IJazis in 
Britain, but these were unsuccessful. See letter of 
Sidney Salomon to Ivan Greenberg 5 
. 
December 1.944 in 
C15/3/33- 
244. It must be suggested that Reed underwent a personality 
crisis in the war. As he himself admitted in A Prophet 
At Home, 48 "1 felt myself so alien in England". his 
mind became totally conspiratorial - in 1939 he lind 
rejected the idea of a Jewish plot - see Disgrace 
Aboundin , 247 but by 1943 "I had perceived the master 
Moves e hind the fighting war". - in his autobio- 
gºr"v. nhical From Smoke to Smother (London, 1948), 110. 
His Times o : itu; iry corrmcnted that his war books, 
"exhi ritcd, unfortunately, a progressive unreason 
rind testiness". Francis Violas in his Insanity ... 
abounding: Reply to Pronliet not quite at home 
(London, 1942tt: cf: ed Reed's ideas, but ns Sidney 
Salomon r: ug'. grested, such a work would have limited 
effect because heed's nntiswaitic mind was not 
receptive to reason. 
245. Veronica Wedgwood who was the reader for Cape in the 
war, can recall little about Reed - letter to the 
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author, 21 November 1985. The Reed file in the 
Cape archive does not suggest that any censorship of 
Reed took place. However Barry Domvile in his 
diary, 18 February 1944 stated that'in the new 
edition of Lest We Regret the main antisemitic 
chapter, IT e Children of Israel' was to be 
omitted. - Domvile Diaries, 18 February 1944, 
DOM 56. However a 1946 edition of the work still 
contained the offending chapter. 
246. See How and Then, no. 71 (Spring 1942); no. 72 
(August 942 ; no. 73 (New Year 1943); and no. 75 
('linter 1943). In this last reference Now and Then, 
commented that Lest the Regret (which was extremely 
antisemitic) was an answer to his critics: "and a 
smashing answer it is. " 
247. Jewish Chronicle, 31 December 1943. 
248. See for example Tribune, 4 September 1942 on All Our 
Tomorrows; Time and Tide vol. 23 no. "29 (18 July 1942) 
for the same book; Nov, English sleekly vol. 17 no. 22 
(19 September 1940) for Nemesis. 
249. National Review no. 693 November 1940) praised 
Reed's "remarkable book Nemesis". In the New 
Statesman vol. 24 (15 August 1942) the reviewer 
claimed that despite its antisemitism "one can't 
help liking All Our Tomorrows". The Tablet no. 5211, 
23 March 1940 felt that Reed's Nemesis - the story 
of Otto Strasser was a good book and their shared 
attitude to Jews was that of Hilaire Bellocs - 
James Agate in the Daily Express praised A Prophet 
At Home because of Tits sincerity, its sense of 
reality and its urgency" - see the cover of All Our 
Tomorrows. 
250. tee in Lest Vle Re , ret, 308. 251. See E. ; 1renc1, Francis Yeats-Brown 1886-1944 (London, 
1948), 246-7 and 259 and The Patriot no. 948 (11 April, 
1940) no. 950 (25 April 1940); no. 1074 (10 September 
1942) and no. 1082 (5 November 1942). 
252. See the Kilburn Times, 3.2 Elay 1944,26 May 1944 and 
9 June 1944. In the last letter to this paper, the 
two clergymen advocated a policy of apartheid. Reed 
was also quoted by another priest, II. A. Wilson in 
Death over IIa erston (London, 1941), 63-4. 
253.11-0 A: DR 2804, March 1943. In the same directive 
DR 2485, praised Reed's All Our Tomorrows and advocated 
extermination as the solution to the Jewish problem. 
254.1.1-0 A: DR 3293. See also an account from a barrister 
in 1943 in IICCL 310/5. This casts some doubts on the 
comments in The Times obituary of Reed which stated 
that his reader "was inclined ... to shake his head 
over heed's virulent antisemitism". 
255. An editorial in Tribune, 9 February 1945 commented 
on the fact that Reed was now working for the Kem sley 
Press despite its former appeasement policy. It 
concluded that heed had allowed "success to run to 
his liver". Reed was associated with the NeVer 
Again Association, a breakaway group from the Vansittart 
movement. Its contributors included A. K. Chesterton 
and U. Sturdy-Smith, a leading antisemitic social 
crediter. Sec its publication Sovereignty (Bromley, 
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Kent, 1944), 5-11. Heed commented that he had 
settled on the NeVer Again'Association after looking 
round many fringe organisations. Heed and Chesterton 
were to cooperate after the war in London Tidings, 
published from 1946 which dealt in conppiratorial 
antisemitism. See the memo on Reed in B of D 
c6/9/3/l. 
256. As in a letter to The Author vol. LV no. 2 (Winter, 
1944), the Daily Telegraph, 7 September 1944 and 
Daily Mail, 30 August 1943 where Heed commented on 
the death of Boris of Bulgaria and the sinister 
secret power behind it - "the international forces 
which desire confusion in Europe". 
257. See his letters to Truth no. 3512 (1 December 1944) 
and no. 3563 (22 December 1944) where Reed referred 
to the "hidden hand", with Jewish fascists "urging 
war on us". lie wrote similarly to the Catholic 
herald, 15 December 1944 and 12 January 1945. 
258. In the Daily Dispatch, 6 February 1943. Bothwell 
claimed he was "not a fascist or Communist but a 
British working man doing his utmost to vein the war". 
In fact he was a pre-war B. U. F. leader in Stockport. 
259. L: -0 A: Fit 1648 found that the letter was widely 
discussed and that remarks that "there's a lot of 
truth in what he said" and "there's no doubt they have 
got too much power in England" were "frequently 
heard". Nevertheless a public meeting of 1200 at 
the lioldswortli Hall in Manchester was arranged by 
the 11CCL to protest against the letter. See Civil 
Liberty vol. 3 no. 9 (March 1943). The Manchester 
and Salford Council of Jews rejected this approach, 
preferring a futile meeting with the paper's editor. 
See their minute book, vol. 3,14 and 18 February 1943. 
260. The Daily Dispatch, 9 February 1943. The Jewish 
Chronicle, 19 February 1942 attacked this approach. 
261: See tie Sunday Pictorial, 13 October 1940; Catholic 
Herald, 5 January 1945; Kilburn Times, 16 June 1944; 
Southport Visitor, 2 March 1943; Hackney Gazette, 
3 March 1943 and The Spectator, vol. 169 (13 February 
1942). 
262. The Spectator, vol. 171 (24 December 1943). 
263. This campaign will be dealt with in chapter 7, p. 560. 
Only 1 out of 155 people interviewed by Mass-Observation 
in January 1944 wanted to 'ban' antisemitism - M-0 
A: PI' 1993. Truth was cat the forefront of the campaign 
Against the ban, see Brook's 'Anti-ser, aitism and 
Treachery' no. 3430 (5 June 1942). L. V. Akhurst 
asked why "Britons should be penalised by a special 
luw to be passed at the behest of Jewry in the 
Ilornsev Journal, 29 December 1944 and CI. If. Bush of 
the Bi r:, ii n a: +in C: t: -. ette sununarised the opinion of 
many, that Britons had the right to be antisemitic 
as much as anti-antisemi tic. In the NUJ conference 
in 1943. t: uoted by the Jewish Chronicle, 9 July 
1943. 
264.9. A. hose (cd. ), l;: vffy: The Diaries of Blanche 
Ihardale 1937-1947 London, 19779211--, -6 diary entry 
of 1 August 1944. 
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265. Another example of this in government circles was the appointment of Lord Winterton as head of the British delegation to the Evian conference in 1938 
and his continued importance in refugee matters in the 
war. Winterton had claimed in 1936 that racial or 
religious prejudice would always exist, and he was 
notorious for his antisemitic remarks. See G. 
Lebzelter, Political Antisemitism in England 1918 - 1939 (London, 1978)v 131 and A. J. Sherman, Island 
Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 
1933 - 39 London, 1973), 107,157,258. For examples 
of his untisemitism see the Daily Telegraph, 30 Nov- 
ember 1945; Jewish Chronicle, 27 December 1946 and 
Daily Worker, 24 October 1947. 
266. G. Himmelfarb, op. cit., 50. 
267. Thomas Nelson removed an antisemitic Mother Goose 
story in 1943 - see J. D. C. minutes, 20 August 1943 
in B of D C6/2/6. The poem had been in Loey Chisholm's 
Nursery Rhymes and Fables (London, 1940), 1-3 "Jack 
sold his gold egg to a rascally Jew, etc. ". In 1945 
Macleans Printing Works decided to remove some offen- 
sive passages about Jews in London from Michael 
Andizzone's Hear Not My Steps- - see B of D report 28 August 1945 in C672/13L. Such successes were rare - 
see the report of Elizabeth Allen in 19144 concerning 
the failure of the N. C. C. L's anti-antisemitic literary 
campaign. In N. C. C. L. 45/2. 
268. In 1944 E. M. Forster refused to see Gerald Hamilton 
because "he was violently anti-Semite" - letter to Christopher Isherwood, 28 February 1944 in Mary Lags 
and P. N. Furbank (eds. ), Selected Letters of E. M. 
Forster, vol. 2,1921 - 1970 (London, 19855,205-6. 
Forster added that "I am false to myself in not doing 
so. I ought to examine his depths for myself, since 
I got amusement of his shallowness in the continental 
days". It would thus seem that Forster, as well as 
people such as Orwell, had re-examined his earlier 
attitude to Jews. Alan Bold in his biography of Hugh 
MacDiarmid - The Terrible Crystal (London, 19831,32 
tells us that he fell out with F. G. Scott over his 
anti semi tism. However, MacDiarmid was also friendly 
with Pound, Eliot and Major Douglas. Belloc's anti- 
semitism may have annoyed some of his friends, but it 
never was a matter of disowning him totally, accerdir g 
to A. N. Ylilson, op. cit., 258. His friends either 
laughed or shouted him down. 
269. Robert Atkin played Shylock in a humane manner at The 
Westminster Theatre in 1942. The Spectator's Basil 
Wright objected to "this somewhat gentle Shylock" - 
vol. 169 (2 October 1942). A few months later Mr. 
Valk played Shylock as the villain of the piece at 
the New Theatre and The Spectator's James Redfern 
approved, : saying it was only right to be able to re- 
fer to bad Jews, despite "the wholesale persecution 
of Jews in our time" - vol. 170 (26 February 194, A). 
270. See Lucy Dawidowicz, 'Can Anti-Semitism Be Measured? ' 
Conm entary L (July 1970), 36-43. 
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271. It is still necessary to weigh the importance of 
'non-theoretical' antisernitism. G. G. Field's 'Anti- 
semitism with the Boots Off' lapses once or twice in 
this res ect, with the author talking of "vague ex- 
pression(s) of national and class fears" (pp. 32 and 
39), without evaluating how strong these were. 
272. We have seen that Mass-Observation reported "an al- 
most universal antisemitic feeling" in London - note 
3. Jews were meant to be rushing into the shelters, 
moaning about the war and getting more than their 
fair share of goods. Murial Box also believed that 
"it was prevalent at that critical period" - Odd Woman Out (London, 1974), 156. Sidney Salomon, 
writing to Israel Cohen in January 1944, stated that 
"when we declared war on Germany it was fondly imag- 
ined that antisemitism would cease, for was this not 
the weapon so largely used by Hitler", but this was 
soon dispelled with Jews being blamed for the black- 
out, profiteering and the war as a whole. Letter in 
B of D C6/2/13b. See also a Home Intelligence report quoted by 
E. W. liolderness to Sir N. Kendal in HO ly4%21429/39- 
45, September 1939. The Mass-Observation reporter 
in the East End commented on "a definite tendency to 
emphasise distinction" - M-OA: TC Air Raids Box 9 
File T. 
273. P. Addison, op. cit., 121 comments on the problems of 
defining morale, as does Ian McLaine, Ministry of Mor- 
ale - Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Informa- 
tion in World War II London, 1979 , 8-9. McLaine 
concludes that in the phoney war period "morale appears 
to have been lower when the impact of the conflict was 
relatively slight, than at any other time during the 
war". Loc. cit., 34. Orwell, as a contemporary, 
shared this analysis, commenting in Partisan Review, 
March - April 1941, that after four months of bombing 
"morale is far better than a year ago when the war 
was stagnant". 
274. See the introduction p. 4-7. Austin Stevens, op. cit., 
248 comments on this motive as regards Hore-Belisha. 
The need to avoid the charge of a . 
'Jews' War' also 
affected government policy to European Jews. This 
will be dealt with later; however, see M. N. Penkower, 
The Jews Vleree E ºendable: Free World Di lornac and 
the Holocaust (Chicago, 1983). 295 for a strong argu- 
ment for this case. 
275. Sir Normal Kendal of Scotland Yard wrote to A. 1laxwwell, 
26 September 1939, commenting that the B. U. F's anti- 
war anti senritisin had "done a lot of damage" - HO ltalt/ 
21429/39-45. In the same file, Maxwell wrote to 
Somervill, the public prosecutioner, warning that if 
Mosley's antiwar activities persisted he could be pro- 
secuted under Regulation 39B. When the Home Office 
Advisory Committee put forward its reasons for de- 
taining Mosley under 18B, Mosley's "bitter campaign 
against the Jews" was cited regularly - see HO 283/ 
1/1-14. 
276. Fascist street violence was at a low ebb and it was 
only the Jews' War line that particularly threatened 
the Jewish community. The Jewish Chronicle, sensitive 
to any hostile developments, could write on 3 November 
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1939 that there was "no perceptible growth of anti- 
semitism". 
277. Mass-Observation reported in late April 1940 that 
"there seems to be no very large increase in antisem- 
itism, (but) there has been a considerable increase of 
antagonism against recently arrived Jews and refugees 
in general" - in M-OA: FR 79. 'Feeling about Aliens', 
25 April 1940. Three weeks later Mass-Observation 
reported that after the news from Holland it was now 
"quite the done thing" to be openly antisemitic and 
anti-alien - M-OA: FR 107. Home Intelligence in late 
April reported that anti-alien feeling was growing 
and "that in Manchester and Liverpool particularly 
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